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ABSTRACT
The Morrill Act was the political telos of numerous 
rhetorical messages calling for pedagogical changes in 
higher education. This study examines the role of prudence 
in four of them. The method is a mode of textual criticism 
that attempts to capture the bifurcated sense of rhetorical 
invention: The immediate rhetorical situation, and the
cultural grammar that constrains the rhetor performatively. 
The author illustrates how the relevant rhetorical 
strategies/gestures within each text and the text's textual 
context pointed to a certain conception of prudence. 
Historically, the author argues that the struggles between 
different notions of prudence impacted political, 
pedagogical action. Theoretically, the author reflects on 
the nature of prudence in relation to the rhetorical canons, 
agent, purpose, and audience. The study contributes to a 
broader understanding of how prudence emerges in rhetorical 
action.
vi
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CHAPTER ONE
A RHETORICAL INQUIRY INTO 
THE CALL FOR PRACTICAL HIGHER EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION
During the nineteenth century, the lack of widespread 
"practical" higher education motivated many of those 
concerned with this issue to rise up and plea for industrial 
and agricultural pedagogy. In 1850, for instance, President 
Francis Wayland of Brown reported that American higher 
education failed to offer applicable courses of instruction 
that the populace needed and desired. In 1851 Jonathan 
Baldwin Turner, speaking to an agricultural convention in 
Granville, Illinois, argued for a college of agriculture and 
industry. In 1857 Justin Smith Morrill, a Vermont 
Representative, proposed a bill in Congress to donate public 
land to states and territories for the purpose of 
establishing agricultural and mechanical colleges. Speaking 
on behalf of the Agricultural College Bill, Morrill 
proclaimed, "There has been no measure for years which has 
received so much attention in the various parts of the 
country as the one now under consideration" (Congressional 
Globe, 1858, p. 1692). Morrill's bill passed through 
Congress in 1858, but President Buchanan vetoed it. After 
revisions, amendments, and a presidential election,
President Lincoln signed the bill into law on July 2, 1862.
There is no question that the consequences of this 
original Land Grant College Act, or "Morrill Act" as we 
often call it, were monumental. It apportioned to each
1
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state thirty thousand acres per senator and representative 
it had in Congress under the 1860 census. The law required 
states to sell the land and reap interest from the receipts 
for the purpose of endowing, supporting, and maintaining a 
college of agriculture, though not excluding scientific, 
classical, and military studies. Thus, it generated 
unprecedented diversity in the curriculum, brought higher 
education to the working classes, and placed classical 
academics and vocational instruction under the same roof. 
Perhaps most importantly, it also gave the general public a 
new lust for learning by democratizing higher education and 
making the practical learned.
The Morrill Act was the political telos of numerous 
rhetorical messages calling for pedagogical changes in 
higher education. By rhetoric, I mean the communicative art 
that seeks to induce an audience to feel, reason, and 
perceive in a certain way. Rhetoric, in the Aristotelian 
sense, is finding, in the contingent world, the 
opportunities for persuasion. More specifically, the 
persuasive efforts resulting in the Morrill Act, working 
alone and together, demonstrate the important role of 
prudence in the invention of public argument. Prudence is a 
difficult word to define. One function of this dissertation 
project is for me to come to terms with what prudence means 
and how it works. At this juncture, let me define prudence 
as practical and appropriate orchestration of persuasive 
possibilities, and practical, appropriate political conduct
2
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in light of situational limitations. While rhetoric is the
art of strategic inducement toward a certain way of feeling,
reasoning, and perceiving, prudence is an implicit— often
explicit— underlying manner of appropriate and practical
discursive practice and political conduct. We should
particularly note, too, that prudence relies on rhetorical
performance for its existence.
Performance is thus another important word I will use
throughout my dissertation. There are many different
perspectives on what performance means. For instance,
Pollock (1998) suggests that
performance is primarily something done rather than 
something seen. It is less the product of theatrical 
invention or the object of spectatorship than the 
process by which meanings, selves, and other effects 
are produced (p. 20).
Pollock turns to speech act theory to make the point. A
"performative" speech act "does" something. This kind of
speech act is "action in the form of representation" (p.
20). Take, for instance, the idea that the short phrases
such as "I do" and "I now pronounce you..." in a marriage
ceremony actually generate meaning; the words make the
marriage so. In brief, this is one way to look at
performance.
However, the above description of performance is one I 
do not aspire to. There are hints here and there that the 
scholars I depend on for understanding prudence mean 
performance in that "doing" way. Nevertheless, those 
scholars do not fully articulate what they themselves mean
3
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by performance. Thus, I cannot assume that they in fact 
adhere to the sophisticated slant on performance as depicted 
above. By performance I simply mean a stylized repetition 
of some tradition of rhetorical action through gesture, 
figures of speech, and the like.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, ARGUMENTS, AND STUDY RATIONALE 
My dissertation seeks to analyze specific rhetorical 
efforts that I suggest were vital to the eventual passing of 
the Morrill Act. I will examine one text that promoted the 
traditional, literary college, the Yale Report of 1828, but 
then focus on several texts that advanced the general 
notions of the Morrill Act. I will analyze a report by 
Francis Wayland, a speech by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, and 
two of Morrill's speeches in Congress on behalf of the 
measure. I seek to understand the role of prudence in each 
text.
I have many questions that I will address. We can 
group them into three general questions: 1) Primarily,
given the rhetors I examine, what sense of prudence did they 
each offer and how did they symbolically actualize or 
achieve that notion of prudence? Along the same lines, was 
such an idea of prudence linked to any communal tradition(s) 
of prudential thinking? 2) Considering the idea of textual 
context, what vision of the past, present, and future did 
each rhetor project, and what sense of prudence did that 
develop? 3) What was the effect of the implicit view of
4
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prudence within each text— did it help or hinder the 
rhetorician's persuasive efforts?
Historically, I argue that the changes occurring 
within nineteenth century American higher education were 
generally a struggle between diverging conceptions of 
prudence in rhetorical action. Specifically, I suggest that 
Morrill supplied a confused notion of prudence that helped 
frame the way his contemporaries received his "act, " and it 
touches us today in higher education as we struggle with 
curricular fragmentation and an unsteady mission. I also 
contend that prudence helps orchestrate rhetorical 
invention. A sense of prudence is, in part, a wrestling 
with strategic calculation and display. A sense of prudence 
also helps govern the tie between rhetorical form and 
persuasive content. What is more, a sense of prudence 
guides the aesthetics of politics. I also argue that 
prudence is both situational and cultural. Thus, to study 
prudence says something about the complicated relationship 
between a rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical 
situation, and between the persuasive text and its broader 
cultural context. Further, a discursive text might have two 
ideas of prudence in tension. Further, I argue that 
prudence changes as communal notions of ethos change, and 
that there is always a representation of prudence within 
rhetorical action. Finally, however, I also suggest that 
prudence is, echoing Wilson (1998), open to different 
interpretations.
5
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Additionally, I assume that the process of creating 
rhetorical discourse is a social process of grappling with 
and organizing a multiplicity of communal, rhetorical 
conventions alive only in rhetorical discourse. Certain 
communal, rhetorical traditions, like standards of 
prudential thought, depend on specific ideational patterns, 
argumentative arrangement, stylistic devices, word choices, 
and rhetorical organization. I suggest that a rhetor must 
always use some tradition of prudential thinking, even if 
the particularized sense of prudence is somewhat novel. It 
is impossible, I believe, to invent an entirely new way of 
prudential thinking. In persuasive texts, rhetors also 
encode their prudential outlook through certain implicit 
and/or explicit conceptualities, or visions, of temporal 
reality. Rhetoric about educational policy almost always 
depicts some temporal vision and depends on it. Finally, 
the sense of prudence alive in rhetorical discourse is a 
pivotal test of the rhetoric's successfulness. Successful 
rhetors are those who best help their audience(s) along to a 
certain way of prudential seeing.
My study is important for several reasons.
Historically, the study of prudence gives us an illustration 
of how different modes of prudence facilitated and or 
inhibited certain ways of thinking about nineteenth century 
pedagogical policies. This study gives us a rhetorical 
insight into the institutional structure of nineteenth 
century American colleges and universities, and their
6
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contemporary off-springs. Hariman (1997) thinks that the 
study of historic public address “can identify and resolve 
problems of historical interpretation that are themselves 
the result of depending on an insufficient understanding of 
the role of pubic talk in the political culture of the 
period" (p. 165). Interests and ideas of a political and 
pedagogical culture work within communicative practices and 
contexts.
Theoretically, and as I mentioned, this study helps us 
better grasp the role of prudence in rhetorical invention. 
Thus, it also forces us to grapple with important issues 
surrounding the persuasive process. We must look at the 
canons. We must look at the relationships between delivery 
and invention. We must struggle with the relationship 
between rhetorical form or organization and argumentative 
content. We must turn to the relationship between style and 
political action. Again, prudence is, at base, an 
underlying discernment of practical, appropriate rhetorical 
response or invention that helps shape appropriate judgment 
and action. Because prudence lives within rhetorical 
efforts, it is a valuable concept when attempting to better 
understand the project of rhetorical invention and the other 
basic rhetorical canons in a practical, variable world.
Additionally, the study of prudence helps us understand 
the complicated relationship between a rhetorical text and 
its immediate rhetorical situation, and between the 
persuasive text and its broader cultural context. Jasinski
7
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(1997), in an effort to recover the bifurcated mode of 
rhetorical contextualization described in 1925 by Wichelns, 
suggests that both an immediate exigency (Bitzer, 1968) of a 
rhetorical situation, and a broader, public, cultural sense 
of context influence a rhetor and his or her agency.
Jasinski (1997) says that "the text is positioned as an 
outgrowth of context; context does not simply surround or 
contain the text but permeates or saturates the text as the 
result of an organic process of emergence and development"
(p. 200) . The study of prudence helps develop this 
dialectic because it necessitates a struggle with both the 
immediate situation, and the broader, rhetorical traditions 
emerging out of the larger context. The study of prudence 
appreciates the instrumental approach to rhetorical 
invention, but also the deeper comprehension of the "birth" 
of a rhetorical text from a widened, cultural source.
Further, the study of prudence helps us better realize 
the nature of the rhetorical agent and rhetorical purpose in 
persuasive discourse. The ethos of a rhetor often helps 
convey an idea of prudence, and communal norms of self ness 
often sanction a rhetorical ethos. Further, in the 
traditional, neo-Aristotelian approach to rhetorical 
practice and interpretation, a rhetor comes to a situation, 
establishes an ethos and purpose, and invents the persuasive 
message. This is not the entire story, however. Jasinski 
(1997) thinks that the "individual authorial agency is 
decentered in the act of textual production as intentions
8
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are 'refracted.' through the spectrum of languages and voices 
that the author seeks to organize" (p. 215) . Thus, the 
study of prudence recounts how a persuasive author invents 
him or herself rhetorically, but also how an author might be 
prudentially purposive and strategic simply by imitating a 
broader, cultural grammar. My point is that communal norms 
of prudence might also help establish the rhetor's 
discursive purpose.
Finally, I think the study of prudence might illustrate 
the important role of the audience as powerful decoders of 
prudential, or not so prudential messages. We might say, in 
light of Hall's (1980) description of dominant, negotiated, 
and oppositional readings, that prudence is a site of 
interpretive struggle. Again, repeating Wilson (1998), 
prudence is a contested space of legitimacy rhetors try to 
fix or stabilize in their discourse.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Because of the nature of my study as a theoretical and 
historical exploration of rhetorical discourse, I think it 
is essential to establish a narrative tying together the 
important historical moments that helped impel my research 
texts to life. I also think it is indispensable to describe 
a historical account of the transformations in rhetorical 
theory and discourse during the nineteenth century. The 
changes emanating from and through the nineteenth century 
rhetorical/communication culture are themselves affected by 
persuasive efforts and rhetorical training.
9
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Historical Narrative
During the colonial period and early American
independence, American higher education was for the elite.
It was for boys from refined families. Education was
classical and literary. Students would learn things like
Greek and Latin. Also, though colonies and states normally
donated land for colleges, the federal government, once
established, had no federal policy of higher education:
Obviously, in a period in which the traditions of the 
state rights and the practices of frontier 
individualism were so determining, there was lacking 
sufficient sentiment of centralization and 
socialization to make possible federal initiative in 
educational policy involving the fixing of standards 
(Ross, 1942, p. 8).
Everything was up to individual states and institutions.
Some colleges and universities began providing
scientific courses during the late eighteenth century and
early nineteenth. For instance, Princeton started using a
chemical apparatus and telescope during the tenure of
President William Smith in 1815. However, it is important
to understand that the general public saw scientists as
charlatans. Scientists were too mysterious. Ross (1942)
states, "In the popular view, as reflected in fictional and
sensational news portrayals, there was much mystery, not to
say magic, connected with the scientist and his laboratory"
(p. 10) . The liberal or classic educators staved off any
major educational innovation, especially in scientific
application to agriculture; though there were some novel
teachings here and there.
10
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The teaching of the classical curriculum held strong 
during the early nineteenth century. Instead of promoting 
new practical and vocational courses based in scientific 
advancement, English model colleges required courses in 
"Evidences of Christianity" and "Moral Philosophy." While 
most colleges kept with their literary traditions and 
perpetuated the innate purity of the Christian soul, 
students rebelled. They rebelled not only because of the 
religious rigidity of most colleges, but the lack of 
curricular innovation and innovative teaching.
Progressive voices were gaining volume. Jefferson's 
experiment at the University of Virginia, which opened in 
1824, was a notable progressive move. Rudolph (1965) 
explains that "at the University of Virginia every student 
was a free agent" (p. 126). Yet, Butts (1939) says that the 
only choice a student really had was which school or schools 
to enter, and the order and time that student might take 
specific courses (pp. 95-96). Moreover, lack of funding 
halted Jefferson's plan of opening a school of agriculture. 
Even still, the Virginia experiment represented the most 
comprehensive democratic ideal of American higher education 
framed through the philosophical and political conceptions 
of freedom, individuality, and practicality (p. 96).
Other unique institutions opened as well. The founding 
of the Rensselaer Institute in Troy, New York, was a 
significant moment in the rise of technical and practical 
education. Also started in 1824, the purpose of the
11
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institute was to qualify teachers to teach the sons of
fanners and mechanics the application of experimental
chemistry, philosophy, and natural history to agriculture
and manufacturing. It helped the progressive educators move
forward. The idea of fitting a higher education to the
wants of the many was in the wind. Even Harvard toyed with
an elective system.
In 1828, the conservative old school reacted against
practical curricular reform in higher education when James
L. Kingsley, a Yale professor of classics, and Yale's
President, Jeremiah Day, gave Yale their famous Report on a
Course of Liberal Education, known today as the "Yale
Report." It was, as it is now, an important defense of
classical, literary education and the learning of ancient
languages. However, despite its conservative edge and
literary trench, Yale supplied instruction in scientific
application starting in 1847. Also in 1847, Harvard opened
its Lawrence Scientific School. The ball of science
practicality was rolling.
As the classical curriculum still ruled the colleges of
the nation, the industrial revolution and its momentum
increased, forever changing the national mind-set. Ross
(1942) thinks that the industrial revolution also had a
profound impact on higher education:
In its broadest scope and truest aim, this movement to 
apply the findings of the new sciences and the 
technique and organization of the new education to the 
changing business and social order marked the most 
socialized phase of the educational awakening (p. 15).
12
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Utilitarian, pragmatic voices invoked visions of individual 
wealth and advancement, especially in Francis Wayland.
Francis Wayland's 1850 report to Brown University's 
corporation is one of the most famous attempts to re-make 
higher education to fit with the dominating progressive 
American scene of commercial individualism. Though the 
"ordinary" farmer and mechanic still shrugged at the notion 
of science, it was clear that the old-line, classical 
curriculum was out-dated because, for one reason, 
enrollments were decreasing markedly. According to Wayland 
(1850), American colleges, like Brown, were somewhat empty 
because they did not offer courses the populace desired. 
However, the plight for the farmer and mechanic seemed to be 
the plight of the middle class educator, not the true 
farmer. Ross puts this idea succinctly when he says that 
"The typical farmer...was governed by established tradition 
which...reconciled him to a fatalistic acceptance of the 
inscrutable and unmodifiable manifestations of nature" (p. 
18). Farmers wanted farms, not degrees, and not necessarily 
scientific innovation. Even so, Wayland's report 
represented the changes in pedagogy that had occurred, and 
were continuing to occur, in the country's colleges and new 
German-styled universities.
The most influential regional drive for agricultural 
education came in Illinois. The Illinois movement, 
spearheaded by Jonathan Baldwin Turner, had more impact on 
the Morrill Act than any other state or regional movement.
13
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In 1851, Turner provided a plan for an industrial college 
that assumed a society split into two major factions, the 
working class and the professional class. For the working 
class, he longed for an institution that joined a modified 
technological education with the exhibitional nature of 
agricultural societies. In a way, this Illinois movement 
had British roots. Agricultural displays were very popular 
in medieval England, and animal breeding and food 
experimentation had occupied eighteenth century minds.
Also, the movement to improve agriculture, again, was not so 
much a yeoman farmer enterprise, but an upper class longing. 
Even still, Ross says that Turner earned a special place in 
the history of the land-grant movement because of his 
rhetorical display. As Ross (1942) states, Turner's appeal 
was, in part, "due to its vigorous restatement of the 
traditional national philosophy of popular opportunity and 
its rhetorical onslaught on the aim and content of an 
obsolescent classicism" (p. 38). Turner continued to speak 
to agricultural conventions and urged others to make the 
case for practical education.
Courses of instruction in technical practicality 
increased throughout the 1850's and new state colleges with 
agricultural leanings continued to emerge. The Farmer's High 
School [now Penn State] opened in 1854. The Michigan 
Agricultural College started in 1857. Progressive educators 
laid the cornerstone for the People's College of New York in
14
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1858. However, the People's College, like so many early
educational experiments, failed.
There were also several arguments for national
agricultural education. They usually followed along common
lines. They "combined appeals to precedent— land grants for
education, asylums, and public works, proposals for a board
of agriculture, and a national university--with the alleged
needs of the nation for industrial leadership" (Ross, 1942,
p. 39). These assertions, however, always provoked strong
opposition. Some argued that a national program for
agricultural and industrial education broke the limits of
the federal government's role. Others argued the process
was not expedient. At the 1857 convention for the United
States Agricultural Society, B. P. Moore "did not think any
gentleman acquainted with the practical workings of Congress
would believe for a moment that there was the slightest
chance of obtaining such an immense donation for such vague
purposes" (cited in Ross, p. 43-44). By the end of the
1850's, the movement was at a point of uncertainty.
Many private and state funds provided technical,
practical education, but there was still a lack of standards
in subject matter, methods of teaching, and resources. Any
drive forward would have to come from a centralized, federal
level. Ross (1942) explains that
Educational exigency had to wait upon political 
expedience, but by the late fifties, in spite of all 
past constitutional and social traditions and 
prejudices and present sectional division involving 
them, sufficient sentiment had been created to make
15
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federal aid to industrial education an 'available' 
issue, provided it was strategically presented(p. 45).
Turner left the job to a New Englander, Justin Smith
Morrill.
Morrill, like Turner, did not care for the domination 
of classical education. From Vermont, Morrill was a self- 
taught intellectual and retired businessman with close ties 
to the working class. He introduced a resolution on the 
matter first in 1856, but it was tabled and lost. He 
introduced a bill in late 1857. In the bill he coordinated 
the leading technical pedagogical plans of the day. In the 
simplest terms, he desired to promote practical education in 
service of industrial classes. The bill, however, proposed 
to do many things. It charted out a popular way to dispose 
of plentiful public lands. It promised soil rejuvenation.
It articulated a way to refine the "ordinary" people. It 
recognized the need to help states less blessed with fertile 
land. It illustrated that America could better compete with 
the agriculturists of Europe. Morrill, a Republican, also 
hoped that the passing of the act would help along his 
party's platform in the eye of the yeoman agrarian.
The arguments against the measure were boisterous. A 
Virginia Representative howled that the measure was "an 
unconstitutional robbing of the Treasury for the purpose of 
bribing the States" (cited in Rudolph, 1962, p. 250).
Others did not see the need for empowering the industrial 
classes of the North or the white Southern farmer through 
education; elitism was still in the air. Moreover, there
16
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still existed hostility toward higher education. As 
mentioned, the bill, with some amendments, passed through 
Congress, but President Buchanan vetoed it. Morrill and his
allies in Congress made specific changes for war-time
considerations and re-submitted the measure in the Senate.
It passed in 1862 and Lincoln signed it into law.
The journals and newspapers of the time did not receive
the measure as major news. Eventually, Northern states 
generated varying forms of Land Grant colleges. After the 
war, the Southern states were soon to follow. Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, Maryland, and Iowa converted existing agricultural 
institutions into land grant "A & M's." Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, Kentucky, Delaware, Indiana and New York gained 
control of private institutions and made them the Land Grant 
universities. Minnesota, Georgia, Missouri, Wisconsin, and 
North Carolina changed existing public colleges into state 
Land Grants. Places like Arkansas, Texas, and Kansas formed 
brand new institutions.
Louisiana, too, embraced the national legislation.
Ross (1942) says that "in Louisiana, where educational 
status had always been curiously confused and unsettled, 
popular sentiment favored the union of the land grant 
foundation with the old military seminary to provide a real 
state university" (p. 82).
Subsequent land granting legislation increased federal 
aid. The second Morrill Act, in 1890, stipulated that 
federal aid be used with an eye to racial equality. This
17
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measure helped form several of the traditionally African 
American institutions.
The Land Grant institutions did not have immediate 
success. Regardless, the institutions evolved and became 
the mainstays of American higher education. Today every 
state has at least one Land Grant university. The policy 
remains one of the most profound legislative acts to affect 
American higher education.
The above narrative is only partial because a detailed 
examination of the history of practical or vocational 
education is not the project of this dissertation. Thus, we 
can see practical, vocational, and scientific pedagogy 
appearing here and there and scattered throughout early 
American history. What is essential to note, however, is, 
again, that the call for practical education came from 
voices of power, not true, uneducated, raw farmers. The 
great agrarian revolts did not occur until the late 
nineteenth century.
Nineteenth Century Rhetoric
Interwoven within the above historical narrative is a 
dynamic history of rhetorical theory and practice. Thus, my 
narrative account sets the stage for my analysis, but I must 
also unveil the transformations of rhetorical theory and 
discursive practice during the nineteenth century because my 
texts for analysis encompass those changes.
Cmiel (1990) focuses on style and analyzes nineteenth 
century voices rarely touched by scholarly lenses.
18
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Moreover, his project on style gives us a broad perspective 
of the changing fabric of nineteenth century rhetorical 
culture. In his book about the struggle over popular speech 
in nineteenth century America, Cmiel is particularly 
interested in the tie between language and the self, social 
authority, and an assumed audience.
According to Cmiel (1990), through a literary 
education, early colleges indoctrinated young gentlemen into 
a so-called refined style of speech and life. Eloquent 
language was a smaller part of an overarching "cultured" 
sense of self. The use of elaborated codes placed this high 
culture style above vernaculars. Yet, educated elites could 
not always convey their messages to the masses. Thus, 
according to Cmiel, as the nineteenth century was dawning, a 
dilemma that expanded throughout the nineteenth century and 
onward emerged: America's elites wanted a refined,
educated, and civilized public, but also their own unique 
political and communicative power. They desired democratic 
republicanism, but wanted to keep their perch. What 
emerged, Cmiel asserts, was a "middling" style, as Cmiel 
calls it, that used both refined and vulgar speech.
Cmiel says that the middling style mixed the literary- 
eloquent with the uneducated raw, or the high culture with 
low culture. Often, to sway the public, literary educated 
rhetoricians had to escape the chains of refined speech. 
Henry Ward Beecher, for instance, used a middling style. 
Daniel Webster and Lincoln used this hybrid style. The
19
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distinctive features that characterized the middling style 
included intrusive informality, calculated bluntness, jargon 
and euphemism. Cmiel (1990) states, "The arrival of 
middling styles led to a war over the soul of American life"
(p. 66). The struggle over what type of language style to
use translated to a struggle over a sense of selfness and 
citizenry.
We could also call Ralph Waldo Emerson's rhetoric an
example of what Cmiel calls middling rhetoric. Antczak
(1985) considers Emerson a democratic educator. However, to
educate the democratic masses, Emerson had to talk in a
plain tongue. Emerson said that the
Masses are rude, lame, unmade, pernicious in their 
demands, and need not to be flattered, but schooled.
I wish not to concede anything to them, but to tame, 
drill, divide, and break them up and draw individuals 
out of them (cited in Antczak, p. 92) .
His middling style invited the masses to identify with his
democratic, rhetorical persona. Thus, Emerson also invited
his audiences to imitate sort of anti-institutional,
democratic character through his middling style.
Cmiel (1990) also states that "from the 1820s and 1830s
through the end of the century, there was continual sniping
between those favoring a more refined decorum and those
committed to the new idioms" (p. 66) . Though the "war over
the soul of American life" persisted, the use of the
middling style was the norm in this era, and used in
journals and newspapers. At the same time, asserts Cmiel,
mid-nineteenth century romanticism offered a Saxon
20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
eloquence, or a humble style. Both the common touch and the 
unadorned style were in vogue. Nevertheless, in the years 
after the Civil War, conservative, literary types desired to 
revive the old, neo-classical style. These conservatives 
wanted to re-draw the lines between the few and the many.
As the century progressed, linguistic differences 
between critics and scholars ignited furious feuds. While 
the critics wanted to return to the old style, the scholars 
began focusing on grammar, expertise, and science. 
Academically trained scholars wanted to assert themselves, 
but through a scientific mode of thinking and talking, not a 
literary one. This struggle continued as rhetoricians and 
philologists butted heads in the late nineteenth century.
The rhetoricians explained that one needed some flare for 
effective rhetorical display, while the philologists thought 
style was mere fashion. The philologists wanted an 
empirical understanding of the way language worked.
The tension between the high style and popular style 
remained, but in the mean time, the academic, technical 
expertise style invaded dictionaries and bibles. Language 
was both jargon filled and informal. In the late nineteenth 
century into the early twentieth, colloquial informality 
became even more accepted while the language of the expert 
flourished. According to Cmiel (1990), as the century 
closed the refined person was now an expert. Technical talk 
replaced aesthetics.
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In an effort to supply the "big picture, " Cmiel (1990) 
argues that, first, cultures actively encourage one style 
over another at given times. Second, late twentieth century 
public discourse has its roots in the effort to accommodate 
a more educated, assertive populace, but at the same time 
create authority for the educated. Third, after the rise of 
mass democracy, the debates over the "raw" and "refined" 
resulted in no wrong style, and by the turn of the twentieth 
century, technical, plain, and colloquial styles were all 
alternatives to traditional rhetorical theory and practice. 
Fourth, middling rhetoric was and is polysemic. Those best 
able to capture populace expectation in their rhetorical 
efforts often won political authority. Thus, it should also 
be noted that Cmiel's insight echoes Cicero and Quintilian. 
The grand style, middle style, and plain style were still 
resources for the nineteenth century rhetorician.
Cmiel's project is important to my work not only 
because it offers a compelling description of the changes 
occurring within the rhetorical culture of the nineteenth 
century, but also because prudence is, in part, a mode of 
style. The type of style a rhetor uses often points to the 
implicit idea of prudence the rhetor is advocating. This 
prudence, moreover, also entails a sense of selfness and of 
audience expectation.
For instance, I will suggest that the Yale Report of 
1828 is an example of a refined style. While this style was 
suitable for an academic audience in the early nineteenth
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century, it had little stylistic appeal for the mass
populace. Wayland used more of a middling style that
allowed him to speak to the populace. Turner used, for the
most part, a middling style and a humble style that aided
his efforts with his rural audience. Morrill, too,
illustrated the use of a middling, but one fitted for his
Congressional situation. In short, then, a prudential
outlook encompasses a certain style of discursive practice.
Clark and Halloran (1993) bolster Cmiel's view of how
rhetoric developed through the nineteenth century. In their
analysis of the oratorical culture in nineteenth century
America, they argue,
Both the theory of rhetoric taught in the schools and 
the practice of public discourse sustained outside them 
were transformed. .. from those of the neoclassical 
oratorical culture into those of the professional 
culture we see characterizing both colleges and 
communities by its [19th Century] end (pp. 5-6).
During the first few decades of the nineteenth century,
the mainstay of the neo-classical rhetorical culture helped
create a communitarian ethos. Echoing the perspectives of
Cicero and Quintillion, early nineteenth century classicists
called for public moral consensus through rhetoric. John
Witherspoon's "complete orator was not motivated by the
ideal of striving for individual advancement that would
become central to middle-class culture in the nineteenth
century" (p. 7) . Thus, the first change of rhetorical
theory and practice during the nineteenth century was from
the orator having a central cultural role of expressing and
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building moral consensus to the orator building up his or
her own identity.
America's unique possession of land helped transfer
moral authority from the neo-classical "polis" to the
individual. Individualism became concrete in the form of
private property which warranted individual claims of
natural rights and political independence. This liberal
individualism invaded rhetorical theory and practice. For
instance, the rhetoric of Ralph Waldo Emerson, again, moved
religion from communitarian institutionalism to private,
individual processes. The public arena became a place to
promote one's own personality. With Andrew Jackson's 1828
ascension to the presidency, the "common man" individual was
winning the day. As Clark and Halloran (1993) put it,
More than any preceding president, Jackson was innocent 
of a classical education, and his victory over the one­
time Harvard chair-holder [John Quincy] Adams can be 
taken as a figure of the declining importance of 
oratorical public discourse and of the collectivist 
assumptions about moral authority on which it was 
based(p. 13).
When distinct academic disciplines and departments 
emerged in the college setting, the expert became the valued 
individual. The expert was the hero. Clark and Halloran 
(1993) state, "Expertise, whether specifically scientific or 
not, came to be understood in the new professional sense as 
a privately held commodity and was for many in the new 
[middle] class the means of advancement" (p. 20) . With the 
expert professional came a neglect of classical rhetorical 
invention and an investment in oneself as an economic
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commodity. The professional ethos, argue Clark and 
Halloran, called for a morally neutral discourse. The 
public forum was a place where persuasion became a "dubious 
function of exciting the passions" (p. 32) . Moreover, 
professional culture, assert Clark and Halloran, constrained 
public debate. It structured fragmented sub-publics. Thus, 
at the close of the nineteenth century, "the dominant 
aspects of American culture in general and the theory and 
practice of its public discourse in particular had been 
transformed by the emergence of the practical and seemingly 
apolitical ideals of professionalism" (p. 25).
While Clark and Halloran's work does not explicitly 
discuss prudence, nor focus on educational discourse, it is 
important to my study because norms of prudence emerge out 
of a rhetorical culture. I will illustrate, for instance, 
that the authors of the Yale Report tied their idea of 
prudence with a neo-classical, communitarianism, but 
Wayland's prudence emerged out of individual longings.
Thus, my study of prudence helps illustrate the changing 
tide of rhetorical culture in the nineteenth century from 
the vantage point of educational policy discourse.
Clark and Halloran's edited work is also important to 
my study because of one specific essay within it. Clark 
examines the oratorical poetic of Timothy Dwight,
Yale's president during the late eighteenth century. Clark 
(1993) suggests that Dwight used the language of poetic 
sentiment, but his rhetoric was also "traditionally
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oratorical in its commitment to engage those it addresses in
the project of shaping and sustaining a common moral and
political culture" (p. 58). I will argue that the authors
of the Yale report extended Dwight's rhetorical mission.
Considering the rhetorical theory promoted in the
college and university classrooms of the nineteenth century,
Johnson (1991) suggests that the rhetorical educators
located rhetorical theory and pedagogy not only in the
classical conceptions of the art, but also eighteenth-
century discourse theory. More specifically, three things
influenced nineteenth century rhetorical education:
classical foundations, like Aristotle and his canons,
belletristic interests in rhetorical beauty, and
epistemological approaches linking science with rhetorical
theory. Thus, the most immediate characteristic of
nineteenth century rhetorical education was that it was
synthetic. This synthesis was a "New Rhetoric," as Johnson
calls it. Throughout the century, then, rhetorical
educators worked off this "New Rhetoric" and mixed
...a philosophical approach to rhetoric that examined 
the nature and aims of rhetoric in terms of the 
processes of the "mental faculties"; the view that the 
study of rhetoric applies to all major forms of 
communication, oral and written; and aesthetic/ethical 
commitment to the critical study of rhetorical theory 
and the development of taste; and a neoclassical 
approach to rhetoric as the art of adapting discourse 
to purpose, audience, and occasion (pp. 19-20).
While early nineteenth century rhetorical educators
most often focused on public speaking as the most crucial
practice of rhetoric, educators expanded the discipline to
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prose composition and critical analysis. The study and 
practice of rhetoric also broadened toward the pedagogical 
ideal of the eighteenth century belletristic tradition of 
eloquence and nonverbal display. Even though many have 
argued that this move illustrated a decline in the status of 
rhetoric, Johnson thinks that the liberal arts curriculum 
during the century supported the pedagogical, philosophical, 
and theoretical interests of rhetoric as a discipline. Her 
point is that rhetorical education served an important 
cultural function. Johnson states, "Rhetorical education 
played a crucial role in bolstering the idealism of 
nineteenth century liberal education, an enterprise that was 
committed to the development of an intellectually 
progressive and cultural enlightened society" (p. 16) .
Johnson's work is important to mine because many of the 
rhetors I examine were classically trained rhetors. The 
authors of the Yale Report, for instance, both took courses 
in rhetoric from Timothy Dwight. Wayland learned the 
classics at Union College. Turner went to school at Yale, 
but wanted to shed himself of the classical persona to 
promote practical curricular change. Thus, it should also 
be interesting to see how the academic appreciation for 
rhetorical education worked out in a more functional 
setting. Further, Morrill did not have higher education at 
all. Thus, it will be informative to see how his rhetoric 
matched up with the synthesized pedagogical processes 
Johnson attests were part of the rhetorical fabric of
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nineteenth century culture. In short, there is often a link 
between prudence and the type of education one has had.
The above studies illustrate the struggles and 
transformations that characterized the rhetorical culture of 
the nineteenth century. This rhetorical culture was an 
offshoot of the oratorical tradition of instruction and 
reflected public, political, and institutional needs. In 
short, we can see that in the nineteenth century the new 
professional style and ethos eclipsed the Ciceronian. Cmiel
(1990) states, "The nineteenth-century debate over language 
was a fight over what kind of personality was needed to 
sustain a healthy democracy" (p. 14) . He goes on to say 
that "the boisterous rhetoric of the nineteenth 
century... reflected the increased assertiveness of the 
popular audience" (p. 16) .
PREVIEW
As I mentioned, in my dissertation I will investigate 
several texts that strongly influenced the educational scene 
during the road to the Morrill Act. The second chapter 
contains a literature review that focuses on my theoretical 
grounding, and I will also articulate my methodological 
perspective. In Chapter Three I will analyze the text that 
best represents the rhetoric against practical education.
This text, the 1828 Yale Report, was a source of great pride 
and power for the "classical" camp. Crane (1963) states, 
"...Yale faculty issued an uncompromising defense of the 
prescribed curriculum and the residential college, which
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remained the chief reliance of educational conservatives 
until after the Civil War" (p. 83) . In Chapter Four I will 
analyze one of Francis Wayland's major rhetorical works, his 
Report to the Corporation of Brown University (1850) . In 
Chapter Five I will investigate Jonathan Baldwin Turner's 
Plan for an Industrial University, for the State of Illinois 
(1851). Writing of Turner's rhetoric, Crane (1963) says the 
piece was "written in homespun style, an assault on the 
learned professions... coupled with proposals for 
institutional development that forecast the vocational 
emphasis of many twentieth century universities" (p. 172) .
I will center on Morrill's congressional speeches in Chapter 
Six. In the closing chapter I will discuss my results and 
the implications of my study.
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AMD METHOD
INTRODUCTION
Many present day scholars return to historical oratory 
to better understand the nature of rhetoric and its impact 
on historical change and institutional structures. To 
locate the link between prudence and historical discourse is 
a current trend in contemporary humanist literature and aids 
that project. Prudence is an ancient concept. Aristotle 
and Cicero discussed it. Many contemporary works on the 
concept have taken a historical approach. For instance, 
Pocock (1975), Kahn (1985), and Garver (1987) each 
historicize prudence in their own way. Hariman (1991) 
focuses on the link between prudence and performance to 
insist that rhetors practice prudence in and through 
rhetoric. Many rhetorical critics locate the concept as a 
take-off point for their analyses. Most recently, Wilson 
(1998) uses the idea of prudence to examine the 
Congressional debate over civil rights in the late 
nineteenth century Reconstruction period. It is my hope to 
continue the conversation about prudence and its 
relationship to rhetorical discourse. In this chapter I 
begin with my literature review. I touch on the theoretical 
link between prudence and rhetoric, and on recent examples 
of rhetorical criticism employing the concept of prudence. 
After my literature review, I will offer an explanation of 
my methodology.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Phronesis
If prudence has a theoretical heritage, it begins in 
the classic notion of phronesis. While some scholars, like 
Ross (1980), translate "phronesis" as practical wisdom, 
others, like Welldon (1987), translate it to prudence. 
Hariman (1991) supports this translation, as do the other 
scholars I depend on in my literature review. Thus, I use 
Welldon's translation for my review of Aristotle's 
theoretical sense of prudence, though we should note that 
prudence and practical wisdom are primarily, at least 
theoretically, the same thing.
Aristotle spent a good portion of Book Six in his 
Nicomachean Ethics pointing out his take on the theoretical 
meaning of prudence. For Aristotle, prudence was one of 
many ways to arrive at truth. The others were art, science, 
wisdom, and intuitive reason. In a moment of immense 
clarity, Aristotle said that "We may ascertain the nature of 
prudence by considering who are the people whom we call 
prudent" (p. 191) . To Aristotle, prudence was the ability 
to deliberate effectively and expediently on one's own 
behalf. Another way of putting it is that if one 
deliberated successfully in light of situational 
constraints, then that person was automatically prudent.
To further account for the theoretical idea of 
prudence, Aristotle compared it to other ideas from his
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theoretical corpus. Prudence was not an art, neither was it 
a science:
— not a science, because the sphere of action is 
variable and not an art, because all art is productive 
and action is generally different from production. It 
remains therefore that prudence should be a true 
rational and practical state of mind in the field of 
human good and evil; for while the end of production is 
different from the production itself, it is not so with 
action, as right action is itself an end (Aristotle,
192, Welldon's emphasis).
What is most significant in the quote is that prudence was
an end in itself. Also, prudence was a type of virtue or
excellence. It was part of the rational soul; the part
dealing with the variable. Thus, it was a practical virtue.
Additionally, prudence was like political wisdom, but
not exactly. One could have political wisdom, but not
necessarily embody practical wisdom. In Welldon's (1987)
translation, Aristotle said that "A person who understands
and studies his own interests is generally looked upon as
prudent, while politicians are looked upon as busybodies"
(p.198) . Prudence was also different from intelligence
because intelligence made distinctions between things, while
prudence issued commands through effective deliberation.
General wisdom, too, was a bit different from prudence
because prudence regarded happiness. Prudence was also
different from cleverness, but could not exist without it.
Aristotle thought that people often applied the term
prudence to the same people considered as having good
judgment, intelligence, intuitive reason, cleverness, and
all the other modes of coming to truth. Thus, there was an
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assumption that prudence could encompass these other 
notions, though it was still different.
Most importantly, prudence assumed a morality and a 
wisdom. Aristotle said that "It is clear from what has been 
said that goodness in the proper sense is impossible without 
prudence, and prudence without moral virtue" (p. 210) . 
Prudence gave birth to wisdom. Aristotle revealed that 
"prudence is not the mistress of wisdom or of the better 
part of the soul.. .For prudence does not employ wisdom, but 
aims at producing it; nor does it rule wisdom, but rules in 
wisdom's interest" (p. 211, Welldon's emphasis). Even 
still, Aristotle thought wisdom was superior to prudence. 
Aristotle stated, "It would seem paradoxical that prudence, 
although inferior to wisdom should enjoy a higher authority" 
(p. 206) . Its higher authority sprang from the fact that 
humans lived in a contingent political world.
Aristotle's notion of prudence is important to my study 
primarily because he suggested that prudence is practical, 
occurs in deliberation, assumes moral virtue, wisdom, and 
encompasses other concepts such as political virtue. Kalin 
(1985) thinks that Aristotle devised his dialectic syllogism 
based on common opinion and consensus and that the 
syllogism's authority sprang from a practical epistemology 
guided by a sense of prudence. This is to say that the 
syllogism found authority in the decemment of a truth in a 
contingent sphere in which "what all believe to be true is 
actually true" (p. 32) . Theoretically, then, even though
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
prudence was practical and situational, it was also
communal. It was a social construct.
Cicero also examined prudence. The standard of
judgment that empowered Cicero's orator was goodness.
Moreover, one of Cicero's central rhetorical concepts was
decorum. Generally, decorum, from a rhetorical perspective,
means adhering to discursive obligations. Goodness, or
morality, and decorum could not conflict, according to
Cicero (Kahn, 1985). In the Orator, Cicero wrote that an
"orator must have an eye to propriety [decorum] , not only in
thought but in language...The universal rule, in oratory as
in life, is to consider propriety" (cited in Kahn, p. 34).
Kahn argues that Cicero thought that political decorum and
prudence were one in the same.
Articulating Cicero's view, Kahn (1985) states, "And
while he first opposes prudence to theoretical wisdom as
Aristotle does, he goes beyond Aristotle when he argues for
the superiority of prudence on the grounds that it is
concerned with action rather than contemplation" (p. 35) .
From this perspective, prudence shaped moral or ethical
choice in the realm of the contingent. In a human society,
prudence was more powerful than contemplation. Cicero
stated in De officiis,
And then, the foremost cf all virtues is wisdom--what 
the Greeks call sophia; for by prudence, which they 
call phronesis, we understand something else, namely, 
the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and 
of things to be avoided. . .And service [a function of 
prudence] is better than mere theoretical knowledge, 
for the study and knowledge of the universe would 
somehow be lame and defective, were no practical
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results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best 
seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is 
essential, then, to human society: and it should, 
therefore, be ranked above theoretical knowledge (cited 
in Kahn, p. 35).
Therefore, Cicero insisted that the prudent person and the
ideal, persuasive orator were synonymous.
Cicero's view of prudence is important to my study
because, even while Aristotle discussed it, Cicero made more
concrete the idea that prudence was the epitome of a good
person speaking persuasively in the realm of the contingent.
The prudent person performed well in life, but his or her
sense of decorum led to appropriate modes of persuasiveness
in rhetorical and political arenas. The link between
political virtue and prudence is significant because
contemporary scholars appreciate the idea that prudence is
both a mode of discursive practice and political conduct.
This is a key point to remember.
Pocock (1975) studies what he thinks are enduring
traditions of prudential thought. Pocock's work is
important to my study not only because he flushes out
prudential conventions, but also because Jasinski (1995)
uses Pocock's assertions to argue that in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an "immanent conceptual
struggle" existed between two norms of prudence, prudential
audacity and prudential accommodation. To Pocock, the
Renaissance handed down these two norms of prudence.
Francesco Guicciardini, in his Dialogo del Reggimento di
Firenze, insisted that a governor be prudent; and to
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Guicciardini that meant waiting on an event and adapting to 
it. However, according to Pocock, Machiavelli thought that 
the prince should be assertive. Pocock suggests that this 
pluralistic, yet stable view of prudence became a resource 
for rhetorical invention during future controversies.
In her own study of the history of phronesis, or 
prudence, Kahn (1985) links up rhetoric, prudence, and 
skepticism in the Renaissance. Throughout the work she 
focuses on the rhetorical theories of Renaissance humanists, 
Quatrrocento thinkers, Erasmus, Montaigne, and Hobbes, among 
others. Though I have depended greatly on her historical 
review, a detailed description of her work and specific 
arguments are not relevant to my study. What is relevant is 
that she illustrates how close textual study of historical 
texts gives rise to divergent conceptualizations of 
prudence. She thinks that prudence is much like rhetoric in 
that its ambivalent moral status is variable. One can 
condemn rhetoric as immoral, like Plato. One can 
subordinate rhetoric to moral judgment and thus justify 
rhetoric as the moral use of rhetoric, like Cicero and 
Quintilian. One can also argue that rhetoric has no 
constraints. Rhetors can use their persuasive art for good 
or evil. Prudence is similar. One can identify it with 
theoretical wisdom if one believes absolute Platonic ideals 
govern prudence. One can identify it as an understanding of 
good and evil— "what to seek and what to avoid" (p. 42).
One can identify prudence with the faculty of practical
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reason governed in every case by decorum--"of the best means 
to achieve the end at hand" (p. 42) . Thus, her work 
chronicles the variability of prudence throughout the 
Renaissance.
Garver (1987) calls prudence a "perennial problem" (p. 
6) . He thinks that the problem with prudence is "the 
problem of practical reason" (p. 7). More specifically, 
Garver thinks that prudence "is the meaning of autonomy, 
integrity, and character in a faculty whose primary strength 
is responsiveness to circumstances.. (p. 7). In the 
simplest terms, Garvar posits a pivotal question for the 
prudent rhetor: "How can an orator base his [or her]
presentation on what his [or her] audience already believes, 
yet persuade them to do what he [or she] wants, not what 
they already want?" (p. 7, his emphasis). Thus, his 
theoretical view of prudence is familiar to us.
What is more important is that Garvar, like Kahn, 
historizes prudence. He says that there are different 
histories of prudence. Some can review pardigmatic prudent 
acts. Garver does not do this. Instead, Garver's history 
is a history of texts. He explores the changing role of 
ethics and politics when he compares and contrasts 
Aristotle's work with Machiavelli's. Garver (1987) insists 
that "the sort of imitation required in the acquisition of 
prudence, and the sort of uses of history available in the 
practice of prudence, are fundamental dimensions in 
prudence’s career..." (p. 164-165). Prudence has an
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external history because its heroes change. These external
and contingent factors, says Garver, gives rise to an
internal history of practical reasoning; the tactics and
resources also change. Most significantly, Garver says that
The permanently defeasible and essentially contested 
nature of any history of prudence, and the way that 
history of prudence must be a history of the embodiment 
of practical intelligence in specific roles and 
characters, appear most critically in the way shifts in 
practical autonomy are connected to the changing 
relations between ethics and politics (p. 166) .
I suggest that the changing nature of prudence occurs not
just in a huge sweep of time, but is always contingent in
line with differing perspectives of ethics and politics.
Hariman (1991) offers the most compelling contemporary
theoretical explanation of prudence and its relationship to
rhetorical discourse. He says that
Phronesis, or prudence, designates the capacity for 
effective political response to contingent events. It 
arises in deliberation, requires implicit understanding 
of the possible, the probable, and the appropriate 
within a specific community, and is not reducible to 
categorical imperatives, deontologies, or universal 
laws (p. 26).
Moreover, Hariman insists that "when we say that someone is 
prudent, we often are accounting for how well he or she has 
mastered the nuances of a particular art [rhetoric] in order 
to perform a script capable of motivating advantageous 
responses from an audience" (p. 27) . Hariman thinks that 
prudence as a form of reasoning emphasizes the significance 
of situation, social knowledge, and enthymemes.
We should particularly note that Hariman thinks that 
prudence is performative. Prudential thinking encompasses
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the nuances of a particular political culture, and a prudent 
agent weighs strategic calculation with questions of 
performative aesthetics or dramatic force. Prudence is not 
an explicit plan one can break off or separate from the 
performance of rhetoric. Prudence lives in and through 
stylistic and argumentative performance of a persuasive 
effort. In essence, this is what Hariman means by the 
performative nature of prudence.
Further, prudence holds the seeds for successful 
rhetorical and political action. Hariman (1991) says that 
"...successful action must be more than the rules specifying 
its reproduction, and this difference is fully articulated 
only in performance" (p. 28) . More specifically, Hariman 
explains,
To claim that some decision is prudent requires that 
one specify an action: it is prudent because it leads
to something desired actually happening, and the 
account of why it is prudent has to include description 
of each of the elements of action, including (in the 
Aristotelian schema) the desire impelling thought, the 
calculation of means and of ends, and the continuing 
value of the state of character being realized (p. 28) .
The prudent rhetor often explicates the process of action he
or she advocates, but also imitates that action through
rhetorical performance. Thus, not only must rhetorical
discourse, to be prudent, specify action, but also motivate
action by "activating awareness of and standards for the
aesthetic dimension of political conduct" (p. 28) . When a
rhetor enacts prudence through rhetorical performance, this
itself is an advocation of a particular political action.
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Hariman also acknowledges that prudence is rule 
governed, but not from a strict rational perspective. 
Different from mathematical algorithms or trial by error 
heuristics, prudential rules for argument building, 
aesthetic force, and action verge on the unruly. Hariman
(1991) puts it this way: " . . . [P] rudential rules are rules 
for designing, predicting, and evaluating an event whose 
value will emerge during its successful enactment as a 
performance" (p. 30). Prudent discourse emerges out of a 
dynamic inventional process, but that brand of prudence 
comes to life only within the performance of rhetorical 
discourse. During the performance of rhetorical discourse 
one can become aware of the negotiation that involves coming 
to terms with the available argumentative and aesthetic 
dimensions and possibilities within a contingent, 
performative culture. The rhetorical construction of 
prudence is itself an interpretation of the available means 
of persuasion a performative culture allows.
There are several other important ideas that Hariman 
highlights. First, he illustrates the reciprocal 
relationship between the concepts of prudence and decorum. 
Again, where decorum accounts for situational obligation, 
prudence accounts for the sense of how one comes to terms 
with such obligations. In viewing prudence as a 
performative term, Hariman (1991) says one can take stock of 
the "alternation between obligatory enactment and reflection 
upon one's conventions of display" (p. 33). The view that
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prudence is a performative sensibility also stresses the 
relationship between morality and gesture. Symbolic gesture 
itself, not motive or consequence, accounts for morality.
In short, a performative conception of prudence stresses 
that political decision making is less a process of rational 
calculation, but of "improvisation upon conventions of 
display." (p. 35).
Hariman's conceptualization of prudence is, in part, 
the basis for my understanding of it, and that is why his 
brief essay is so important to my work. Again, to him, a 
prudent rhetor must understand the possible, probable, and 
appropriate within a specific rhetorical and political 
community, and this sense of prudence comes to life through 
rhetorical symbolism. Prudence symbolically might also come 
to life through specific policy action requests, through 
illustrations of why such requests are taking place, through 
a plan of how it will work, and through indicating the moral 
value such an action will evoke. Still, these policy 
requests are not always cut and dry. Recall that a 
significant point I am trying to make is that rhetorical 
gesture often develops political policy requests implicitly.
Hariman also thinks that prudence is rule governed, but 
not necessarily rationally. Prudential rules help a rhetor 
design his or her rhetoric, predict what will happen with 
it, and help an audience evaluate it, but the rules for 
these processes will only show up in rhetorical discourse. 
Rational generalizations do not ground the rules. In fact,
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these rules are not rules at all, but rather unstable 
cultural guidelines for appropriate rhetorical performance 
one gleans from other acts of rhetoric.
We can see from the above discussion that prudence is a 
very tricky and complex theoretical concept; this is 
probably why only a hand-full of scholars have dared to 
study it. As we glance back through the review we can see 
that prudence occurs in successful deliberation, but that it 
is more of a virtue than anything else. We cannot learn 
prudence from a book; prudence is as prudence does.
Moreover, to Cicero, prudence encompassed ideas of wisdom 
and eloquence in as much as it called for rhetorical 
decorum. However, we also learn that prudence can be 
traditional and communal, though always variable. It is 
communal to the extent that it is learned through communal 
participation and observation of prudent discourse and acts, 
but also that prudence is a stylized repetition of 
rhetorical strategies. Hence, prudence is a discursive 
practice and political action. Prudence is traditional and 
situational. The interpretation of prudence is up for 
grabs, but it is also an illustration of strategic 
intention. And when I say, "Up for grabs, " I do not mean 
that prudence is totally polysemic. A particular act of 
rhetorical discourse still limits the ways we can read that 
act.
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Prudence and Rhetorical Criticism
As mentioned, Jasinski (1995) used the idea of prudence 
to understand and critique Henry Clay's oratory. Jasinski 
argues that the Congressional struggle over slavery in the 
mid-nineteenth century was actually a battle between two 
different perspectives on what was prudent, given the 
complex situation. The views of prudence at odds were, as 
mentioned, "prudential accommodation" and "prudential 
audacity." Prudential accommodation impelled Clay and other 
Congressmen to reason that compromise was the most prudent 
way to act. Clay performed this prudence through his 
techniques and strategies. For instance, Clay valorized the 
ontological status of accommodation, created an association 
between the Union and constitutional compromise, and 
deferred the slavery issue through metonymic logic that 
substituted the problem of disunion for slavery.
Importantly, Jasinski, like Hariman, argues that prudence is 
a product of rhetorical performance, but that producing a 
certain view of prudence (accommodation in this instance) 
can limit the possibilities of effectively negotiating a 
crisis. In this dispute over slavery, Jasinski argues that 
the situation called for prudential audacity and that Clay's 
misreading of the constitutional framers' prudence 
contributed to his promotion of accommodation. As Jasinski 
puts it, "It may also be the case that history is open and 
contingent. If that is the case, then a tradition of 
prudential accommodation based on deferral, restraint, and
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blind imitation probably contributed to the [the Civil War] " 
(p. 473).
Jasinski's research is important to my dissertation in 
two ways. First, Jasinski says that acute controversies 
illicit standard norms of prudence. "A political culture's 
dominant form (or forms) of prudence will most likely be 
enacted or performed in an effort to resolve a particularly 
acute controversy" (1995, p. 456). I suggest that the 
educational debates during the nineteenth century 
accentuated an acute controversy. As industrialization and 
commercialism became dominant modes of cultural discourse, 
as regions conflicted and war eventually waged, and as 
literary canons controlled the educational scene, something 
or someone had to render American higher education relevant. 
Second, Jasinski's work displays important characteristics 
of nineteenth century political rhetoric. In the process of 
promoting any sort of federal action, he says that a 
nineteenth century rhetor "was obliged to engage in 
constitutional hermeneutics: they needed to subvert rival
constructions of the Constitution and federal power...while 
affirming that the government possessed the power to do what 
was proposed" (p. 462). The Morrill Act is an example of 
this interplay.
However, though Jasinski's rhetorical critique offers 
valuable insight for the student of rhetoric and prudence, I 
think he misses something. Echoing Wilson's (1998) 
sentiment, Jasinski treats prudence as too stable. In other
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words, he takes the performative traditions for granted. 
Jasinski implies that all prudential outlooks are either 
accommodating or audacious. But rhetoric is an innovative 
art and rhetoricians are egocentric. A rhetor would not 
call his or her rhetoric imprudent. There is a multiplicity 
of prudential resources even as there are prudential norms.
Another recent rhetorical critique using prudence is 
Levasseur' s re-examination of Edmund Burke' s rhetorical art. 
Critiquing Burke's private correspondence, Levasseur depicts 
the struggle between prudential and heroic functions of 
rhetoric in attempt to account for Burke1s ironic place in 
the history of rhetorical discourse; scholars view him as a 
rhetorical genius, yet many of his persuasive efforts were 
not successful. To Levasseur (1997), Edmund Burke's 
rhetorical discourse "is an apt illustration of the frequent 
tension that exists between rhetoric's prudential and 
existential functions...[and how] the collision of these two 
functions can generate discourse which is at war with 
itself" (p. 334) . Levasseur equates prudence with the good 
and practical. Heroic rhetoric corresponds to an 
existential function. Through rhetorical discourse rhetors 
constitute their "very beings" (p. 336). Levasseur argues 
that while Burke's rhetoric was both prudential and heroic, 
the heroic function usually won out: "Burke was rather
successful at elevating his personal standing with discourse 
which failed to meet its explicit persuasive goal" (p. 345).
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Thus, Burke is a mainstay rhetorical hero, yet he often did 
not move his immediate audiences.
Levasseur's project is important to my research in one 
important way. Levasseur emphasizes the important and 
complex role of prudence in the process of rhetorical 
invention. To him, prudence is both good and practical, and 
in "rhetorical practice, this tradeoff between principles 
and pragmatism translates into a dialectical tension between 
adaptation and constancy" (1997, p. 335). How can a rhetor 
use the expected norms, yet innovate for the sake of unique 
immediate concerns? The rhetor's view of what is prudent 
helps flush out this inventional process.
However, even as Levasseur points out the complex 
nature of prudence, I still think that he makes it out to be 
too simple. I agree with Wilson (1998) when he states, "I 
do not dispute Levasseur's reading per se, but I do question 
his dichotomy that implies a settled and widely accepted 
notion of what is prudent" (p. 133). Levasseur does not 
express an appreciation for the dynamic and multiplistic, 
yet normative nature of prudence as a performative tradition 
of political expression. It might have been prudent to be 
heroic.
Browne (1997) thinks that Daniel Webster's fictional 
speech within a speech during his eulogy to Thomas Jefferson 
and John Adams was a sign of Webster's prudence. During the 
speech, Webster offered a sort of "sub-speech" he attributed 
to Adams, but which Webster composed. Browne says that
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Webster wanted to transmit cultural knowledge through 
prudential display.
Browne uses Lyotard's understanding of how narrative 
tradition helps generate cultural knowledge. Lyotard offers 
pragmatic rules that help generate a social bond through 
cultural narrative. These rules include "know-how,"
"knowing how to speak," and "knowing how to listen" (p. 41). 
Know-how is a symbolic standard of action and a celebration 
of quick, practical wisdom in a specific community. To 
Browne, "Know-how is thus displayed as a quality of 
character as much as of mind, and it is evident in the 
actor's successful negotiation between principle and 
expedience. It is a sign of prudence" (p. 41). Browne 
thinks that Webster illustrated "knowing how to speak" 
through celebrating the orator-as-hero and attributing 
rhetorical eloquence to character and oratorical authority. 
Eloquence and authority merge when eloquence "gives to great 
action its fitting expression" (p. 41). Considering the 
last criterion, Browne thinks that Webster suggested that 
listening properly meant to study and learn from the past:
"As Webster commemorates Adams he in effect celebrates 
himself, at least as an exemplar of republic competence, and 
teaches others that in listening well the good citizen 
learns to remember" (p. 42).
I do not specifically use Lyotard's scheme in my 
dissertation. Nevertheless, Browne's essay is essential to 
mine because it appreciates the communal nature of prudence.
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The essay also suggests that prudence emerges out of
rhetorical action.
Leff (1997) also employs the idea of prudence when he
suggests that Jane Addams appropriated Lincoln as a
prudential hero in order to help diffuse the Pullman strike
of 1894. Leff's project is to locate uses of Lincoln as an
important symbol of national identity in rhetoric after his
assassination. Leff argues that the symbolic Lincoln became
a resource for rhetorical invention, "but a pliable resource
that could be constructed and adapted to fit a variety of
political purposes and ideological agendas" (p. 135) .
Pullman thought Lincoln's own explicit values were a fixed
code. However, Addams altered Lincoln's values for the
moment at hand. She did not reproduce Lincoln, but imitated
his authority in new forms. Though Leff does not explicitly
make the point, to be prudential means appropriating or
imitating past rhetorical gestures in new forms for present
circumstances. That is why his work is important to mine.
Wilson (1998) argues that prudence is not a stable,
unchanging concept or practice, but a contested space:
Not only does it demand a balance between the ideal 
good and the practically possible, political rhetoric 
remakes prudence so that it coincides with the 
speaker's position... Prudence, then, is a coveted space 
of legitimacy that [political rhetors] attempt to 
occupy by discursively controlling its meaning" (p.
133) .
Focusing on the civil rights debate between 1874-1875,
Wilson argues that the battle over civil rights during 
Reconstruction was a competition between different meanings
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of prudence. By performing different images of the past and
present within their texts, the rhetors implied different
forms of prudence. These different perspectives, Wilson
charges, contributed to different views about desegregation.
Wilson explains that the differing textual contexts "implied
divergent norms for political judgment and discursive
practice...Each side articulated a different vision of the
then and the now, and these expressions led to opposing
ideas about the wisdom of desegregation" (p. 137). In
short, the Southern Democrats saw racism as a personal error
that individual maturation could remedy. On the other hand,
the Republicans saw it as a systemic cultural problem.
Thus, these contrasting visions of prudential action led to
the separate but equal doctrine, the doctrine that
established "equal" public accommodations for African
Americans, but maintained segregation.
Wilson's essay is important to my dissertation not only
because he emphasizes prudence as implicit and dynamic, but
also because he links prudence with social change. Wilson
(1998) concludes that
Social change...has links to the variability of 
prudence. Because rhetoric refashions prudence in 
every moment of practice, a progressive articulation 
may rework the norms that inform the practice. From 
this perspective, political judgment theory becomes a 
useful perspective to illumine the evolution of a 
rhetorical culture and community" (p. 132).
Though Scott and Smith (1969) imply that principles such as
prudence can impede confrontation and change, Wilson says
that, "In every communicative act, prudence may be a
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conservative or progressive influence on the norms that 
guide its articulation" (p. 145).
Moreover, I think Wilson is pretty much on the mark 
when he says that "sharp boundaries between prudent and 
imprudent rhetoric...underrate the dynamic elements that 
make the concept an important window into rhetorical theory 
and practice" (1998, p. 133). I agree that critics must 
interpret the dynamic workings of rhetorical discourse and 
that prudence is indeed re-fashioned through rhetorical 
practice. Because prudence is at the heart of rhetorical 
invention, the prudential process a rhetor advocates is the 
window into understanding the artistic process of invention. 
What Wilson misses, however, is the idea that prudential 
conventions are often communal. This, I think, is a flaw in
his research. Again, we need to appreciate prudence as
communal and thus as a rhetorical resource, but prudence is 
also up for grabs from an interpretive perspective.
METHOD
I will use a textual methodology to uncover the 
implicit views of prudence alive in the rhetoric I will 
investigate. While I agree with the foundational premises 
of textual criticism, my research is more in line with 
Jasinski's (1997) stand on the interpretive practice. In 
the effort of making the method clear, let us take a look at
this brand of rhetorical analysis from a historical
perspective.
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Textual Criticism
Textual criticism received a great deal of interest in
the late 1980's and early 1990's and continues to offer the
critic a valuable tool for getting inside rhetorical
discourse. Leff (1986), in his encomium to G. P. Mohrmann,
illustrates the basic nature of textual criticism. As he
puts it, textual criticism is generally
The close reading and rereading of the text, the 
analysis of the historical and biographical 
circumstances that generate and frame its composition, 
the recognition of basic conceptions that establish the 
co-ordinates of the text, and an appreciation of the 
way these conceptions interact within the text and help 
determine its temporal movement (p. 380) .
The methodological process seeks to flush out the
relationship between the textual, internal rendition of the
external situation and the historical circumstances. To
Leff, "The central task of textual criticism is to
understand how rhetorical action affect[s] this negotiation,
how the construction of a symbolic event invites a
reconstruction of the events to which it refers" (p. 385,
his emphasis).
In many cases this method was, and still is,
problematically stabilized into a search for the text's
context. Concerning this notion of "textual context," Lucas
(1988) states that, "Based on the understanding that
rhetorical discourses are temporal phenomena, it holds that
a text creates its own internal context as it unfolds in
time and is processed by a listener or reader" (p. 249). A
text creates the context. It creates and contains various
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circumstances, temporality, characters, and norms of action.
The method, then, seeks to better understand the temporal
flow of rhetorical characteristics within the text and how
this progressive flow interacts with the audience to suggest
a way of seeing. Lucas goes on to say that
The benefit of close textual analysis is that it 
allows the critic, in essence, to "slow down" the 
action within the text so as to keep its evolving 
internal context in sharp focus and to allow more 
precise explication of its rhetorical artistry" (p.
249) .
The methodological vantage point described above holds
an important assumption: rhetorical oratory is time-bound.
In a sense, immediate concerns and audiences imprison
rhetoric. Yet, though a rhetorical text must adhere to the
history outside the text, it also holds an internal history.
Rhetoric develops in time through discursive progression.
Leff (1986) contends that
Every rhetorical text is a particular construction that 
unfolds in time as it is written or spoken and as it is 
processed by a listener or reader. The rhetorical 
text, then, is a historical development occurring 
within a broader context of historical developments. 
However circumscribed by extrinsic events, the text 
retains an internal history of its own (pp. 384-385) .
As mentioned, in his monograph on the contested space
of prudence, Wilson (1998) uses Lucas' and Leff's notion of
"textual context" to interpret prudence. Taking this view
of textual criticism and the idea of "textual context,"
Wilson reconstructs the way the texts of the civil rights
debate during Reconstruction advanced a specific past,
present, and future. As his rational for this method,
Wilson (1998) argues, "Prudence requires an apprehension of
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circumstances and an anticipation of potential futures" (p.
134) . Wilson continues, “To appreciate the prudence
articulated by the Democrats and conservative Republicans
who opposed desegregation, it is necessary to recover the
reality that their discourse created— that is, their
rhetoric's textual context" (p. 134).
However, Jasinski (1997) thinks that "rethinking the
relationship between context and text may help stimulate
thicker interpretive practice" (p. 205). Jasinski's problem
with the textual context process is the assumption of a
stable context. Jasinski criticizes Lucas when he contends
that Lucas's "version of particularism contributes to a
[sic] set of interlocked assumptions that constitute the
instrumental tradition" (p. 210) . As Jasinski has it, this
instrumental condition includes:
A mode of contextualization that assumes situational 
stability, a sense of agency that assumes that 
intentions are unambiguous, fully present, and capable 
of directing textual production, and a sense of the 
text that assumes its coherence and its ability to 
represent authorial intention fully and without 
significant distortion (p. 210) .
The goal, then, should not be to stabilize the particular,
but illustrate the multiplicity in the particular.
The way he seems to do this methodologically is to
uncover performative traditions embedded in rhetorical
discourse. This process is not only a good way to answer my
first question, but I also think it is an addition to our
theoretical understanding of prudence. We theoretically
understand prudence better, or at least differently, when we
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accept it as a type of performative tradition. Jasinski 
(1997) says, “Performative traditions are a promising 
context in that they constitute the conditions of discursive 
possibility or, in the neo-Aristotelian idiom, the available 
means of persuasion" (p. 212).
To Jasinski, there are four things that help define and 
label a performative tradition. First, "a performative 
tradition is embodied in a linguistic idiom or language" (p. 
213). Certain types of terms and specific words ground 
certain traditions. Rhetors use these terms and words to 
give meaning to or describe the tradition. For instance, 
Jasinski says that civic republicanism is embodied in terms 
of value, like virtue, and opprobrium, like corruption. 
Second, "a performative tradition is enacted through 
particular speaking voices" (p. 213). It would be difficult 
for a wealthy suburbanite to enact the performative norms of 
inner city poverty. Third, "a performative tradition is 
marked by various figurative and argumentative patterns and 
structure" (p. 213). Jasinski says that the locus of the 
existent marks the performative tradition of 
accommodationist prudence. Last, "a performative tradition 
is perpetuated by a range of textual practices and organized 
into generic forms that are structured through generic 
conventions" (p. 214). As Bercovitch (1978) observed, 
Puritanism uses the jeremiad. In other words, certain 
traditions rely on certain genres of speech. Hence, 
according to Jasinski (1997), we can say that prudence is a
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resource for rhetorical invention because it is a 
performative tradition that occurs within a language 
context. And a "language context is most appropriately 
understood as an ongoing process of creating and diffusing 
multiple idioms or modes of speaking" (p. 210). Prudence is 
itself a layered mode of speaking.
More specifically, prudence is a performative tradition 
because certain words and phrases— idioms--essentially 
embody certain modes of prudence. Also, specific voices 
enact certain traditions of prudence. Certain traditions of 
prudence rely on marked figurative and argumentative 
structure. Prudence, because it concerns the process of 
appropriate political judgment, is most usually dependent on 
epideictic genres, though most genres are never pure.
However, I do not see prudence as just one of many 
performative traditions. Because of the nature of prudence, 
I argue that prudence is a master performative tradition. 
Even while there are different modes of prudence— like 
accomodationist prudence or audacious prudence— in whatever 
shape or form prudence takes it orchestrates the process of 
rhetorical invention. Prudence, as such a performative 
tradition, is the process of interplay between a rhetor's 
textual interpretation of the available means of persuasion 
and the contextual limitations on those available means of 
persuasion.
Therefore, while I agree with Wilson's (1998) stance 
that prudence is not an "a priori reflection of cultural
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expectations" (p. 133) , his sense of the stability of an 
internal textual context which then implies a perspective of 
prudence troubles me. Wilson argues that it is the text's 
rendition of a past, present, and future, what he calls a 
"vision," that implies divergent norms of political judgment 
and discursive practice. This procedure seems not to 
appreciate the fluid nature of the text, its inside context, 
and its outside context. Wilson's method is good, but it 
needs help. Wilson's method allows me to answer my second 
question, but not my first. The cultural norms of political 
judgment and discursive practice embedded in performative 
tradition help craft the way rhetors see certain situations. 
In the inventional process, the multiplicity of resources is 
not unending. Innovation cannot stray too far from 
tradition. In short, prudence as an orchestrating 
performative tradition is implicit within the rhetorical 
elements in a text that, then, help construct an internal 
temporality.
Hence, my method is a sort of play between a neo­
classical, intentionalist approach, and one, as Jasinski 
(1997) recommends, that de-centers the rhetorical agent to 
focus on the text/context relationship apart from 
intentionality. And this seems to be a useful way to go. 
Hariman (1997) thinks that a combination of neo-classical 
thought, and post-structural analysis invigorates the study 
of public oratory.
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Neo-classical approaches to oratory focus on an 
individual speech and a specific situation, and how this 
speech supplies an argument for a tangible political policy 
or defines some aspect of civic culture.
Poststructuralists, on the other hand, get away from all 
this and desire to analyze the social structure and a 
broader process of discursive creation and reception. 
Generally, poststructuralists emphasize the fragmentation of 
discursive practice, the limited role of individual rhetors, 
and the dispensability of particular texts.
Hariman (1997) thinks a middle of the road approach 
might look to the relationship between prudence and decorum; 
decorum, again, being situational obligations. However, 
single versions of prudence or decorum are short-lived. 
Cultural pluralism disallows it. Thus, Hariman thinks that 
to study oratory one must give an "eye to its imitation" (p. 
173) .
The middle ground is focusing on the imitation of 
persuasive artistry for specific, situational expectations. 
More specifically, Hariman (1997) says that "Instead of 
attention to the striking turn of phrase, the critical 
interest should be in the strategic value of particular 
persuasive designs that become widely available for use in a 
myriad of situations" (p. 175). And how particular 
persuasive designs are themselves imitations of past 
rhetorical art. I want to understand how certain senses of 
prudence, implicit within the texts I analyze, are
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themselves imitations of communal norms of prudential 
thinking.
Another way of saying all this is that the middle 
ground method is really an attempt to capture both grounds. 
Thus my study of prudence looks something like Watson’s 
(1997) recent study. In her study of the Sentiments of the 
1833 American Anti-Slavery Society, Watson finds a middle 
ground between viewing a text as a symbolic whole and as an 
intertextual phenomenon. She argues that the Declaration of 
Independence was a textual influence on later American 
Declarations. She also argues that "historically rhetors 
have been the interpreters of texts to their own strategic 
ends" (p. 92). Even iconic texts are in the process of 
intertextual play. However, I also think that my study 
looks something like Henry's (1997) investigation of William 
Lloyd Garrison's 1833 Declaration of Sentiments through 
close textual analysis. He concludes that the Declaration 
is an outgrowth of Garrison's personal history and immediate 
anti-slavery persuasive goals. The Declaration is, in other 
words, instrumental rhetoric. It is purposeful discourse, 
shaped with intent by the rhetor, to persuade a specific 
audience, in response to immediate situational concerns.
I view rhetorical texts as wholes. I think we ought to 
focus on specific texts that rhetors intended as responses 
to specific situations. However, those texts are also 
intertextual to the extent that, in line with Leff (1997), 
they appropriate past prudential voices in certain ways.
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spgcigj-c Application
I organize each chapter, and each analysis, using a set 
methodological process in attempts to understand the 
prudence implicit in each discourse and how that prudence 
impacts persuasive art. In each of the following chapters I 
will offer, first, a general introduction that attempts to 
capture the key exigencies the rhetors faced. Next, I will 
supply a general textual description; a summary. This is 
important because it will illustrate the basic pedagogical 
policy each rhetor advocated. We must assume that each 
rhetor thought that his policy was prudent.
After that, I will take Jasinski's (1997) advice and 
try to recover a representation of prudence as a 
performative tradition. Again, this will help me answer my 
first question. I will focus in on the important figurative 
and argumentative aspects of a text; these figurative images 
and argumentative patterns that gave life to prudential 
traditions and possible innovations. This process will be a 
sort of back and forth interplay between the artistic 
elements of the text and the aesthetic traditions of 
discourse available to the rhetor. In other words, in light 
of Jasinski’s description of performative traditions, I will 
attempt to illustrate the tradition or innovation within the 
text. During this effort I will often use words like 
"actualize" or "enact" because a notion of prudence is alive 
within discursive symbolism. During this effort I will also
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use various "sub-methods" to help me account for persuasive 
art. I will describe those methods when I get to them.
Next, I will show how the text's artistry and the view 
of prudence it offers generated a vision of the past, 
present, and future within the text; its textual context. I 
will illustrate how the performative tradition(s) of 
prudence worked within the text and orchestrates the 
multiplistic nature of rhetorical invention within a 
temporal framework; the framework of the rhetoric and the 
reality it created for immediate rhetorical purposes.
Simply put, this method will illustrate how the marker's of 
the text's prudence played out within a temporal framework 
and helped (re)negotiate the historical context; it helps me 
answer my second question.
Finally, I will underscore the implicit prudence within 
each text, but evaluate the limitation or aid its prudential 
outlook afforded given the texts' historical, cultural 
context. This will be an attempt to fold the text back into 
its historical grounding, both discursively and politically, 
to figure out its rhetorical consequence. While I will, to 
some extent, discuss the rhetoric's successfulness or 
unsuccessfulness, I certainly understand that such labels 
are difficult to make.
Further, in this final section I will also attempt to 
grapple with Hall's (1980) idea of encoding and decoding and 
the different types of "readings" an audience or specific 
receivers might develop. From my understanding, all Hall
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means by encoding is the meaning an author embeds in a 
message, and decoding is what an audience gets out of that 
message. However, an author might intend one thing, but an 
audience member decodes it another way all together. 
Moreover, the term "reading" is complex because it connotes 
a sophisticated process of not just decoding, but organizing 
meaning from a message to fit one's individualized scheme of 
reality. In my dissertation I will not attempt to offer a 
"cultural study." I do not necessarily consider myself a 
structuralist, or poststructuralist, or ethnographer, or 
semiotician. And I am obviously not studying media culture. 
Yet, Hall's project is useful to anyone studying 
communication.
His project is useful mainly because of his ideas of 
dominant or preferred, negotiated, and oppositional 
readings. By a dominant or preferred meaning, Hall (1980) 
means communication that is perfectly transmitted, "or as 
close as we are likely to come..." (p. 136)— a rhetor 
intends a certain message, and the "reader" gets that same 
message. A negotiated meaning is a mixture of adaptive and 
oppositional elements. Finally, an oppositional reading is 
one that decodes "the message in a globally contrary way"
(p. 138, his emphasis). I should note that most readings 
are negotiated. Very rarely do we completely accommodate to 
the speaker' s message and very rarely do we receive a 
completely different intention. In sum, these ideas will 
help me consider the impact of the rhetor's prudence and
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persuasive art. I will not use his ideas as a method, but 
as a simple guide to direct my thinking about possible 
interpretations of prudence in rhetorical action.
I think through all of these methodological layers of 
analysis I can best see how struggles over prudential 
discursive practice impacts historical political and 
pedagogical action. Again, the first critical exercise 
attempts to capture prudence as a performative tradition.
It illustrates how the text's symbolic gestures were 
imitative and/or innovative. The textual context is more 
instrumental. It more closely looks at how the norm of 
prudence in the text helps constructed an internal reality, 
but also how that norm of prudence impacted political 
consideration. The last step goes back to figure out the 
historical impact of that sense of prudence implicit in the 
text performatively and temporally.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE "YALE REPORT" OF 1828
INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores a pivotal report authored by 
Yale's president, Jeremiah Day, and ancient language 
professor, James L. Kingsley, and the report's impact on the 
academic battle waged during the early nineteenth century. 
Again, this battle concerned the unsteady function of 
American higher education in an increasingly industrialized, 
commercial society. On one side stood the reformers or 
progressives, who wanted an American system of higher 
education fitted for the perceived practical realities of an 
industrialized era: choice in the curriculum and practical
education for the masses. On the other side, classicist 
conservatives wished to preserve the literary tradition. As 
I mentioned, the conservatives seemed to be winning the 
debate in the early nineteenth century. The conservatives 
thought that a classical education was the ideal form of 
pedagogy no matter what societal changes were occurring 
outside the college (Butts, 1939, p. 116).
I mentioned in Chapter One that Harvard, early on, 
experimented with progressive pedagogy. George Tickner, 
Harvard's president during the early nineteenth century, 
supplied a voice of reform. The changes he desired included 
opening up Harvard to students not seeking degrees, 
developing departmental systems, and allowing some choice of 
curriculum for students. He helped bring an elective
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principle to Harvard. Though Harvard's progressivism 
declined under future conservative college presidents, 
Tickner's ideas provoked Yale's faculty and administrators 
to ponder such progressive changes at their institution.
Thus, in light of Harvard's move to make ancient 
languages and the classics elective, some at Yale proposed a 
similar change. The trustees of Yale asked Day and Kingsley 
to comment. X suggest that they had to meet a couple of key 
exigencies. Obviously, they had to quiet the shouting down 
of classical education as impractical. They had to 
illustrate that the ancient languages mattered. Also, Yale 
was the stronghold of orthodox Congregationalism and was a 
model for many denominational colleges springing up in the 
West. Thus, they had to tie together orthodox religious 
ideals with a classical education. Originally published for 
the public in 1829 in the American Journal of Science and 
the Arts, what Day and Kingsley came up with is today 
considered one of the most powerful defenses of classic, 
literary education: "Yale explicitly and forcefully 
formulated, in opposition to Harvard's position, the 
doctrine that a liberal education can be attained only by 
following a strictly prescribed college curriculum based 
upon considerations of mental discipline" (Butts, 1939, p. 
119) .
In the first section of this chapter, I will give a 
brief summary of the report. Second, I will analyze the 
emergence of prudence in the text. Third, I will analyze
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the text's textual context. Finally, I will evaluate the 
report and the sense of prudence implicit within it. I will 
suggest that Day and Kingsley's conception of prudence both 
hindered and helped their rhetorical effort.
SUMMARY
The authors arranged the report in two major 
sections. Day authored the first section and Kingsley the 
second. The over-riding policy action they advocated, in 
both sections, was continuing the tradition of literary 
education at Yale. They desired to beat back the tide of 
modern languages. In the report, Day dealt mostly with what 
he called the "object" of collegiate education, while 
Kingsley focused on the particular struggle between ancient 
and modern languages.
Day (1829) understood a college's mission as laying a 
foundation for future studies, not to finish a student's 
education. Day grounded this foundation in vigor, balance, 
authority, and, by necessity, suitable buildings. Moreover, 
part of that foundation was a balanced approach to 
instruction. Day wanted study in science balanced out by 
study in literature. A balanced mechanism for instruction 
gave symmetry to the foundation Day was building. However, 
though Day desired educational balance, students in his 
scheme marched the same steps. This devotion to a thorough 
education differentiated the literary education from the 
professional. To Day, one attained practical information 
with little mental effort. A student acquired a literary
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education, on the other hand, only from seemingly endless 
mental drudgery. To Day, any other type of education was 
superficial. Further, those schools in the United States 
desiring to copy practical European institutions without 
caution ran the risk of diminishing the thoroughness of a 
literary education. Finally, Day linked a thorough, 
classical education with an elevated character. The 
practical arts, like farming, should begin not in practical 
measures, but in foundational classics to help build an 
elevated character. If American institutions were to ignore 
the classical foundation, they would be disavowing the 
country's destiny of greatness in all spheres of public 
culture, and the nation would crumble.
Kingsley (1829) supported Day's ideas by comparing a 
liberal education to the foundational elements of 
mathematics in under standing the workings of the physical 
world and the ancient perfection of Greek architecture. He 
wrote that a person educated in the literary classics could 
assert themselves over the artisans. Furthermore, Kingsley 
claimed that ancient languages were more practical than 
modem ones because the world was partly literary and those 
who desired to participate in it needed to realize the value 
of ancient literature. Also, ancient languages were simply 
the foundation of many professional studies. To substitute 
modem languages for ancient languages resulted in a 
superficial education. Additionally, Kingsley argued that 
the public did not really demand modem languages. Those who
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desired it sought out every new fad. Finally, to Kingsley, 
a literary education led to public notoriety.
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT
The policy Day and Kingsley advocated was to perpetuate 
the pedagogical status quo at Yale. They apparently thought 
this was prudent pedagogical action. Day and Kingsley 
enacted this idea, or invented it symbolically, through, 
first, specific metaphorical concepts. The authors offered 
structural, light and dark, and nature metaphors and so 
encouraged a certain way of seeing classical and practical 
education. Second, Day and Kingsley also constructed a 
sense of prudence by making classical education a vehicle 
for moral development both for the individual and, 
consequently, society. Rhetorically, they did this 
specifically by employing the sacred/secular metaphors of 
"taste" and "genius," metaphors used by Yale's former 
president Timothy Dwight. Thus, while the Yale Report is a 
secular, educational epideictic, I also contend that the 
authors engaged a performative homiletic tradition framed by 
the ideas of Dwight.
Metaphor
Ivie (1989) says that "In the most important uses of 
metaphor, as a source of rhetorical invention, a term (or 
'vehicle') from one domain of meaning acts upon a subject 
(or 'tenor') from another domain" (p. 199) . As the vehicle 
and tenor interact, the number of ways one can see or read a 
rhetorical text becomes limited. The interaction of vehicle
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and tenor directs one’s attention to a certain place. Burke 
(1968) calls this idea "terministic incentive" (p. 45). For 
Burke, metaphors incite a reader to see the text from a 
certain perspective.
As I mentioned, there were three clusters of vehicles 
Day and Kingsley used to create a particular vision of 
classical and practical education. The first was a 
STRUCTURE cluster consisting of such terms as "foundation," 
"solid," "balance," "finish," "superstructure," "furniture," 
"pillar," and "superficial." Though one might consider 
"solid" a dark-light metaphor, the authors used it as a 
positive metaphoric descriptor of a structure; no one wants 
a building that is not "solid." Likewise, no one wants a 
building that is "superficially" constructed. Moreover, the 
term "balance" metaphorically reinforced the idea of a 
"solid” structure, something that will not "fall." 
Additionally, the term "finish" supported Day's assertions 
because Day did not think Yale ought to be in the business 
of "finishing" any sort of structure. These images, or 
vehicles, helped Day and Kingsley describe classical 
education, the tenor, and its premises. Consequently, they 
also gave practical education a pretty bad rap.
There are several examples of the "foundation" metaphor 
in association with the "balance" metaphor. For instance, 
Day (1829) asserted that the object of a literary college 
like Yale was "to LAY THE FOUNDATION of a SUPERIOR 
EDUCATION..." (p. 300, his emphasis). Classical education
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maintained this "object" through strict toil of all mental 
faculties. Day stated, "A costly edifice ought not to be 
left to rest upon a single pillar" (p. 301). Thus, Day also 
thought that "in the course of instruction in this college, 
it has been an object to maintain such a proportion between 
the different branches of literature and science, as to form 
in the student a proper balance of character" (p. 301, his 
emphasis).
The "foundation" metaphor ruled the pages of the 
report. The other STRUCTURE metaphors seemed also to 
congregate around the term "foundation." Using constant 
repetition, Day declared that a literary education "is far 
from embracing everything which the student will ever have 
occasion to learn. The object is not to finish his 
education; but to lay the foundation, and to advance as far 
in rearing the superstructure..." (p. 308, his emphasis).
And again, "Our object is not to teach that which is 
peculiar to any one of the professions; but to lay the 
foundation which is common to them all" (p. 308) . Speaking 
of students, Day asserted, "They should not be sent, as we 
think, with an expectation of finishing their education at 
the college; but with a view of laying a thorough foundation 
in the principles of science, preparatory to the study of 
the practical arts" (p. 310, his emphasis).
Further, Yale offered "...solid attainments" (Day and 
Kingsley, 1829, p. 321). The country needed classical 
education, because "there is perhaps no nation whose
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interests would be more deeply affected, by a substitution 
of superficial for solid learning" (p. 322).
A general DARK-LIGHT cluster supported the STRUCTURE 
cluster and revealed further how Day and Kingsley enacted 
their prudence textually. The DARK-LIGHT cluster included 
such images as "elevated," "high," "thorough," "down," 
"low," "partial" and "blind." Day and Kingsley almost 
always associated the term "solid" with an "elevated" or 
"enlightened" way of seeing. Moreover, I consider 
"thorough" this type of vehicle because it indicated a 
clarity in seeing. Throughout the report, Day and Kingsley 
associated practical education with the dark and classical 
education with the light.
We see this when Day explained that people of "mere 
practical detail are wanted, in considerable numbers... but 
the higher stations require enlightened and comprehensive 
views" (1829, p. 311). Recall that Day and Kingsley wanted 
all literary students to follow the same steps. Why? "To 
this we answer, that our prescribed course contains those 
subjects only which ought to be understood, as we think, by 
every one who aims at a thorough education." (p. 312, my 
emphasis).
Day (1829) argued against progressives who desired to 
copy the expanded German form of education in the United 
States through metaphor. Day claimed that American 
universities might learn a few things from European 
institutions, but "not by blindly adopting all their
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measures without discrimination" (p. 316). Thus, Tickner
and Harvard could not see.
Moreover, Day thought that the sentiment that Latin and
Greek ought to be optional would reverse intellectual
progress. Day asked,
When in almost all our schools, and academies, and 
professional seminaries, the standard of education has 
been enlarged and elevated, is this a time for the 
college to lower its standard? Shall we fall back, and 
abandon the ground which, for thirty years past, we 
have been striving so hard to gain? (1829, p. 318, his 
emphasis).
Though Harvard had made ancient languages elective, "it is 
to be hoped that, at no very distant period, they will be 
able to come up to this elevated ground, and leave the 
business of second-rate education to the inferior 
seminaries" (p. 321).
Day (1829) offered his conclusive remarks by explicitly 
declaring that a literary institution holds an "elevated 
character" (p. 320) . Those educated in the literary, 
classical tradition "must take their position on a summit 
which towers above the height of surrounding ranges of 
hills" (p. 322).
Kingsley (1829) thought that when one knew Greek and 
Roman writers, in the Greek and Roman tongues, one could 
take "relish of what is elevated..." (p. 329). It worked 
the mental faculties and brought the intellect to its 
"highest maturity" (p. 330). To stay its liberal course,
Yale had much to expect, "but by deserting the high-road 
which it has so long traveled, and wandering in the lanes
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and bye-paths, it should trifle with its prosperity, and put 
at hazard the very means of its support and existence” (p. 
337) .
A final cluster, a NATURE cluster, referred to 
naturally occurring objects and bound the positive structure 
images and the light images with the beauty of nature.
These images helped Day and Kingsley construct a tie between 
classical education and the perceived splendor of a poetic 
nature. The authors associated the "highest" of natural 
beauty with classical education. While a practical 
education was like a poplar, "slender, frail, and blighted,“ 
a classical education was "more of the stately elm; striking 
deep its roots, lifting its head slowly to the skies, 
spreading wide its grateful shade, and growing more and more 
venerable with the years" (1829, p. 322). Day asked, "When 
even our mountains, and rivers, and lakes, are upon a scale 
which seems to denote, that we are destined to be a great 
and mighty nation, shall our literature be feeble, and 
scanty, and superficial?" (p. 324). He thought that 
classical education ranked up there with mountains, rivers, 
and lakes.
While these metaphorical images do not necessarily 
force a reader to accept the necessity of certain 
pedagogical perspectives, they do limit one's ability to see 
classical and practical education any which way. Again, the 
basic pedagogical policy the rhetors advocated was in 
keeping with the educational status quo at Yale. Thus, to
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enact this prudential policy, Day and Kingsley helped the 
report's readers see classical education as a good, "solid," 
and lasting structure, more "elevated" than other types of 
education, and very near the beauty of nature. The authors 
bound classical education with "solid" structures, but did 
not "finish" the details. Classical education did not deal 
in "ornaments, " as Day put it, but in building the 
foundation for future studies. However, that foundation was 
much more "elevated" than the "low-ness" of "mere" practical 
education, or professional education minus the foundational 
elements of a specific practice. To study the ancients was 
to study the "beautifully displayed, " the "warmth, 
animation, and intellectual illumination of the living, 
active and intelligent being..." (Day & Kingsley, 1829, p.
346). The various subjects of classical education were the 
best possible examples of solid and lasting human work.
This use of metaphor, then, was the prudential argumentative 
and figurative enactment of the policy Day and Kingsley 
desired upheld.
"Taste" and "Genius"
By themselves, the metaphors Day and Kingsley employed 
give us a good demonstration of how they went about 
constructing a sense of prudence rhetorically. Another way 
prudence took shape was through the terms of "taste" and 
"genius." When we accept "taste" and "genius" as 
metaphorical appeals or perspectives as well, we can
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interpret the Yale Report as an extension of a tradition of
prudence passed down from Timothy Dwight.
Timothy Dwight, president of Yale during the first two
decades of the nineteenth century, thought that "public
happiness results from individual citizenship that enacts a
regenerate sort of virtue that must come of God's grace"
(Clark, 1993, p. 57). According to Dwight, Yale was "the
fountain from which flow the laws of the state [Connecticut]
and its whole jurisprudence, the rules which form its happy
society, and the doctrines and precepts which are inculcated
in its churches" (cited in Clark, p. 58). Clark suggests
that Dwight expressed his idea of prudence through the
metaphors of "taste" and "genius." To understand how Day
and Kingsley's representation of prudence worked out
textually, we must investigate Dwight's notion of prudence.
In Clark's view, Dwight meant the metaphor "taste" to
refer to the process of correct judgment, and intended the
metaphor of "genius" to refer to the action of this so-
called correct judgment (Clark, 1987, p. 156). More
specifically, by taste, Dwight signified both an aesthetic,
secular taste that, once acquired, led to moral virtue; but
also a sacred taste that was a "refined sensibility enabled
by spiritual regeneration" (Clark, 1993, p. 65). In 1812
Dwight offered angels as the model for what he saw as
prudent. As cited in Clark, Dwight explained that angels
...admit nothing but truth [because they 
are]possessed. .. of the most noble and refined taste. 
Their relish is as regularly conformed to truth as 
their intellect. Nothing little can engross their
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attention: nothing debased can give them pleasure
(cited in Clark, p. 67, Clark's emphasis).
By genius, Dwight indicated a genius consisting of two
functions: a logical function sifting through truth and
error and a rhetorical function in eloquence making
impressions upon others. Teaching both theology and
rhetoric at Yale, Dwight professed a public discourse theory
that was both secular and sacred. This discourse theory
assumed the "motivating force of the language of
sentiment..." and it was "traditionally oratorical in its
commitment to engage those it addresses in the project of
shaping and sustaining a common moral and political culture"
(p. 58).
Dwight blurred rhetoric and poetic and in so doing "did 
the homiletic work of appealing to sentiments that would 
nurture the regenerative virtue that he believed functions 
as a powerful public bond" (p. 59). Both theology and 
rhetoric inculcated taste and genius in Dwight's type of 
society. Dwight had a religious and political vision of a 
"godly government" (Clark, 1987, p. 149). This was Dwight's 
prudential endpoint. It is apparent that Day and Kingsley 
take these metaphorical terms— taste and genius— and 
Dwight's perspective of what they meant, as models for 
prudential action and discursive practice.
Considering the term "taste," the authors often used it 
either in promoting so-called correct taste in relation to a 
classical education, or poor taste in a desire not to study 
the classics. For instance, Kingsley (1829) illustrated
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that "Familiarity with the Greek and Roman writers is 
especially adapted to form the taste, and to discipline the 
mind, both in thought and diction, to the relish of what is 
elevated, chaste, and simple" (p. 329). Kingsley argued 
that through the study of ancient literature a student 
gleaned proper, superior taste. This was "proved by the 
only proper evidence, the voice of men of letters in every 
country where the classics have been studied, and where a 
correct taste has prevailed" (p. 330). To Kingsley, Yale 
laid "the foundation of a correct taste..." (p. 330). When 
engaged in classical study, "every faculty of the mind is 
employed; not only the memory, judgment, and reasoning 
power, but the taste and fancy are occupied and improved"
(p. 330). Day and Kingsley illustrated that through the 
study of language, at its classical root, the student could 
"hardly fail to improve his taste and to enlarge his 
capacity to think, and to communicate thought" (p. 347) .
Again, the term "taste," understood metaphorically, 
submitted both a sacred and secular appeal while it also 
framed the Yale Report1s construction and imitation of 
prudential tradition. While I suggest that Day and Kingsley 
perpetuated Dwight’s notions of "taste" and "genius," it is 
also important to understand that Dwight depended upon 
conventions of prudential thought as well. Hence, Day and 
Kingsley not only imitate Dwight, but Dwight's models too.
For his secular understanding of taste, Dwight depended 
on the understanding of the term drawn from the moral
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philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. From this 
secular stance, taste was the refined moral sentiment and a 
pre-requisite to public virtue. Dwight connected the 
aesthetic poetic and the moral by asserting moral virtue to 
be the endpoint of their merger. Day and Kingsley, too, 
seem to have meant secular virtue as the endpoint of 
classical education. To them, classical education did not 
merely offer the means for future employment, but it 
generated the proper character to enact morality and thus 
public virtue. For Day and Kingsley, I argue, their 
rhetoric inescapably tied their sense of secular morality to 
their conceptualization of prudence.
The secular notion of taste leading to moral virtue 
blurred into the sacred notion as depicted by Jonathan 
Edwards, Dwight's maternal grandfather. Both Dwight and 
Edwards embraced regeneration by grace in sentiment before 
reason. "And both use the refinement of sensory taste, n 
Clark (1993) argues, "as a metaphor to describe the felt 
effect of grace, relying on the term relish to describe the 
heightened ability to perceive the good that was, for both, 
a primary consequence of regeneration" (p. 65, his 
emphasis). Perception of God's grace and beauty led to 
affection for that grace, or sacred taste, which, then, led 
to godly, virtuous actions. Therefore, for Dwight, part of 
prudence began in the ability to perceive and relish in 
moral and spiritual beauty. I contend that this was the so- 
called regenerative virtue and the meaning for sacred taste
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to which the language in Day and Kingsley's report aspired
as well. One could best enact and explore both morality and
the grace of God through classical education.
As I mentioned, "taste" is performed through a kind of
"genius." To Day (1829), part of Yale's purpose was
"rousing and guiding the powers of genius" (p. 301) .
Moreover, "The sublime [sic] efforts of genius consist in
the creations of the imagination, the discoveries of the
intellect, the conquests by which the dominions of science
are extended" (p. 302) . Kingsley thought genius resided,
partly, in the works of ancient Greeks. Kingsley wrote
that, "...the original works of Grecian genius are the
models by which artists, even at the present time, direct
their labors; the standards by which in great measure, their
merits are determined..." (p. 329). Furthermore, Kingsley
asked: "...[I]n order to understand the true spirit and
genius of English literature,--which is of the greatest
practical use, the literature of France, or the literature
of Greece and Rome?" (p. 332). Kingsley thought it was
Greece and Rome. In the closing arguments. Day and Kingsley
suggested that
. . .we [Americans] are the people, the genius of whose 
government and institutions more especially and 
imperiously than any other, demands that the field of 
classical learning be industriously and thoroughly 
explored and cultivated, and its riches productions 
gathered (p. 345).
In an essay written in 1787, under the title of An 
Essay on American Genius, Dwight proposed, with Hugh Blair, 
that genius, nationalistic poetry for instance, would pave
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the way for a refined, tasteful American citizenry. Clark 
(1987) suggests that "Dwight presented his notion of 
American genius as the core of his politicized doctrine of 
taste" (p. 158). Clearly, Day and Kingsley continued this 
tradition. Clark also explains that Dwight's Yale lectures 
somewhat re-defined genius into a general faculty of effort. 
As Clark notes, "This redefinition transports Blair's 
esthetic notion of genius as the native ability to create 
beauty directly into Dwight's political realm of moral 
action and public discourse" (p. 160). Dwight’s project 
filtered truth and error and generated the idea of a "city 
upon a hill" inhabited by regenerative souls (p. 161) . For 
Day and Kingsley, it took classical education to foster 
taste, but also to enact it by storing past works of genius 
within the mind, building upon and imitating them, and 
performing eloquence in the community. Classical education 
fostered this sense of prudence.
In Siam, Dwight's secular and sacred sense of taste and 
genius was the foundation of Dwight's prudential outlook.
It, too, had a heritage and took shape in his teaching style 
at Yale, but also emerged in the discourse of his students, 
Day and Kingsley. The students, like Dwight, linked taste 
with grace and the language of animated feeling or 
sentiment. They showed genius as a mode of distributing the 
impression of taste to the community. Clark (1993) thinks 
that
This act of impression was central to his [Dwight's]
instruction at Yale... instruction in public discourse
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[both in theology and rhetoric] that addressed first 
the taste, in both the sacred and the secular senses of 
that term, from which he believed would spring the sort 
of citizenship upon which his vision of community 
depended (p. 75) .
Dwight hand-picked Day to take his place as Yale ’ s
president. It is evident that Day, a mathematician, and
Kingsley, a professor of ancient languages, inherited
Dwight's notion of prudential action and discursive
practice.
Hence, from Jasinski's (1997) point of view, we might 
say that Day and Kinsley represented a specific prudential 
outlook that was also a performative tradition anchoring and 
organizing the process of rhetorical invention. It existed 
in and through the language of feeling and sentiment and 
used specifically the terms "taste" and "genius". It was 
best spoken through classicists radiating Dwight's sacred 
and secular notions of taste and genius. It depended on 
metaphorical thinking as its figurative and argumentative 
framework. Intellectual, conservative homiletic tradition 
perpetuated this thinking. Another way of putting it is 
that Day and Kingsley's rhetoric was an imitation of 
previous rhetoric, but their prudence also lived on through 
future rhetoric. For instance, while Austin Phelps, 
schooled at Yale's theological seminary, preached a much 
more rational stance compared to Dwight, a conventional view 
of prudence remained, not necessarily pure, but alive. 
Speaking of Austin Phelps, Professor of Sacred Oratory in 
Andover Theological Seminary from 1848-1879, Hirst (1993)
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explains that Phelps thought that "from the fountain of 
regenerated individual character would spring the right, 
unforced, and lasting response to every kind of social ill" 
(p. 78-79).
THE REPORT'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT
The authors' weaved their idea of prudence with 
metaphors. The metaphors revealed a standard way of viewing 
classical and practical education, and the regenerative 
vision of Dwight extrapolated from the metaphors of "taste" 
and "genius". Furthermore, Day and Kingsley's depiction of 
temporal reality is telling not only because the report's 
rhetoric created it, but it highlighted their prudential 
outlook by illustrating what they saw to be appropriate 
action, rhetorical response, and judgment in temporal 
action.
Undoubtedly, the symbolic prudence, as analyzed above, 
was a layered configuration of both sacred and secular 
arguments. The report advocated both the intellectual path 
to individual and societal moral attainment, but also a 
feeling-centered, more sacred notion of the same process.
In attempts to prudentially create a symbolic reality--a 
rhetorical vision of the past, present, and future--the 
classical became sacred and evangelical.
Day and Kingsley supply a fairly specific view of how 
they saw the wide sweep of past, present, and future. To 
them, the past, antiquity, was an era of beauty and 
perfection. The present was a struggle between the beauty of
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past treasures and the "business" or "practical" character 
of their contemporary America. The future, if students 
studied the past, would be bright. If Yale ignored the 
past, or made ancient languages optional, the future would 
be dismal.
To Day (1829), the past held "sublime discoveries" (p. 
311) . Kingsley thought along the same lines, but made a 
more profound statement. He said that a classical, literary 
education "is obviously distinct from a professional, 
education...The former is antecedent in time; the later 
rests upon the former as its most appropriate foundation"
(p. 324) . The works of the ancients, of "genius, " are 
"models" for artists. Ancient art supplied the "best 
guides, the surest interpreters of nature itself" (p. 328). 
To Kingsley, "Time, which brings to light so many defects, 
and suggests so many improvements in most of the discoveries 
of men, has added its sanction to the perfection. . . " (p.
330) . Speaking directly to the question of the practicality 
of ancient languages, Kingsley announced that "to begin with 
the modem languages in a course of education, is to reverse 
the order of nature" (p. 333) . Moreover, "to suppose the 
modem languages more practical than the ancient... is an 
obvious fallacy" (p. 333) . To study ancient languages was 
foundationally important and had always been so because "the 
learned world long ago settled this matter, and subsequent 
events and experience have confirmed their decision" (p.
344) .
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Not only did the study of ancient languages help
illustrate perfection in art and linguistic practice, but
also in character. Day and Kingsley (1829) illustrated that
...to appreciate justly the character of the ancients, 
the thorough study and accurate knowledge of their 
classics, in the language of the originals, are 
indispensable; as the simplicity, energy, and striking 
peculiarities of these pristine exemplars of freedom 
which are forcibly and beautifully displayed. . . (p.
345) .
When a student read the ancient literature in the ancient
language then
...such study carries the young pupil back to the 
earliest era in the history of mental efforts, and lays 
open to him the most simply and original operations of 
the mind and acquaints him with its brilliant and 
unrivaled productions (p. 346).
Even further, a classical education revealed "splendid
results of mental labors" and "seized [sic] the refined
treasures of antiquity" (p. 347). To study Greek was to
study "perfection" of "almost mathematical precision" (p.
347) .
What is most important to the authors was that ancient
insight revealed truth:
The ancient languages having been made the organ of 
communicating revealed religion to man....In a matter 
of such deep concern, what teacher will be disposed to 
forego any available means of ascertaining the truth?
As by biblical criticism, controversies involving 
eternal interests are often determined, faithfulness to 
the souls of men imposes an imperative obligation to 
read and know the Scriptures in their original 
simplicity and purity (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 348- 
349) .
Thus, for the student desiring to study the "Divine, " the 
bible, in its antique linguistic form, offered the "oracles 
of truth" (P. 349) . For Day and Kingsley, the Christian God
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"communicated to man in the ancient languages" (p. 349) .
Not only did the authors perfect the past, but made it 
sacred, and so too its languages.
To Day and Kingsley, the present was a struggle between 
the beauty of antiquity and a call for practical education 
within a "business" culture. Day (1829) thought that the 
public were "undoubtedly right, in demanding that there 
should be appropriate courses of education, accessible to 
all classes of youth, " but Day argued that this was not 
Yale's job (p. 318). In light of the "business" character 
of Day's era, as he depicted it, the argument that colleges 
should adopt "to the spirit and wants of the age" was wrong. 
Day thought that the argument that Yale and other classical 
colleges will "soon be deserted, unless they are better 
suited [sic] to the business character of the nation" was 
ill-conceived (p. 300) . He asked, "Do the public insist, 
that every college shall become a high-school, gymnasia, 
lycea, agricultural seminaries, &c" (p. 318)? Day did not 
think so because this would, in part, de-value college 
education: "What will induce parents in various and distant
parts of the country" Day inquired, "to send us their sons, 
when they have academies enough in their own neighborhood?" 
(p. 320) . The only way to maintain Yale's place in the 
"business character" of the nation was to offer an "elevated 
rank" of education.
Moreover, in this "business character" the "field of 
enterprise is so wide" that even a person of "a very limited
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stock of knowledge" could "push himself forward into notice 
and employment" or even to "office and popular applause"
(Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 321-322) . In this type of 
atmosphere, America needed a college like Yale in order to 
supply "high literary excellence, and professional 
distinction" (p. 322). Classical education gave a student 
sacredness, and the ability to influence others toward 
godliness.
Further, Yale was indeed changing. While critics 
charged that Yale started up in the days of "monkish 
ignorance, " Day (1829) responded that "nothing is more 
common, than to hear those who revisit the college, after a 
few years absence, express their surprise at the changes 
which have been made. . ." (p. 299) . "We believe, ” Day 
asserted, "that changes may, from time to time be made with 
advantage, to meet the varying demands of the community" (p. 
299) . Yale inevitably changed with time, but it was hasty 
to change everything. To Day, any institution ought to 
"still firmly adhere to some of its original features, it is 
from a higher principle, [rather] than a blind opposition to 
salutary reform" (p. 299) . Again using a key metaphor, Day 
believed in a cautious and gradual change.
In the Yale Report, the future had two possibilities.
As mentioned above, Yale could adhere to antiquity and 
prosper, or "blindly" change and "fall" into "blight." To 
Day (1829) , if Yale adopted a practical or vocational 
European approach then parents would not send their children
85
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to college. In Germany, for instance, there was no 
"parental" philosophy that helped guide and discipline the 
student. Day asked, "Would parents in this country consent 
to send their sons, at the age of sixteen, to an institution 
in which there should not be even an attempt at discipline, 
farther than to preserve order in the lecture room?" (p.
316). Raising the standards of admission was a good idea, 
but to allow students complete freedom of curriculum "shall 
only expose" Yale to "inevitable failure and ridicule" (p.
317) .
Moreover, Day and Kingsley illustrated that some French 
schools neglected the ancient languages and "that example, 
neither by its literary or moral results, can demand our 
imitation" (p. 345). If Yale made the study of ancient 
languages and option, then not only would its education sink 
in value, but also lead to a further perpetuation of 
commercialism. Day and Kingsley did not want to surrender 
to the business climate of the day: "The standard of 
scholarship would not only be lowered here, but we should 
become directly accessory to the depression of the present 
literary character of our country" (p. 345) .
Also, and as I mentioned, if Yale acquiesced to the 
call for mass practical education without foundational 
classical education, then the public would lose confidence 
in the institution. Certainly, a new class of student might 
walk the halls of Yale college, but "if we should not 
immediately suffer in point of number, yet we shall exchange
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the best portion of our students, for others of inferior
aims and attainments" (Day and Kingsley, 1829, p. 320, Day
and Kingsley's emphasis). If all educational institutions
in America offered the same "object, " then the "rivalry
becomes a mere scramble for numbers, a dexterous arrangement
of measures in beating up for recruits, the stand attainment
will sink lower and lower, till the colleges are brought to
a level with common academies" (p. 321).
However, even while Day called for a "high intellectual
culture" he understood that the business class would earn
most of the financial prosperity in the country:
Is it not desirable that they should be men of superior 
education, of large and liberal views, of those solid 
and elegant attainments, which will raise them to a 
higher distinction, than the mere possession of 
property; which will not allow them to hoard their 
treasures, or waste them in senseless extravagance; 
which will enable them to adorn society by their 
learning, to move in the more intelligent circles with 
dignity, and to make such an application of their 
wealth, as will be most honorable to themselves, and 
most beneficial to their country? (p. 323-324)
Hence, clearly Day and Kingsley thought that Yale and its
graduates out to regenerate the commercial go-getters in the
business climate or culture pervading Day and Kingsley's
era. Yale needed to spiritually re-awaken the commercial
culture.
The distinct textual context articulates a certain 
vision of the past, present, and future, and this expression 
leads to an over-arching idea about the practical wisdom of 
classical education. The temporal vision of the Yale Report 
is thus telling in three ways. First, it located the wisdom
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of classical education in the perfected language of God. 
Only through perpetuating the perfection of the past could 
one glean godly revelation. Second, because "business" 
tainted the present, it was only through a thorough, 
classical education that secular/sacred moral taste and 
genius emerged. One could not generate a language of 
sentiment without deep knowledge of the classics and 
Dwight's society needed this type of language in order to 
exist. Therefore, third, this textual context illustrated 
the prudence of Dwight's political vision and the metaphoric 
resources Day and Kingsley used to spur it along.
Clark (1987) illustrates that Dwight used the metaphor 
of "family" as a model for a happy political community.
Those who lead, Dwight thought, "should nurture the citizens 
as a virtuous parent nurtures his children" (p. 152). 
Moreover, societal leaders lead "on the basis of the same 
divine sanction and divine guidance that authorizes people 
to govern their own children" (p. 152). As quoted in Clark, 
Dwight, in 1791, said that these "virtuous rulers" were 
"...elevated to the first earthly distinction, entrusted 
with the first means of usefulness, and separated from the 
rest of men by peculiar insights of deity..." (p. 152) .
These insights took the form of both revelation from God, 
but also knowledge of God's language. Dwight thought that 
"the voice of god...entitled [leaders] to an unrivaled 
homage, and secured from opposition, disgrace [sic], and
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unrivaled irreverence as common parent to the great family
of the state" (p. 152).
Day and Kingsley surely thought the same way. To Day,
"When removed from under the roof of their parents, and
exposed to the untried scenes of temptation, it is necessary
that some faithful and affectionate guardian take them by
the hand, and guide their "steps" (1829, p. 303) . The
"parents" in the college were not only responsible for
disciplining the students, but also for illustrating the
vision of the type of leadership that would enact Dwight' s
plan. Day stated.
This consideration determines the kind of government 
which ought to be maintained in our colleges. As it is 
a substitute for the regulations of a family, it should 
approach as near to the character of parental control 
as the circumstances of the case will admit (p. 303).
Undoubtedly, Day and Kingsley meant this type of government
to also be the model for their country. Classically trained
people would lead this country by acclaiming the past as
perfect, and transforming the present "business" society
back to a literary one. Yale would produce students who
could spiritually re-awaken the culture because those
students would become the secular/sacred parents of a godly
society.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION 
In light of Harvard's move to make classical studies 
and ancient languages elective. Day and Kingsley revealed 
that prudent pedagogical policy was maintaining the 
pedagogical status quo; ancient languages stayed where they
89
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
were. To do this. Day and Kingsley defended classical 
education and asserted its importance over practical 
education through metaphor. They recovered the language of 
sentiment and feeling, and also borrowed the prudential 
conventions of Timothy Dwight by using the key terms of 
"taste" and "genius." This recovery fused a sacred/secular 
meaning for classical education itself. Also, the author's 
rhetorical re-enactment of an oratorical poetic within a 
perceived business culture illustrated the primary wisdom of 
maintaining the status quo. It would further develop 
Dwight's vision of a godly government.
Placed within the context of nineteenth century 
rhetorical culture. Day and Kingsley's sense of prudence had 
both successful consequences, and not so successful ones. I 
evaluate it as successful because it perpetuated the role of 
the classically trained rhetor in an oratorical society. 
Again, during the first part of the nineteenth century, the 
stronghold of the neoclassical tradition helped create a 
communitarian ethos helped along by classical, literary 
pedagogy. The Yale Report and the view of prudence it 
advanced gave solace and fuel to the classically educated. 
These types thought that the educated orator had a central 
cultural role of expressing and building moral consensus.
The notion of prudence that the Yale Report adhered to 
certainly helped Day and Kingsley advance their sense to 
many denominational schools in the West. For the most part, 
the report staved off any major pedagogical change in
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conservative, literary colleges for many years. The report 
and its model of prudence helped to prolong "neoclassical 
elitism" (Clark, 1993).
To Clark (1993), Dwight's doctrine was "developed in 
the eighteenth century, influential in the nineteenth, and 
perhaps still with us residually...worked explicitly against 
a democratic transformation of public discourse..." (p. 76). 
The model of prudence Day and Kingsley supplied helped the 
conservative, classical cause in the eyes of those already 
perpetuating classical elitism. However, it only alienated 
the industrial and agricultural yeoman. It made practical 
education illegitimate. It did not bring the working 
classes into the fold, nor could it. Those who disagreed 
with Day and Kingsley's standard of prudence, both 
politically and discursively, were, in fact, imprudent. 
Granted, during this early period farmers and industrialist 
thought classical education was nonsense and that science 
was too "magical" to learn. Regardless, the Yale Report 
certainly did not make classical education attractive to the 
yeoman agrarian and industrialist. If anything, it created 
a larger chasm between those desiring practical education 
and those clinging to the conservative way.
From Hall's (1980) perspective we might note that those 
academic, classical audiences read the report in a preferred 
manner. To them, communitarianism fit in with how they saw 
the culture. It made sense to them. It sounded like good 
news. For even those desiring practical education, we might
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say that Day and Kingsley offered some solace. A negotiated 
reading might have been one that scoffed at Day and 
Kingsley's arrogant argument that classical education was 
superior to other forms, yet applauded the idea that 
practical, vocational education had a place. Even the 
Morrill Act, once passed, gave legitimacy to classical 
pedagogy even as it advanced vocational education. However, 
we might also say that some readers might have received the 
report as one not having the entire national interest in 
mind, but a class interest instead. Prudence, thus, is up 
for grabs. To some, perhaps, the policy Day and Kingsley 
advocated, and the report itself, were prudent. To others, 
they certainly were not.
Again, according to Cmiel (1990), while a classical, 
literary education indoctrinated young gentleman into a 
refined style of speech and lifestyle, the classically 
educated elites had trouble conveying their message to the 
common people. Therefore, while I suggest that the 
tradition of prudence Day and Kingsley prolonged helped them 
in the eyes of other conservative classicists, their primary 
audience, it may have hindered them when it came to 
persuading anyone else outside that class. The Yale Report 
slowed down pedagogical progressivism in certain spheres. 
However, those spheres were populated, for the most part, by 
easily swayed, already cheering, classically trained 
audiences salivating at the ringing sounds of Latin and 
Greek. But practicality would soon have its day. It got a
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good shot in the arm when Francis Wayland reported the 
status of American higher education to Brown's overseeing 
corporation in 1850.
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CHAPTER POUR
FRANCIS WAYLAND AND HIS 1850 
"REPORT TO THE CORPORATION OF BROWN"
INTRODUCTION
Francis Wayland was born March 11, 1796, in New York 
City and died in 1865. His parents were both English 
immigrants. Strong religious teaching occupied his early 
childhood. On Sundays, before dinner, Wayland's parents 
taught him a new hymn; before tea, his parents taught him 
portions of the Catechism; after tea, his father read 
scriptures and explained their meaning; after that the 
family sang hymns and prayed.
His strong Christian, Baptist upbringing seemed to 
prepare him for his years at the Dutchess County Academy, 
and then at Union College. He graduated from Union on July 
28, 1813 at the age of seventeen. He then studied medicine, 
but decided to return to his Christian roots. He began 
study at the Theological Seminary at Andover in the autumn
of 1816. In 1817 he became a tutor at Union College
teaching the classical courses. In 1821 he entered his
pastorate at Boston's First Baptist Church. He was ordained
pastor on August, 21, and stayed in that post for five 
years.
He decided to leave Boston and return to Union College 
to teach in 1826. Although he was popular in Boston,
Wayland himself condemned his sermons because he thought 
they were lacking in the "simple and homely address 
essential to true popular effect, and [they were]
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constructed too much on lines of an ambitious, intellectual 
display" (Murry, 1891, pp. 55-56) . Wayland hardly got his 
feet wet back at Union when Brown declared a vacancy.
Wayland was president of Brown University from 1827 to 
1855. Although educational scholars dub Wayland a 
progressive, early in his career he embraced a 
conservative educational philosophy (Butts, 1939). Between 
1827 and 1840, Wayland did not challenge the status quo.
His radical call for reform did not come until after a trip 
to Great Britain. It was not that he wanted America's 
colleges to mirror English ones. Wayland did not think too 
highly of Oxford and Cambridge because these were places of 
"fruitless discussions" (p. 143). However, Wayland 
perceived a cultural chasm between England and America. To 
Wayland, the English college was near perfection for 
monastic and literary- needs, but America needed a newly 
styled system of higher education.
His voice of educational reform took flight in several 
speeches, articles and pamphlets. His most important works 
include his Thoughts on the Present Collegiate System in the 
United States, published in 1842, and his 1850 report to the 
corporation of Brown. He was conservative in his stance in 
1842, desiring to increase requirements for the bachelor's 
degree, and he did not advocate the elective system. What 
was clearly radical in his earlier work was that he thought 
Brown should supply an education for people desiring 
knowledge and skill in the practical arenas such as
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mercantilism and agriculture. Butts (1939) contends that
Wayland's 1842 pamphlet unveiled a "complete" statement of
the problems Wayland saw with early nineteenth century
American college education. Wayland's 1842 effort
proclaimed that America's students needed a narrower focus.
Though he did not explicitly support an elective
system, Wayland thought colleges assisted only ignorance by
promoting the ideal that students should learn all subjects:
Wayland pointed out, as others had done, that the 
amount of knowledge and number of courses had doubled 
or trebled since the colleges were first established 
and yet that the amount of time allowed for finishing 
the course had remained exactly the same; thus it had 
become impossible for young men to acquire all of this 
knowledge in such a manner as to insure proper mental 
discipline (Butts, 1939, p. 145).
Wayland's other ideas for reform included raising 
requirements for admission in order to instill in students 
an appreciation for thorough knowledge, but also to engender 
a "university" system through advancing all the important 
branches of knowledge. The classical course would lead to 
the B .A. and the practical would lead to the B.S. or B.
Litt. Wayland wanted to retain the classically prescribed 
college curriculum, but also wanted to expand the system and 
open Brown' s gates to everyone. Wayland thought that 
offering scientific knowledge and modes of scientific 
application to the arts, like farming, would increase the 
wealth of the country by way of the individual and, at the 
same time, enlighten the masses.
"His theories were the most advanced in terms of 
democracy since the days of Jefferson" (Butts, 1939, p.
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146) , but his recommendations did not take hold. He could 
not make the changes he wanted at Brown because of so many 
dissenting voices in the faculty. At the same time, 
enrollment had decreased almost twenty-five percent from 
1835 to 1849, and the college's income was plunging. In 
1849 Wayland tried to resign, but the Brown corporation 
would not let him. Instead, Wayland designed a new proposal 
for reform. In light of the situation, Wayland had to 
contend with several general contingencies, as implied 
above. First, he had to negotiate his radical ideas with 
the conservative scene of mid-nineteenth century American 
higher education; especially at Brown. He also had to re­
make Brown into an enticing place to earn an education. 
Finally, he had to deal with the glum state of Brown's 
income. What Wayland came up with was pretty much in line 
with his 1842 treatise, but much more radical.
In the first section of this chapter I will describe 
and summarize the report. Second, I will interpret the view 
of prudence Wayland advocated discursively. In the third 
section I will examine the report's textual context and how 
Wayland further developed his prudential outlook temporally. 
Finally, I will evaluate the historical consequence of 
Wayland's view of prudence, suggesting that it hindered his 
efforts at Brown, but helped his public rhetorical effort.
SUMMARY
Wayland's report is a broad treatise of seventy-six 
pages, organized categorically, and within each category,
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organized chronologically. Wayland discussed education in 
Great Britain, the progress of education in the United 
States, the condition of Brown University, how to make it 
more useful, and finally the value of collegiate degrees.
Wayland claimed in the first two sections that the 
nation's educational founders misunderstood the nation's 
unique educational needs; copying English traditions stifled 
American higher education. Thus, classical education 
created elitism, but practical education uplifted the 
practical longings of practical people. Wayland (1850) did 
not want a student "profoundly versed in mathematics or 
classics, and ignorant of all earthly things else..." (p.
37) .
Within his third section, his history of Brown, Wayland 
declared that he would alter Brown’s system in several ways. 
For instance, Wayland suggested abandoning the four-year 
fixed term of a college education. Wayland also proposed to 
determine time allotted for particular courses of 
instruction by the nature of the courses themselves. 
Additionally, he wanted to allow every student to choose a 
particular course of study and never interrupt it until 
finished. Wayland also suggested that Brown should 
continually revise the curriculum according to communal 
desire. He urged Brown to allow students to attend any 
particular course they wished to attend, allow for non­
degree seeking students, and award non-degree seekers with
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certification for every course pursued. To Wayland, these 
changes would help Brown fend for itself financially.
Wayland also wrote about the relationship between the 
corporation and the instructors. He argued that the 
corporation should furnish the instructor only with the 
necessary apparatus, lecture room, and library. Payment 
depended largely on individual academic and pedagogical 
talent in Wayland's scheme.
Moreover, talent and intellect were the true signature 
of an academic degree. Wayland (1850) believed that the 
degree in arts had become a social "knighthood" signifying 
no real "attainment" of knowledge. The degree had lost 
academic value. It was merely a social distinction.
Wayland wanted to change this, not only to bring more 
students from the working classes of society to college, but 
also to usurp the aristocratic label of the college degree.
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT
Wayland's claim was that Brown ought to democratize its 
education in order to uplift the practical classes of 
society. Consequently, this was what Wayland suggested was 
prudent pedagogical policy. The rhetorical sentiments of 
individuality, self-reliance, and commercial autonomy 
enacted Wayland's sense of prudence. A mode of rhetorical 
identification also helped bring his notion of prudence to 
life. Both Wayland's political ideals and his discursive 
practice were popular and conventional. Wayland used and
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perpetuated a representation of prudence consonant with the 
perceived egalitarianism in the age of Andrew Jackson. 
Individualism
As the nineteenth century marched on, "the rhetoric 
that emerged both within and outside the academy in America 
expressed...increasing individualism" (Clark and Halloran, 
1993, p. 13). Antczak (1985) explains that the watershed 
moment of Andrew Jackson's election marked the era and 
called for a "rhetoric of identification." Echoing 
Antczak’s perspective, Clark and Halloran (1993) explain 
that "Jackson defeated Adams by presenting himself to the 
voters as a representative personality, using rhetoric that 
addressed its audience not as citizens who must judge but as 
spectators observing a version of themselves" (p. 14) . 
Wayland exemplified this discursive practice and it brought 
to life his sense of prudence. In short, sentiments of 
individualism were more persuasive then classical 
argumentation.
The desire for practical training was, in Wayland's 
(1850) view, "Individualized in the bosom of every citizen" 
(p. 13) . Wayland's prose constructed a lush view of 
individuality in which "every man is desirous for himself 
and especially for his children, of that knowledge which is 
most essential to success in the field which is placed 
before him" (p. 13). Moreover, Wayland thought that "it is 
one thing to aid the struggles of genius oppressed by 
adversity," but it is "another to provide such inducements
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to education, that young men shall be enticed into the 
learned professions, who would be more useful and successful 
in other departments of life" (p. 35) . Every individual had 
his or her own unique calling. Wayland went on to say that 
any funds or scholarships given to entice students to enter 
Brown should "not paralyze the sentiment of honest, manly 
independence, without which genius itself is contemptible"
(p. 35) . A college or university ought not make a preacher 
out of a farmer, or vice versa.
Along the same lines, Wayland (1850) proposed that 
Brown must supply "courses of instruction, not for the 
benefit of one class, but for the benefit of all 
classes...Is there not reason to believe that, if such an 
education were furnished, they would cheerfully avail 
themselves of it?" (pp. 50-51). It was obvious to Wayland 
that individuals would snatch up opportunities for self 
progress. Also, Wayland justified his idea of prudence 
through that argument that "every man. . .has an equal right 
to the benefits of education, every man has a special right 
to that kind of education which will be of greatest value to 
him in the prosecution of useful industry" (pp. 56-57). 
Therefore, imparting only classical studies was, 
consequently, unjustified and imprudent.
Wayland (1850) also suggested that the corporation 
should support professors, but that Brown's corporation 
members could not "pretend any longer to hold themselves 
responsible for the support of every professor;
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nor. . .pretend to oversee him in the discharge of his duty" 
(p. 62) . Wayland thought that the professors should look to 
independent student fees for what the corporation could not 
give. In this way, "like every other man, the instructor 
will be brought directly in contact with the public, and his 
remuneration will be made to depend distinctly upon his 
industry and skill in his profession" (p. 62) . This 
discursive strategy recognized the ideal of self-reliance.
I suggest this rhetorical gesture was a key symbolic 
enactment of Wayland's prudential outlook.
Continuing his sentiments of individuality and self- 
reliance, Wayland (1850) argued that the college degrees 
were "mere privileges by courtesy" (p. 66). Wayland 
insisted that the A.B. should signify the possession of a 
specific amount of knowledge, and the A.M. a bit more. 
Wayland believed that if Brown reduced the number of studies 
an individual student took up, it would increase the value 
of the degree program. The student would have options and 
could take electives that substituted for other courses. Of 
significance, Wayland admitted that this kind of policy 
might greatly effect the classics, but "if by placing Latin 
and Greek upon their own merits, they are unable to retain 
their present place in the education of civilized and 
Christianized man, then let them give place to something 
better" (p. 74).
We can see that Wayland's treatment of academic degrees 
was a representative anecdote of his discursive treatment of
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individualism and self-reliance, and thus his sense of 
prudence. When the college degree was an individual program 
of study, aiding the student in an individual, practical 
quest, the degree obtained its merit. His talk about 
degrees and his policy solution to the problem indicated his 
idea of prudent policy and how he enacted it rhetorically 
through the gesture of curricular natural selection.
In short, Wayland supposed several stances on 
individualism and self-reliance. My point is that these 
stances were themselves discursive sentiments that 
articulated his implicit view of prudence. At the heart of 
it, he thought that every person longed for personal 
attainment, but he also thought that each individual was 
unique and had a special, individual calling. Not every 
person attained, or should attain, high intellectualism. As 
long as each individual was self-reliant and there was equal 
opportunity to seek out autonomy, Wayland was content. That 
would be prudent policy.
Additionally, this prudential perspective, and the 
inventional framework that constructed it, was consistent 
with Wayland's (183 5) thoughts in his Elements of Moral 
Science. In that work, Wayland argued that "every human 
being, is a distinct and separately accountable individual" 
(p. 202) . While each person was unique, equality reigned:
" [A] 11 men are placed under circumstances of perfect 
equality. Each separate individual, is created with 
precisely the same right to use the advantages with which
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God has endowed him, as every other individual" (p. 202, his 
emphasis). In this moral philosophy we also see the seeds 
of Wayland's primary ideal of prudence. This ideal, as 
manifested in his report and his text on moral philosophy, 
emerged out of the democratization of his era.
Wayland's report is a Jacksonian appeal. Antczak 
(1985) says that during the early period of the nineteenth 
century, with the aid of Jackson's election, a democratic 
audience emerged. A characteristic of this democratic 
audience was, in part, "outsideness;" a willingness to butt- 
heads. As Antczak puts it, "Americans saw themselves as 
potential 'heroes against the odds';increasingly confident 
in their can-do attitudes, they were willing and even eager 
to 'enter the scramble' and get ahead" (p. 49). This 
perception developed, Antczak contends, through the 
personality and exaggerated triumphs of Jackson. What is 
more, an aversion to authority existed and also an anti- 
intellectualism. Antczak, speaking of Jackson, says that he 
"was the key representative figure of American politics in 
the nineteenth century because with him, identification with 
a democratic character became the most effective mode of 
persuasion of the popular audience..." (p. 49).
Hence, I argue that Wayland developed these attitudes 
as dimensions of prudential conduct and discursive practice. 
I also suggest that Wayland might have seen himself as a 
sort of Jacksonian educator. Though a Baptist Whig, he 
apparently considered himself the outsider in an arena
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dominated by conservative, classical thought. He was trying 
to beat the odds in consideration for the mass populace. 
Crane (1962) says that Wayland's earlier critiques of 
classical education "struck a popular and potentially 
destructive note in the age of Jackson" (p. 107). The 
destructive note was that he still wanted to retain and 
improve the traditional classical course. However, in 1850, 
he thought the traditional courses should stand on their own 
merits. His democratic appeal illustrated that he seemingly 
longed to be the public's educational hero, and the 
classicist's villain.
Commercial Autonomy
A consistent economic voice further established 
Wayland's gestures of individualism and self-reliance. 
Through his mode of rhetorical identification, he 
established a sort of commercial personality for the 
democratic, autonomous agent. Again, Antczak (1985) reveals 
that in the age of Jackson the "rhetoric of personal 
identification" beat out the "rhetoric of issues" (p. 43).
To Antczak, "[T]he practice of Jacksonian politics, a 
rhetoric of personality led to reshaping the substance of 
politics..." (p. 43). The substance centered around 
"strictly personal considerations" (p. 43). While Wayland 
was not on the same political playing field as Jackson, I 
contend that he, too, engaged in a type of rhetoric of 
personality. Though it does not recant any triumphant 
measures, Wayland's report granted only a specific
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characterization for the moral individual: He or She was
economically viable. At the get-go, Wayland argued that 
"Every man among us is the architect of his own fortune" (p.
13) .
Two of Wayland's key ideas were that education was an 
article, and that universities ought to be economically 
independent. Discussing the history of American colleges, 
Wayland (1850) said that "the demand for the article 
produced in the colleges was falling off, not from the want 
of wealth, or intelligence, or enterprise in the community; 
but really because a smaller number of the community desired 
it" (p. 22). Wayland thought that to fix things meant 
offering newly styled and practical course work. This would 
allow colleges/universities to stray away from communal 
financial support. Wayland's point was that asking a 
community for money was not economically self-reliant. 
Harvard tried this system of communal charity, but Wayland 
did not think it worked out. Wayland offered extended 
statistics to argue that Harvard found it difficult to fund 
itself even as the community helped it along. Therefore, 
there was a profound problem with the system. Primarily, 
the problem rested in college and university administrators 
not being prudent enough to re-work pedagogy to become 
economically autonomous as institutions.
Wayland (1850) continued this thought when he discussed 
some proposals for agricultural and industrial schools. He 
argued that if traditional colleges did not provide for
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practical training, the populace would attend the new, 
practical institutions: "If the prestige of colleges should
be thus destroyed, and it be found that as good an education 
as they furnish, can be obtained in any of those other 
schools, the number of their students will be seriously 
diminished" (p. 60, his emphasis) . Brown had to change or 
it would become obsolete in the educational market-place.
If Brown would make the changes Wayland thought prudent, 
only then could it "reap all the benefit arising from the 
diffusion and progress of knowledge" (p. 61). Brown, like 
the individual, should be self-reliant— especially, like 
Jackson in New Orleans, in the face of adversity.
Furthermore, Wayland1s (1850) "history of the 
institution" (p. 41) was an economic narrative. He 
discussed the number of students, the salaries of teachers 
and administrators, he even supplied a table. He considered 
the income of the institution, the aid given to students, 
the money donated to the institution, the property assets of 
the institution, and the financial strategies the 
corporation followed to insure the college's success.
Wayland also recounted administrative deeds, but with an 
economic slant. He reported at length on how donors offered 
specific amounts for such things as the library and means 
for scientific progress. These were all commercial appeals 
that helped shape his prudential point of view.
Wayland concluded his treatise with several economic 
observations, also appeals shaping his conception of
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prudence. First, Brown could not exist much longer without
increased funding. Second, given the impractical mode of
education, even funding additions would not increase the
number of students unless a major provision created
"gratuitous" tuition. Third, "gratuitous" tuition would only
steal students from other colleges; it would not increase
the number of educated citizens in society or bring
education to the working classes. Fourth, the same amount
of money needed to sustain the college would, if they would
fix things the way Wayland wanted, add to the number of
students and "confer inestimable advantages on every class
of society" (1850, p. 75). While one might argue that
Wayland was simply reporting the obvious economic state of
things, I suggest his economic observations highlighted his
form of practical reasoning. His economic way of seeing and
talking bolstered what he considered prudential pedagogical
policy. He was declaring his thesis that
...our colleges are not filled because we do not 
furnish the education desired by the people...Our 
customers, therefore, come from the smallest class of 
society. . .We have produced an article for which the 
demand is diminishing... Is it not time to inquire 
whether we cannot furnish an article for which the 
demand will be, at least, somewhat more remunerative?" 
(p. 34) .
Thus, Wayland regarded students as customers seeking an 
article. His supply and demand way of thinking borrowed 
from a tradition of prudence founded in the commercialism of 
the mid-nineteenth century. He enacted a notion of prudence 
through the language of commercialism that revealed the 
importance of economic self-reliance. Wayland thought that
108
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Brown had to adapt or become impoverished. The school had
to re-invigorate the value of its education so customers
could consume a product of value and, through the process of
consumption, become more independent.
Crane (1962) says that "his [Wayland1 s] policies were
based on principles of educational finance..." (p. 68).
Crane also reveals that Wayland's "individualistic moral
code, qualified faith in democracy and progress, and
laissez-faire economics, which he associated with the laws
of the universe, provided the basis for his educational
policies" (p. 69). I have suggested that the discursive
practice of talking in an economic tone helped establish
Wayland's sense of prudence. It illustrated the type of
democratic personality he advocated. Put simply, the ideal
democratic personality, the prudent democrat, was
economically viable. Additionally, the economically viable
person was also moral:
Wayland's investigations in political economy 
strengthened his convention that a benevolent 
providence governed human affairs and that social 
institutions must meet the test of utility...Thus the 
laws of political economy paralleled and reinforced 
those of moral philosophy" (Crane, p. 74) .
As Wayland himself put it.
Reasoning from unquestionable facts in the history of 
man, they [wealthy people] have incontrovertibly proved 
that the precepts of Jesus Christ, in all their 
simplicity, point out the only rules of conduct, in 
obedience to which, either nations or individuals can 
become either rich or happy (cited in Crane, p. 74).
Thus, Christian rules apparently supported Wayland's
prudential framework. These rules took formal structure in
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both his moral philosophy and political economy texts. In 
1837, Wayland announced that "the principles of political 
economy are so closely analogous to those of Moral 
Philosophy, that almost every question in one, may be argued 
on grounds belonging to the other" (p. vi) .
To summarize, Wayland’s idea of prudential pedagogical 
policy was to democratize higher education. In light of 
Jasinski's (1997) ideas, we might say that Wayland enacted 
this sense of prudence through appeals to Jacksonian 
individualism and the language of commercialism. The 
conventions of mid-nineteenth century democratic 
individualism, Wayland's personal understanding of moral 
philosophy and political economy founded in Baptist, 
Christian belief all produced Wayland's conceptualization of 
prudence. Because he thought that the rules of moral 
philosophy and political economy were manifestations of the 
laws of God, he used this conventional mid-nineteenth 
century conviction in order to invent his rhetoric. Through 
his prudential way of thinking Wayland sought to fashion a 
specific kind of democratic identification. He offered his 
own commercial/Christian, political/moral personality to the 
public as a rhetorical illustration of the ideal democratic 
citizen. Furthermore, Brown was a symbolic representation 
of the democratic individual. To make Brown profitable was 
to make it an example of prudent democratic and moral 
action.
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THE REPORT'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT 
I have suggested that Wayland emphasized what he saw as 
the ideal democratic citizen. In this, Wayland was a 
rhetorical popularizer. I also suggest that Wayland 
unveiled an ideal of democratic citizenry for the audience 
to model. Like other rhetorical popularizers, his 
"invitation was not to some specific and shareable 
commitment but to the acceptance of individual moral 
responsibility generally" (Clark and Halloran, 1993, p. 14). 
Rhetors often conveyed this "responsibility" through story. 
While Wayland offered specific educational proposals to 
advance his prudential stance, he also conveyed an ideal 
democratic character in narrative action.
Crane (1962) thinks that Wayland believed that "simple 
piety...was more effective than learning" (p. 71).
Moreover, Wayland "paid little attention to the historical 
development of human institutions. If educators obeyed 
moral laws, their schools would probably prosper; in any 
case, their consciences would be clear" (p. 69) . While I am 
not as cynical as Crane, I do think that Wayland perhaps 
meant his historical narratives to frame the role of 
American college education and the specific role of the 
practical classes within the unfolding of American history.
Therefore, his narrative history further dramatized the 
plight of the practical classes, illustrated the specific 
character of college as sin economic article to be consumed 
on the road of individual progress, but, most importantly,
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promoted what he thought was the ideal, prudent person in 
action. His textual context was a fiction that helped him 
develop his prudential view in temporal flow. The 
rhetorical appeals that established his prudential outlook 
also generated his textual context.
When Hart (1997) discusses the rhetorical narrative, he 
urges critics to look for specific things. For one, the 
critic ought to decide if a narrative springs from a master 
story. Second, one should decide what proposition a 
narrative is revealing. Third, one should decide what 
propositions the narrative masks. Simply put, Wayland's 
fiction was the story of mythical frontierism, pragmatism 
and the self-made American. It submitted the proposition 
that a college/university education ought to be a utility 
for the individual on the way to economic well-being. 
However, the story hid the proposition that a 
college/university ought to function more classically, 
producing a sense of communitarianism. More specifically, 
it hid the competing view of prudence articulated in the 
Yale Report. Through his individualistic and commercial 
appeals, Wayland generated a seemingly historic narrative 
that implicitly refuted the Yale Report by masking the 
perceived importance of classical education with the face of 
individual, commercial merit.
Wayland painted the past as a time of warranted mis­
understanding and error; early American educators simply did 
not understand the progressive nature of the American
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experiment. Wayland illustrated the present in his repeated 
comments about the "progress” of the nation, and in his 
rendering of Brown as an educational embarrassment. His 
vision of the future took form in his arguments about what 
might happen if the corporation would not, or would, heed 
his proposals. For instance, if the corporation conceded to 
Wayland's policy requests it would result in financial 
compensation to Brown.
Wayland spent most of his rhetorical effort recounting 
the past. For instance, in the first major section of the 
report, he weaved a narrative about the traditional style of 
education in Great Britain. To Wayland (1850) , it was 
"natural" for early American educators to desire to copy 
English literary colleges. However, Wayland argued that 
because the United States was unlike Great Britain in many 
regards, the fit between literary education and American 
democratic idealism and pragmatism was unnatural. In the 
first place, "they were ecclesiastical and monastic 
institutions" (p. 6) . Further, Wayland argued that British 
universities were not universities at all, but rather "a 
collection of colleges" (p. 7). The single college, the 
prototype for the colonial colleges, was a "distinct 
society" (p. 9) . The object was to educate youthful, future 
ministers in a family environment: "master, fellows, tutors, 
and students, all sitting at the same table" (p. 9).
Wayland made the traditional English college out to be an 
educational utopia for future clergy. Moreover, "if a
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system of this kind were to be adopted, we do not perceive 
in what manner the present organization of a college in an 
English university could be improved" (p. 9) .
However, Wayland suggested that historic American 
colleges unwittingly fouled things up. Mistakes took shape 
in, first, an adoption of "the unchangeable period of four 
years, and confined the course of education almost 
exclusively to Greek, Latin and Mathematics..." (1850, p.
9). Also, early American colleges assumed the role of 
superintendence over the student, but did not arrange their 
buildings appropriately or require all officers to live on 
campus. Third, "We [American educators] gave to the college 
the power of conferring all degrees in the several 
faculties..." (p. 10). Wayland insisted, "Hence, in this 
country, a college and a university mean the same thing; in 
England their meaning is very dissimilar. The result of our 
departures from the original idea has been in every respect 
unfortunate" (p. 10) . Finally, Wayland maintained that the 
American experimentation was in some ways successful. "We 
certainly have then no reason to be ashamed of the colleges 
founded in our early history" (p. 11).
Yet, Wayland emphasized throughout the first section 
that the nation's educational founders misunderstood the 
nation's educational needs; copying English traditions 
stifled American higher education. The early colleges 
wanted to use the clergy model for every student. Early 
educators did not quite see the unique democratic sense of
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Americanism. America had a unique democratic 
characteristic, much different from that of England, and 
Wayland thought this should force educators to re-model 
American higher education.
Within the second section of the report, Wayland (1850) 
became even more of an embellishing historian, still focused 
on the past, but closer to home. With the "dawn" of the 
nineteenth century new sciences held the "progress of 
civilization" (p. 12). Literacy increased, the Revolution 
quickened intellectualism, and the "spirit of self-reliance 
had gained strength by the result of that [the Revolution] 
contest" (p. 12). To Wayland, the nation's wealth and its 
ability to produce was unending, but the country needed 
scientific application. Given this historical rendition, 
Wayland argued, "That such a people could be satisfied with 
the teaching of Greek, Latin, and the element of 
Mathematics, was plainly impossible" (p. 12). Practical 
needs awaited. "What could Virgil and Horace and Homer and 
Demosthenes, with a little mathematics and natural 
philosophy, do towards developing the untold resources of 
this continent?" (p. 12-13). With frontier leanings,
Wayland became an opponent to classical education; he became 
the "outsider."
Wayland (1850) suggested that instead of changing the 
curriculum, turn of the century educators held to 
unwarranted assumptions that "our colleges were designed 
exclusively for professional [clergy, law, medicine] men;
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that they must teach all that professional men might wish to 
know; and that all this must be taught in four years..." (p.
14). Wayland narrated all the various branches of learning 
offered in New England at the turn of the century and, using 
his statistical mode of support, he added all the weeks of 
four years, divided it by twenty courses of study, and 
concluded that "in this manner all continuity of thought is 
interrupted, and literary enthusiasm rendered almost 
impossible" (p. 15). However, to the turn of the century 
educators, "The greater the number of studies prescribed in 
the curriculum, the more generous is believed to be the 
education imparted" (p. 15). Wayland thought this was 
absurd.
Still focusing on the past, but alluding to the 
present, Wayland (1850) contended that the result of turn of 
the century educational system was not all that impressive. 
Again using his statistical examples, he made it obvious 
that given a fixed amount of time, an increase of subjects 
resulted in a decrease in learning: "the student never 
carrying forward his knowledge to its results, but being 
ever fagging at elements, looses all enthusiasm in the 
pursuit of science" (p. 17). Colleges during the early part 
of the nineteenth century simply taught too much. Not only 
did this impact the student, but also the teacher. The 
teacher could "not mark out such a course as he would wish 
to teach, but must teach as much as he can, in the fragment 
of time allotted to him" (p. 19) .
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In his historical narrative, Wayland discussed the 
early history of American higher education from an even more 
economic way of seeing. Through several paragraphs, Wayland 
argued that the option of teaching more in the same fixed 
time was partly a function of the institution's economic 
framework. In the early history of American education the 
institutions supported themselves. Most usually, at least 
before communal support, institutions depended on fees, but 
fees were failing because of the movement of civilization. 
The early system was correct, thought Wayland, but did not 
move quick enough. Offering a glimpse of his view of 
American progress, Wayland (1850) insisted, "It is manifest 
to the most casual observer, that the movement of 
civilization is precisely in the line of the useful arts"
(p. 21) . Given this seemingly natural movement, colleges, 
especially in New England, had difficulty supporting 
themselves: "The fact is, they were originally schools for 
merely the learned professions, and the proportion of those 
whole desired a professional education was growing less" (p. 
22) .
Thus, what resulted was a system of charity in order to 
create a "gratuitous" tuition. However, to Wayland (1850) 
there was "danger, under such a system, that colleges may be 
tempted to render education cheap instead of striving to 
render it valuable" (p. 31). This system of looking for 
financial support in the community in order to supply very 
cheap education failed, according to Wayland. It did not
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work because the practice did not idealize the American 
democratic experiment of individuality and commercial self- 
reliance that saturated the culture outside of academe.
When Wayland elaborated on his present-day Brown he 
praised the university, but, in light of its charity system 
and lack of innovative courses, also said that in many ways 
it was not the type of institution it ought to be. "The 
number of students, for several years, has not increased, 
but has diminished. Hence the condition of the institution 
has become embarrassed" (1850, p. 47). Wayland continued 
the point by reporting that not only might Brown exhaust its 
funds if the failing system persisted, but also that the 
institution would lose prestige if it did not alter its 
educational philosophy. Given these problems, Wayland 
suggested that two options of "relief" were open to the 
college. The first was to continue what it was doing and 
adjust the branches of learning available, but stay the 
literary framework and fixed time. However, this would "do 
nothing, or very little either to reduce the cost of tuition 
or render it gratuitous. It would not, therefore, increase 
the number of students" (p. 49) . The second option would be 
to meet the needs of the public.
As he continued developing his historical narrative, 
Wayland (1850) illustrated that one of the reasons for 
making education more practical and democratic was its 
expedience (p. 57) . I suggest this expediency supported and 
developed Wayland's sense of prudence in temporal movement.
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Again, to Wayland, American civilization was naturally
advancing toward the useful arts. Past minds did not
appreciate the practical arts, but the birth of practical
industry called for practical knowledge. He revealed, "The
time then would seem to have arrived, when our institutions
of learning are called upon to place themselves in harmony
with the advanced and rapidly advancing condition of
society" (p. 59) . Brown had to make the change or it would
"suffer injury from one of the most hopeful indications of
the progress of civilization" (p. 61) . Again, Brown could
not be economically self-reliant without the change.
I already mentioned the changes Wayland wanted to make
at Brown and the general policy he advocated and thus
apparently thought prudent. As he proposed his changes, he
revealed one a glimpse of how he saw the possible future.
He said, "The object of the change would be to adapt the
institution to the wants, not of a class, but of the whole
community" (1850, p. 53). This would relieve Brown's
embarrassment by allowing the college to fend for itself:
[N] o other way can this result be arrived at, than by 
extending its advantages to every class of the 
community, and thus increasing the number of its 
pupils. The more it can do for itself, the less 
need...[for] friends...(p. 54).
Wayland, therefore, saw past educational systems as 
blunders to be re-worked. Wayland flooded the present with 
progressivism outside the academy, but stagnation within. 
The future, if the committee accepted Wayland's proposals, 
would help perpetuate Wayland's notion of prudence and thus
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help sustain commercial individualism. Through a narrative 
voice, he weaved a tale aligned to the popular American 
mythos of the time. Antczak (1985) says that democratic 
urges often got help from frontier notions. He explains 
that "people of the time found the notion of the possibility 
for advancement increasingly credible, so much so that their 
belief eventually generalized to the characteristically 
American 'myth of the self-made man' and 'the doctrine of 
self-improvement'" (p. 26). Materialism amounted to an 
idealism; and, the "moral habits of self-determination" 
helped average citizens think in political terms. Wayland's 
narrative emphasized a prudential stance marked by moral, 
commercial individualism and a democratic mythos.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
In sum, Wayland's view of prudent policy was that Brown 
ought to extend the curriculum and allow the working classes 
to attend the institution. I suggest that the languages of 
individuality, self-reliance, and economic materialism were 
the linguistic idioms that actualized Wayland's sense of 
prudence. These idioms were traditions Wayland adhered to 
for dramatic effect. He used these idioms for the purpose 
of uplifting the practical classes of society— or individual 
citizens within those classes— in accordance with what he 
identified as universal laws.
Further, Wayland also made himself out to be the 
Jacksonian outsider through his often anti-classical 
sentiments and the recanting of his own moral causes. Not
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unlike his political contemporaries, Wayland's was a 
rhetoric of identification. This was his argumentative 
structure. "The speaker had to be a sort of representative 
figure," says Antczak (1985), "— representative in the sense 
of being one with, one of the democratic audience, of 
course; but representative too of the discipline he wanted 
to popularize" (p. 9, his emphasis) . In this case, WayLand 
wanted to popularize not rhetoric, but college education, 
and a mode of prudential conduct and discursive practice.
Though the work he crafted was a formalized report to 
Brown's corporation, it was, as Crane contends, an appeal to 
the public. To be sure, future pragmatist perpetuated his 
prudential outlook of democratic, commercial individualism, 
and his inventional framework. Noting the democratic 
idealism within the 1850 report, Crane (1962) states, "It 
was used by critics of the classics and became a weapon for 
politicians demanding radical changes in existing 
institutions that they might serve the 'practical' needs of 
laborers and farmers" (p. 67) .
Considering the textual context, we can see that 
Wayland constructed a narrative in order to tap into popular 
mythos. To Antczak, the average citizen longed for 
education in order to live up to the ideal of materialism 
and self-determination. Wayland re-worked higher education 
as a utility to this end. This was his proposition. No 
longer was a college education about the sanctity of 
classical thought. Wayland's prudential outlook was that
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Brown must democratize higher education in light of the
story he narrated. Wayland's was the age of commercial
individualism, and he gave terms of action to his audience
through his rhetorical narrative.
Wayland seemed to have acquired much of the financial
support he needed to inaugurate his new system before he
published the report. Though the New England Baptists did
not give funding, after Brown published the report the
public rallied to Wayland's economic needs, and the
corporation conceded. The Fall semester of 1850 saw
Wayland's new scheme in action. There was a wide choice of
courses, though the traditional classics remained. Brown
promised a master's degree to students desiring to learn and
complete their studies in the classics. The Bachelor of
Arts offered elective options and only required one ancient
language. The only course required of all students was
Wayland's own in moral philosophy. According to Crane
(1962), it was the only course required "since it treated of
God's laws for human conduct, it was more important than
purely intellectual studies" (p. 117). Wayland appointed
two new professors in "practical" education. Brown welcomed
non-degree seekers, especially their payments. What is of
most importance, however, is that
Wayland's reforms involved not simply the 
introduction of elective studies, but, more 
significantly, the provision of a pattern of 
alternative degrees and educational opportunities for 
students who were not seeking any degree at all. Here, 
in a repudiation of the traditional curriculum which 
appears almost chaotic, was the ultimate expression of
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the president's utilitarianism and educational 
democracy (Crane, p.118).
Typical of an administrator, Wayland was happy to see 
Brown's classrooms very full. The increase in number was 
dramatic. However, the major increase was in the demand for 
a classical education and the new master's degree. While 
Wayland thought it was his educational proposals that were 
ringing in the profits, Crane asserts that it was a new tide 
in American prosperity.
Even still, Brown was a successful institution for a 
while, but such controversies as dormitory supervision 
forced Wayland to oust professors and replace them with 
trusted alumni. Faculty morale grew low, especially in 
regards to Wayland's fee system of compensation. Wayland 
resigned in 1855. Brown elected Wayland a Fellow of the 
University, but he broke all ties with Brown in 1857 because 
the new president, Barnes Sears, for all intents and 
purposes dismantled Wayland's radical system. He did so, 
says Crane (1962), in order to gain respect with his 
colleagues around the country "who had viewed Brown's 'new 
system' primarily as an attack on the ancient languages" (p. 
120) .
Historically, Wayland and his 1850 report have many 
fans. For instance, Crane (1962) reveals that the 
democratic leanings and emphasis on a practical curriculum 
forecasted two of the major features of American colleges 
after the Civil War. William Green Roelker (1943) acclaimed
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Wayland as the pioneer of the elective system. Butts (1939)
ranks Wayland with Jefferson.
However, many educators responded to Wayland's rhetoric
and his prudential way of thinking with harshness. Crane
(1962), though giving Wayland some credit, explains that
Wayland's progressive ideas "rudely interrupted the natural
development of Brown University, though they were
accompanied by a major addition to its funds" (p. 66) .
Harvard historian Samuel Eliot Morison (1936) thought that
Wayland's philosophy did more "mischief" than any other
reform notion in the history of American education. Bronson
(1914) says that Wayland struggled between the objective of
mass education and the objective of a sound Brown treasury.
Wriston (1945) thinks that Wayland's report was "vitiated by
a fatal confusion" (p. 30). More specifically.
It was framed with a view not only to educational 
reform but also to financial support. No program can 
have promotion as one of its essential elements and be 
educationally successful. It is not possible to make 
money by emphasis on 'high intellectual culture,' 
practical philosophy, or Christian ethics (cited in 
Crane, 1962, p. 68) .
Wayland's contemporaries at Brown, like Sears, shared many
of the above critical sentiments. Wayland's critics
commented on the danger of placing the principles of supply
and demand upon pedagogical culture.
Nevertheless, I contend that Wayland's prudential
outlook and the way he enacted it through his rhetoric
helped his persuasive effort. Wayland's prudential thought
promoted the commercially viable, self-reliant individual as
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the epitome of ideal Christian morality and as a model of 
the ideal democratic personality. X suggest that this aided 
his quest to democratize higher education in America not 
only because it helped perpetuate his own moral and economic 
codes, but also an American mythos he obviously embraced.
It helped because he borrowed his prudence from an immensely 
popular public sentiment. While for the most part the 
faculty of Brown were ashamed by the report, as were others 
in the higher education scene, the general public, 
especially those in Rhode Island, seem to have rallied to 
Wayland's side (Crane, 1962).
Hence, we can say from Hall's (1980) perspective that 
perhaps the general public, or those advocating democratic 
notions, read the meaning that Wayland actually intended; 
this idea that democratic individualism was synonymous with 
commercial self-reliance and morality. However, we can say, 
too, that perhaps a negotiated reading led some in the 
culture to think in terms of democratic pedagogy, but also 
retort the supply and demand way of thinking. However, 
others might have read it not as a slogan for and from the 
democratic masses, but rather an attack on ancient 
languages. And I do not think that is really what Wayland 
intended. He was saying that classical courses, courses he 
had taught at Union College, simply needed to compete with 
more vocational studies. He wanted all the types of courses 
under the same roof to give students choice.
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In short, I suggest that his prudential way of thinking 
hindered his efforts within the educational scene. His 
changes at Brown were short-lived, and scholars savoring the 
sacredness of classical education have consistently berated 
his appeals. Maybe Wayland wanted to antagonize 
conservative educators. If so, this clash gives credence to 
the successfulness of his effort for the future. While he 
made little lasting headway in his immediate arena, he 
became a martyr for his cause. Progressive voices still 
herald him as an educational savior and imitate his sense of 
prudence. Even J.B. Turner, though he did not discuss 
Wayland's proposal, certainly enlisted similar notions of 
American democratic individualism in his speech to a rural 
crowed in Illinois.
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CHAPTER FIVE
JONATHAN BALDWIN TURNER AND HIS 1851 
"PLAN FOR AN INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY"
INTRODUCTION 
Jonathan Baldwin Turner was b o m  on a farm in 
Massachusetts, December 7, 1805, and died on January 10, 
1899. His father was an Army captain, and his grandfather a 
lieutenant. Turner was of English, French, and Norman 
origin. Turner was a strong, vigorous youth— a farm boy 
type. But he was smart as well. The practical knowledge he 
picked up here and there he taught to others. He also 
worked for neighbors when he was not needed at home.
Turner's family wanted him to stay home and not venture 
off to school like his older brother. When Turner was 
twenty-one his father gave him a deed to all the Turner 
property. However, Turner's brother, Asa, persuaded his 
father to allow Jonathan to enter Yale, as Asa himself had 
done. At Yale, Turner was appointed as an instructor of a 
gymnasium school connected with Yale, but Turner also took 
preparatory courses in order to enter Yale. When he 
finished his preparatory work, Turner entered the Classical 
Department at Yale. He took prizes in English composition 
and Greek. After the summer vacation of 1832, Turner 
returned to Yale, but things would soon change his 
educational process.
In 1833 Jeremiah Day personally suggested to Jonathan 
Turner that he journey to Illinois to teach at Illinois 
College in Jacksonville. Although Turner had not yet
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graduated from Yale, Day promised to award him the degree if 
he went west before his graduation. Henry (1961) explains 
that "Turner's enlistment in Illinois education and the 
reasons for it had the quality of a volunteer for missionary 
duty" (p. vii) . Turner was not the first Yale student or 
graduate to venture that way. The Presbyterians helped 
establish Illinois College and wanted Yale graduates to help 
develop the religious frontier through education.. The number 
of Yale graduates in Illinois led to the formation of the 
"Yale Band," a group of seven. Included in the seven was 
Turner’s older brother, Asa. These seven had organized, in 
1829, "The Illinois Association" to promote learning and 
religion in the rural area through preaching and 
establishing a seminary of learning.
Turner, however, was unorthodox and did not strictly 
adhere to conservative doctrines. Turner dabbled in 
religion, politics, and education and was sort of a roaming 
"evangelist of ideas" (Henry, 1961, p. viii), but his 
unconventional stances brought him criticism. For instance, 
conservatives rebuked him when he attacked the views of his 
Presbyterian roots. Early on, he spoke against slavery 
before it was popular to do so. In the educational arena, 
he voiced the need for practical education for the working 
classes and the impracticality of a classical education for 
the yeoman agrarian and industrialist. He was so boisterous 
that he became the "center of public turmoil" in Illinois 
(p. viii) . According to Henry, "Like Horace Mann, he used
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every occasion he could find--teachers' meetings, sermons, 
county fairs— to awaken the people to a greater interest in 
their schools and in how to advance their welfare" (p. ix) . 
Edmund James, president of Illinois College, called him "A 
prophet of democracy in the western country" (cited in
Henry, p. ix) . Even so, in 1848, the Presbyterians forced
Turner to abandon his post at Illinois College. Turner, 
then, returned to the love of his youth, agriculture.
Instead of going back to his Massachusetts homestead, 
however, he remained in Illinois.
While he was advancing agricultural products like the 
Osage Orange, which made it possible to fence the prairie, 
Turner also lectured both in and out of Illinois on the
social and practical advancement of the "working class." He
became associated with the movement for the creation of an 
industrial university in Illinois, and through the 1850's 
was the principal lobbyist for the Illinois Industrial 
League. He gave several speeches very similar in nature.
One speech Turner delivered to a convention in Granville, 
November 18, 1851, best captured his prudential outlook, his 
view of reality, and what he saw as the plight of the 
laboring classes.
When he taught, Turner was a teacher in the humanities, 
specializing in rhetoric, Latin, and Greek. According to 
Henry (1961), Turner most usually offered "purple passages" 
and a "grand manner" of speaking characteristic of early 
nineteenth century oratory (p. xi) . This is true, but
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perhaps he needed to maneuver around his classical training 
for this speech. I suggest that Turner faced two general 
exigencies. First, he had to promote a pedagogical plan 
that brought the rural crowd into the fold; he had to 
convince them that it was prudent for a farmer to have a 
college or university education. Second, in light of his 
classical training, he had to identify with his rural 
audience.
In the first section of this chapter, I will describe 
Turner's speech. Second, I will interpret the notion of 
prudence he developed rhetorically. In the third section I 
will examine the speech's textual context in order to more 
fully understand the sense of prudence Turner advanced 
through textual time. Finally, I will explain how Turner's 
prudential outlook aided his persuasive effort.
SUMMARY
Turner's speech was about the proposition to devise an 
Industrial University in the state of Illinois. Turner's 
arguments for a new university took shape through several 
different sections. He first discussed what he interpreted 
as the "want" of the industrial classes and how they could 
themselves supply it. Then he moved to offer his arguments 
for practical education by contrasting practical education 
with a classical education. Finally, he spoke of funding 
and administering the would-be industrial college.
As Turner began his speech, he established what he saw 
as a natural relationship between the professional class and
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the industrial class. This class division was necessary, 
but the industrial class had, heretofore, received the short 
end of the stick in regard to education. The professional 
classes had their specific schools, curriculums, textbooks, 
teachers, but civilized society had not yet afforded the 
working classes with a unique and appropriate educational 
system. Turner believed the working classes desired their 
own educational niche.
To Turner, existing institutions could not offer such 
an education. There needed to be parallel educational 
schemes that correlated to the opposite destinies of the two 
classes. Through a new education system, Turner wanted to 
supply the working classes with a different, practical 
pedagogical process that might bring them higher social 
standing.
As Turner continued his speech, he insisted that 
progressive efforts should not focus on primary education. 
Education, like water, flowed downhill. Moreover, he argued 
that a National Institute of Science should exist to help 
coordinate industrial universities in each class with other 
schools like lyceums and high schools. Turner wanted a 
federal eye on the ball.
Turner's plan also focused on specific, practical 
principles. For instance, he urged that any industrial 
university must have several appropriate buildings. He also 
thought that instruction should cover the "anatomy and 
physiology, the nature" (1851, p. 73) of almost every living
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animal, bird, insect and plant under the sun. Turner
suggested that the university should instruct students on
the nature of soils, on the nature of manufacturing, on the
"political, financial, domestic, and manual economy...to all
industrial processes..." (p. 73). Even further, the model
industrial university would to teach law, the theory and art
of government, the laws of vicinage, health, trade,
commerce, ethics, and accounting. In short, Turner desired
the institution to teach
...all those studies and sciences, of whatever sort, 
which tend to throw light upon any art or employment 
which any student may desire to master, or upon any 
duty he may be called to perform, or which may tend to 
secure his moral, civil, social, and industrial 
perfections as a man (p. 73)
Apparently, Turner wanted nothing left out.
He suggested, too, that professors ought to hold annual
experiments. In order to accomplish these experiments, the
institution required plentiful resources like appropriate
grounds and collections of vegetation. Turner insisted that
there should also be a number of buildings to secure a
successful experimentation process and a shed to keep tools
in. When the experiments started producing results the
state would create a patent office to register inventions.
Additionally, any industrial education would have an
industrial library with practical literature. Students
would come from any class and stay at the institution for
any length of time they were willing to pay for, either in
money or necessary work on the grounds. Even more, Turner
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envisioned an annual fair during which students showcased 
their efforts and professors lectured.
Turner then moved to ideas about how to handle the 
administration and funding of his hypothetical, practical 
institution. He thought a fund already existing for the 
purpose of creating a college would do the trick. Illinois 
designed the fund to give a college to the "people." And 
the administration of such a college would be in the hands 
of the "people." He wanted the Governor to nominate a board 
of five to look after the funds. The Senate would confirm 
the nominations. If any members of the board were 
"sinister" the people could impeach them.
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT
I suggest that Turner's prudential sense of appropriate 
pedagogical policy was that the yeoman agrarians ought to 
have their own educational scheme. We can recall that 
Jasinski (1997) thinks a performative tradition exists in 
and through certain linguistic idioms, particular speaking 
voices, figurative and argumentative patterns, and future 
generic conventions. The idea of prudence that emerged in 
Turner's discourse primarily existed in and through the 
language of myth. Turner became a representative hero of 
that myth not only because he bought into the mythic cause, 
but because he shed his classical identity. The myth took 
shape in the metonymic structure of his argument and the 
anti-intellectualism Turner professed. This tradition, more 
or less, was perpetuated by other rhetors, especially in the
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late nineteenth century during the agrarian revolts, to 
enliven agrarian ideals through the story.
Metonvnrv
The essence of metonymy is that it reduces substantive 
reality to a word or phrase. Hart (1997) says that metonymy 
refers to "using the name of one thing as the name for 
something else to which it has a logical relationship" (p. 
151). This stylistic device functions to generate a new 
association among ideas. Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) say that metonymy provides a spotlight on the 
intellectual focus of a rhetorical effort. It calls 
attention to a single feature. The example Hart (1997) uses 
is the phrase, "Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait" (p.
151) , which reduces the Iraqi military to a single villain. 
This reduction, however, can be dangerous. Burke (1950) 
thinks that a metonymic reduction does not capture the 
essence or substance of reality. Leff (1989) thinks that 
this stylistic device does not consider "the motives and 
interests that inform the substance of human behavior..."
(p. 120). To Leff, this type of logic reduces "all human 
action to naturalistic correlations, to mere processes..."
(p. 120). Echoing Burke and Leff, Madsen (1993) states, "A 
mytonymic construction of an event would be a 
misrepresentation or deflection of the essence of the event"
(p. 210).
Turner's speech reduced social reality to what he 
called a non-antagonistical relationship between the so-
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called professional class and the working class. While this
mytonymic structure of social reality maybe mis-represented
the existing substance of Turner's external reality, this
social organization gave potentiality to the prudential
action he advocated. We can see the logic advancing
throughout his speech as he compared and contrasted the
destinies of the two classes of people.
In the introduction of his "plan, " Turner (1851)
proposed his metonymic view of reality:
All civilized society is, necessarily, divided into two 
distinct cooperative, not antagonistic, classes; a 
small class, whose proper business it is to teach the 
true principle of religion, law, medicine, science, 
art, and literature; and a much larger class, who are 
engaged in some form of labor in agriculture, commerce, 
and the arts (p. 69) .
He called one class the "professional" class and the other
the "industrial" class. Society needed very few people in
the professional class, but Turner implied that a seducing
professional siren often snatched up individuals not suited
for that class. While Turner concluded that the
professionals were unique, he also seemed heartened by the
number and preponderance of workers.
To Turner, it was problematic for a "worker" to become
a "professional." The life of each class was the antithesis
to the other. From Turner's perspective, if fate had one
picked for farming, it would be ridiculous to combat that
destiny. A "farmer at birth" had to embrace the practical
life and long for a practical education, not a classical
one. "How absurd would it seem," Turner (1851) mused, "to
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set a clergyman to plowing and. studying the depredations of 
blights, insects, the growing of crops, etc., in order to 
give him habits of thought and mental discipline for the 
pulpit.. ." (p. 81). A person destined for a practical art
would learn "all that God has made, and all that human art 
has done" (p. 81) .
Like Wayland, Turner believed that the existing 
pedagogical system needed to radically change, but Turner 
was much more revolutionary than Wayland. The professional 
classes had their liberal education. They had enough 
literature to "well-nigh sink a whole navy of ships" (1851, 
p. 70) . The industrial class, however, had no schools, 
university, professors, or apparatus. As Turner revealed, 
"In other words, society has become, long since, wise enough 
to know that its teachers need to be educated; but it has 
not yet become wise enough to know that its workers need 
education just as much" (p. 70, his emphasis).
True, teachers offered rudiments of a practical 
education in the early schooling years, but that education 
was not nearly enough for Turner. While the classicists, 
like Wayland, had invited the industrialists to higher 
education. Turner thought that the process "set by some of 
our older professional institutions [was to] keep the rising 
and blazing thought of the industrial masses from burning 
too furiously" (1851, p. 70) . Turner insisted, "They 
[professionalists] have hauled a canoe alongside of their 
huge professional steamships and invited all the farmers and
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mechanics of the State to jump on board and sail with
them..." (p. 70). Turner admitted that the professionalists
might have had their hearts in the right place, but they did
not know how to "save," as Turner put it, the workers. The
workers needed to "save" themselves.
Therefore, Turner (1851) wanted to generate a totally
new scheme of industrial education. His idea was that no
existing institution could supply effective practical
pedagogy. Those colleges could not escape their
professional, literary design. "Their whole spirit or aim
is literary and intellectual— not practical and industrial;
to make men of books and ready speech— not men of work, and
industrial, silent thought" (p. 71). Again, one should not
attempt to tempt fate:
But the very best classical scholars are often the very 
worst practical reasoners; and that they should be made 
workers is contrary to the nature of things, the fixed 
laws of God. The whole interest, business, and destiny 
for life of the two classes run in opposite lines; and 
that the same course of study should be equally well 
adapted to both is as utterly impossible as that the 
same pursuits and habits should equally concern and 
benefit both classes (pp. 71-72).
Thus, the working class needed its own "system of liberal
education... adapted to their own pursuits; to create for
them an industrial literature, adapted to their professional
institutes" (p. 72, his emphasis). Why? Turner thought
this should "elevate them, their pursuits, and their
posterity to that relative position in human society for
which God designed them" (p. 72).
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The metonymic logic that marks Turner's prudential 
outlook was similar to the prudential thinking of John C. 
Calhoun. This suggests that this basic prudential 
perspective already existed discursively in the rhetorical 
and political culture of the day. Calhoun also argued that 
civilized society must, necessarily, divide itself between a 
working and professional class. To Hofstadter (1970), 
Calhoun wanted division of labor adapted to the needs of the 
particular geographical sections of the United States. 
Calhoun thought the North had wage labor, the West the 
farmer, and the South, slavery. To Calhoun, all were 
correct divisions. Turner was talking only of the western 
farmer and mechanic. My point is that Turner used a marker 
of societal organization perhaps most popularly promoted by 
Calhoun. Calhoun, and other rhetors, established it in the 
oratorical culture of the day. Unlike Calhoun, however, 
Turner wanted to upset the roles.
Hence, Turner's idea of prudence depended on this 
metonymic way of structuring society, but from a particular 
slant. Turner seemingly believed in a natural aristocracy 
much like Thomas Jefferson did. Marmor (1988) insists that 
Jefferson thought an American aristocracy would spring from 
"more distant and humble counties of the nation" (p. 6) .
They would not be aristocratic in birth, but in humble hard- 
work and self-reliance. Jefferson thought that the best 
suited to lead were the simple people. Jefferson expected 
that the members of this natural aristocracy would "emerge
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from the farm houses of yeoman America, not the Federalist 
drawing rooms of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and 
Charleston" (Marmor, p. 15) . Calhoun was born into this 
idea and perpetuated it, but, as Hofstader (1970) observes, 
he too rigidly perceived the dichotomy- Calhoun's 
contemporary. Turner, did not.
Thus, not only did Turner' s logic generate a natural 
dichotomy in line with the tradition popularized by Calhoun, 
but hearkened back to the Jeffersonian ideal of a new, 
natural aristocracy tempered by simplicity and agrarian 
values. According to Turner (1851), the workers would rise 
up and form their own aristocracy. Americans had to produce 
a nobility with the leisure and means for agricultural 
experimentation. For Turner, this nobility would come "from 
our own ranks, to aid and serve, not to domineer over and 
control us" (p. 77) . There was no rise to such a level 
without the hierarchy Turner built through his metonymic 
logic. There was no natural aristocracy without a non­
aristocracy. Turner's notion of prudence depended on this 
metonymic structure.
In short, Turner established a way of thinking and 
acting prudently using a metonmyic logic that reduced 
reality to a struggle between two natural classes of people. 
In this, Turner resonated the popular sentiments of Calhoun, 
one of the most prolific rhetoricians of Turner's era. I 
contend that Turner used that tradition, but stepped back to 
adhere to the Jeffersonian ideal of a natural aristocracy.
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This yeoman aristocracy was also dependent upon the 
metonymic logic on which Turner relied.
Anti-Intellectualism
Hart (1997) says that rhetoric often reduces evil to a 
scapegoat, "a person, group, or idea treated as the 
incarnation of evil" (p. 270). A rhetor can scapegoat 
something else. Burke calls this victimage. A rhetor might 
scapegoat him or herself. Burke calls this mortification. 
"In either case," Hart asserts, "rhetoric cleanses the soul 
of sin and provides new 'attitudes’ for use in daily 
decision-making" (p. 271). When looking for processes of 
scapegoating, Hart suggests one ought to consider how strong 
or overt the scapegoating is, where the scapegoat resides, 
if the scapegoat resides in another person or group, and why 
that person or group is being victimized. As mentioned, I 
suggest that the language of anti-intellectualism was 
another aspect of Turner's prudential representation. He 
used anti-intellectual sentiments to overtly scapegoat the 
professional class and classical education, and his own 
background.
Turner revealed, in part, his anti-intellectual 
sentiment when he asserted that classical education did not 
necessarily have all there was to say about mental and moral 
discipline. With a sarcastic tone, Turner (1851) admitted 
that he trembled "at the thought of being arraigned before 
the tribunal of all the monks and ecclesiastics of the Old 
World, and no small number of their progeny in the New" (p.
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79) for advancing practical education. Sure, classicists
should become fine writers and talkers and, therefore, learn
the dead and living languages, but "it has become quite
doubtful whether, even in their case, such a course is most
beneficial..." (p. 79). While mental discipline did arrive
for these literary types through daily course of study, it
only hindered their teaching effort. Turner thought that a
"classical teacher who has no original, spontaneous power of
thought, and knows nothing but Latin and Greek, however
perfectly, is enough to stultify a whole generation of boys
and make them all pedantic fools like himself" (p. 80).
Turner (1851) also believed that there was just too
much talk and too many "purple passages." "This chronic
diarrhoea of exhortation, while the social atmosphere of the
age tends to engender, tends far less to public health than
many suppose" (p. 80). Turner promoted an idea of mental
and moral discipline--a conceptualization of prudence--that
came from daily practice of simple farming. To Turner, "The
history of the Quakers shows that more sound sense, a purer
morality, and more elevated practical piety can exist, and
does exist, entirely without it [classical education], than
is commonly found with it" (p. 80) . Thus, the practice of
"sophistical cant" and "verbose declamation" had too much
power over "obvious facts" (p. 81).
There was no way for a classicist to teach a person
suited for a life in agriculture:
It may do for the man of books to plunge at once amid 
the catacombs of buried nations and languages, to soar
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
away to Greece and Rome, or Nova Zembla, Kamchatka, and 
the fixed stars, before he knows how to plant his own 
beans, or harness his own horse, or can tell whether 
the functions of his own body are performed by a heart, 
stomach, and lungs, or with a gizzard or gills (Turner, 
1851, p. 80).
Common people had to rise and generate a new pedagogical 
process, "unless, indeed, the pedantic professional trifles 
of one man in a thousand are of more consequence than the 
daily vital interests of all the rest of mankind" (p. 82).
According to Burke, hierarchy helps generate obedience 
and communication, but one cannot obey everything since 
humans are imperfect. Thus, this imperfection feeds guilt, 
or pollution, into human language systems. When individuals 
recognize guilt, both victimage and mortification occur.
The catharsis or purification comes through victimage and/or 
mortification, and leads to a state of stasis, or 
redemption. The rhetor is a new self. Thus, on one level, 
by evoking sentiments of anti-intellectualism Turner was 
renewing himself by wringing himself away from his own 
educational background that he perceived as out of date. He 
was building, through his rhetoric, an agrarian character 
for himself and this discursive gesture encompassed his 
notion of prudence. Also, still working within his 
metonymic logic. Turner used his own elite style to make fun 
of it and treated classical studies, and the class that 
promoted it, as the incarnation of societal evil. This also 
helped develop the sense of prudential action he advocated.
Additionally, Turner's anti-intellectualism associated 
him with the same feeling popular in the oratorical culture
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of his day. I classify his anti-intellectual sentiment as a 
characteristic of what Cmiel (1990) calls a middling style 
of rhetorical discourse. We can recall that this middling 
style mixed the literary eloquent with the uneducated raw. 
Because literary education was so powerful in the early part 
of the nineteenth century, rhetoricians, to sway the common 
populace, had to escape the chains of refined speech, as I 
mentioned. Again, Cmiel identifies several basic 
characteristics of this effort, including intrusive 
informality, calculated bluntness, jargon and euphemism. 
Cmiel thinks that the invention of this middling style 
provoked a "war over the soul of American life" (p. 66) .
There existed a battle between the refined style and the 
raw. Turner's speech was a microcosm of this war. Along 
with his refined speech spawning from his classical 
training, he used calculated bluntness and euphemism, and at 
points great informality, to, again, scapegoat his own 
educational background, literary studies, and the class that 
employed it.
During the same period, mid-nineteenth century 
romanticism helped offer a Saxon eloquence, or a humble 
style of speech. In several cases, Turner (1851) disclaimed 
his plan. For instance, when presenting his points he said,
" [A] nd let them pass for whatever the true friends of the 
cause may think them worth" (p. 71) . When he described his 
plan of administration, he revealed, in his humble style, 
that if someone had a better idea then he would "cheerfully
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accord with it" (p. 84) . Turner used an often adorned style 
to promote an unadorned, simple attitude and new, simple, 
unadorned hierarchy. This was a representation of 
appropriate political action and discursive practice.
Mvth
Myths are "the substance of culture" (Hart, 1997, p. 
242) . A culture’s dominant myths hold "...a society's 
collectivity of persistent values, handed down from 
generation to generation, that help to make the world 
understandable, support the social order, and educate the 
society’s young" (Rushing & Frentz, 1978, p. 67). Robertson 
(1980) says, "Myths are self-justifying. Because they often 
carry social ideals, the people who use them and participate 
in them assume that the ideals justify the past out of which 
these ideals came" (p. 19). A myth can rationalize decision 
making. A myth can hold the seeds of prudence, but Burke 
(1947) sees a difference between political ideology and 
myth. Myth drifts to the side of image, but ideology drifts 
to the side of ideas, though image and ideology obviously 
bleed into one another. Burke sees myth as a non-political 
first principle of the political; it is pre-political. As 
Braden (1983) puts it, "[M]yth provides an effective means 
of establishing identification or consubstantiality. When 
the speaker activates the myth, listeners develop feelings 
of kinship or oneness with him" (p. 74) . When a speaker 
activates a myth through speech, that invigorates the pre­
political narrative, the society that embraces it, and the
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individuals that participate in that society and story. One 
of the most important markers of Turner's conception of 
prudence was his activation, dependence and perpetuation of 
mythic agrarianism. With it, he helped energize a specific 
audience identity.
This agrarian myth was a story of the yeoman farmer and 
his sacred tie to land. Hofstadter (1955) describes part of 
the myth: "Because he [the yeoman farmer] lived in close
communion with beneficent nature, his life was believed to 
have a wholesomeness and integrity impossible for the 
depraved populations of cities" (p.24-25). Burkholder 
(1989) describes several themes of the myth often used in 
nineteenth century populist rhetoric. Four of the themes 
are important for my purposes here. First, small landowners 
were archetypal citizens. As Burkholder puts it, "Self- 
sufficient and economically independent, yeomen farmers were 
the foundation of democratic society" (p. 294). Second, 
agriculture was uniquely important to society and called for 
governmental protection. Third, America was the "garden of 
the world" and "[f]orces outside the garden, in other 
countries and in the American east, were suspect and 
probably evil" (p. 294). Finally, nature was beneficent and 
honest labor reaped its bounty.
There were several instances that indicate that the 
yeoman agrarian was the ideal citizen to Turner, but this 
was perhaps best illustrated when he discussed what kind of
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student ought to attend, and who should control his
propositional university. Turner (1851) said that
A man of real skill is amazed at the slovenly ignorance 
and waste he everywhere discovers on all parts of their 
premises, and still more to hear them boast of their 
ignorance of all 'book farming, ' and maintain that 
' their children can do as well as they have done' ; and 
it certainly would be a great pity if they could not 
(p. 78).
Turner wanted to tap into the mythical possibilities of the 
situation, but also wanted to refute the often unfriendly 
response some farmers gave to scientific agricultural 
education. Turner wanted students amazed at the ignorance 
and waste .and wanting to change that tide. "The man whose 
highest conception of earthly bliss is a log hut in an 
uninclosed yard, " Turner announced, "where pigs of two 
species are allowed equal rights, unless the four-legged 
tribe chance to get the upper hand, will be found no patron 
of industrial universities" (p. 78) . Turner would cast a 
certain type of yeoman in his mythic drama.
He also thought that another class of untaught farmers 
was not right for his school. These were the farmers 
schooled in management of capital and labor, not in the 
actual labor. As Turner (1851) put it, "[DJeprive them of 
these [their management skills] , and confine them to the 
varied culture of a small farm, and they would starve in 
five years, where a true farmer would amass a small fortune" 
(p. 78) . It was the self-reliant, independent farmer Turner 
praised.
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Turner (1851) also suggested that these true farmers 
were democratic exemplars, as he desired to place control of 
the university in their hands. When he pondered the 
question of administration of the would-be institution he 
said that
...without hesitation and without fear, that this whole 
interest should, from the first, be placed directly in 
the hands of the people, and the whole people, without 
any mediators or advisers, legislative or 
ecclesiastical, save only their own appointed agents, 
and their own jurors and courts of justice, to which, 
of course, all alike must submit (p. 82).
Turner meant the agrarian yeoman when he used the term
"people." If a board member did to take into constant
consideration the "interest of properly and worthily
educating all the sons of her [the state's] soil," then the
people would "set on such a man, if the miscreant wretch
lives, for all future time, a mark as much blacker than the
mark set on Cain as midnight is darker than noonday" (p.
83) .
Another mythic theme Turner articulated was that, in
light of the above illustrations, government would have a
direct hand in the protection and progression of the
agrarian ideal:
The fund given to this State by the general government, 
expressly for this purpose, is amply sufficient, 
without a dollar from any other source; and it is a 
mean if not an illegal perversion of this fund to use 
it for any other purpose. It was given to the people, 
the whole people, of this State— not for a class, a 
party, or sect, or conglomeration of sects...(Turner, 
1851, p. 82).
This idea of using educational funding for the "people," or 
for yeoman farmers and industrialists, was very important to
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Turner because governmental funding and endless promotion of 
professional and classical education was the "inevitable 
result of trying to crowd all liberal practical education 
into one narrow sphere of life" (p. 79) . If government 
would fund an agricultural and industrial university these 
yeoman heroes would not be as they were "starving 
scavengers," but "honored members" of the mythic yeoman 
class.
Turner also said that Illinois lost financial resources 
because of farming ignorance; thus he again tied agriculture 
to government. Using an economic argument woven within his 
mythic proclamation, Turner suggested that "in a few years 
the entire cost of the whole institution would be annually 
saved to the State in the above interests alone, aside from 
all its other benefits..." (p. 75).
Turner also illustrated the theme of the garden and the 
theme of honest labor. He weaved a lush tale of his school 
as an agrarian utopia managed through diligent labor. Smith 
(1950) says that the "image of this vast and constantly 
growing agricultural society in the interior of the 
continent became one of the dominant symbols of the 
nineteenth-century" (p. 123). Turner tapped into this 
symbolism. It is my conjecture that while part of his plan 
included necessary "garden speak," he embellished the 
symbol, especially the associated "labor" symbol, for 
rhetorical purposes. Even if he did not mean to, the 
symbolism still existed. "The master symbol of the garden, "
148
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Smith explains, "embraced a cluster of metaphors expressing 
fecundity, growth, increase, and blissful labor in the 
earth, all centering about the heroic figure of the 
idealized frontier farmer armed with that supreme agrarian 
weapon, the sacred plow" (p. 123) .
Turner went back and forth between his recanting of 
labor and the fruits it brought. For instance, early in his 
plan he illustrated the importance of annual experiments. 
Turner (1851) revealed specific examples for each 
department, but his point was that every professor labor not 
only to expand existing practical knowledge, but also 
because the "most natural and effectual mental discipline 
possible for any man arises from setting him to earnest and 
constant thought about things he daily does, sees, and 
handles. . .to make them thinking laborers. . . (p. 80, his 
emphasis).
As for those needing "at this late hour" to write the 
textbooks, professors would "...be men of the most eminent, 
practical ability in their several departments... or all the 
peculiar benefits of the system would be lost" (Turner,
1850,p. 76). Professors would not only preach, but practice 
what they did. In Turner's program, the professors would 
give lectures in the colder months of the year so that they, 
and their students, could labor during the warmer months.
The students would come from any class and stay at the 
institution for any length of time they were willing to pay 
for, either in money or labor. Moreover, "[a]mong those who
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labor, medals and testimonials of merit should be given to 
those who perform their tasks with the most promptitude, 
energy, care, and skill" (Turner, 1851, p. 76). In the 
process of reward. Turner would "let the law of nature, 
instead of the law of rakes and dandies, be regarded, and 
the true impression ever made on the mind of all around, 
that work alone is honorable, and indolence certain 
disgrace, if not ruin" (p. 76, his emphasis).
Turner used lush symbolism when he revealed the garden 
resources required for the labor of the university. There 
was, for instance, a direct cluster between labor and the 
garden. On his institution. Turner (1851) would have "a 
botanical and common garden...orchards and fruit- 
yards... lawns and promenades, in which the beautiful art of 
landscape-gardening could be appropriately applied and 
illustrated..." (p. 75). Furthermore, Turner desired to 
maintain "...all varieties of pasture, meadow, and tillage 
needful for the successful prosecution of the needful annual 
experiments" (p. 75). On these symbolic grounds, Turner 
wanted samples of "every variety of domestic animal, and of 
every tree, plant, and vegetable that can minister to the 
health, wealth, or taste and comfort of the people..." (p. 
75) .
The myth of the garden and the farmer as its 
archetypal hero was a mainstay as a performative tradition. 
Walt Whitman called the West and its farmers "the real 
genuine America" (cited in Smith, 1950, p. 124) . Ben
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Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and many other popular 
writers of that day, helped this notion along. Franklin 
theorized a society based in the agrarian mythos. In the 
late 1780's Franklin declared agriculture as the business of 
America (Smith, p. 125). Likewise, Jefferson contended, 
"Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, 
if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made 
His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue" 
(cited in Edwards, 1976, p. 23) . Smith (1950) says of 
Jefferson, "He saw the cultivator of the earth, the 
husbandman who tilled his own acres, as the rock upon which 
the American republic must stand" (p. 128) . Jefferson used 
his agrarian ideal for political endeavors like the 
Northwest Ordinance that opened the trans-Allegheny and 
eventually admitted new Western states, he arranged a plan 
for the country to give out public lands to individual 
owners, and he achieved the Louisiana Purchase, not to 
mention his educational experiment at the University of 
Virginia.
The discursive assertions and political actions of 
Jefferson were also simply part of a rich fabric of ideas 
and attitudes living within the rhetorical culture of his 
era. Eisinger (1947) finds several themes of agrarianism in 
the late eighteenth century by pursuing the writings of the 
time:
[A] griculture is the only source of real wealth; that 
every man has a natural right to land; that labor 
expended in cultivating the earth confers a valid title 
to it; that the ownership of land, by making the farmer
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independent, gives him social status and dignity, while 
constant contact with nature in the course of his 
labors makes him virtuous and happy; that America 
offers a unique example of society embodying these 
traits; and, as a general inference from all the 
propositions, that government should be dedicated to 
the interests of the freehold farmer (cited in Smith, 
1950, p. 126).
Thus, early on in American history the farmer was a
republican symbol. This symbolism continued throughout the
early part of the nineteenth century along with westward
settlement.
However, by 183 0, Smith (1950) contends, there were two 
conflicting views of agrarianism. Smith says that "each of 
these new agrarianisms found expression in imaginative and 
symbolic terms: that of the South in a pastoral literature
of the plantation, that of the Northwest in the myth of the 
garden of the world with the idealized Western yeoman as its 
focal point" (p. 133). Turner continued the tradition of 
Jefferson. Calhoun took the Southern perspective. While 
for Calhoun the laboring class were the slaves, for Turner 
they were the heroic yeoman farmers. During the middle part 
of the century, as Smith puts it, the mythic agrarian yeoman 
was the "darling of poets and social theorists.... [the 
yeoman symbol] is one of the most tangible things we mean 
when we speak of the development of democratic ideas in the 
United States" (p. 135). Turner assimilated the myth in his 
speech. It became a resource for his prudential point of 
view both as a mode of political action and discursive 
possibility.
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TURNER'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT 
As mentioned above, myth is a story, a narrative, and 
therefore a type of narrative strategy. Not only does the 
myth, once activated by a rhetor, provide identification and 
a heightened sense of community (Hart, 1997), but the form 
of the myth gives direction to human action. Many "identity 
myths" plot out the narrative course of the myth's hero. 
According to Rushing(1989a), "In a truly transcendent myth, 
although the hero may be from a particular culture and thus 
appear in a time and space-bound guise, his or her message 
will be universal" (p. 35). Specifically, the hero usually 
has an extraordinary, but modest birth, proves early 
superhuman strength, rises to distinction and authority, and 
gains great victories over forces of evil. In essence, 
Turner asked his audience members to rise up and become 
heroic; and he did it through the mythic context he weaved. 
Like the textual context of Wayland's report. Turner also 
fictionalized a figurative sentiment popular in the culture 
of his day in order to further develop the educational 
policy he thought was prudent. The use of metonymy, anti- 
intellectualism, and myth helped generate the narrative he 
weaved.
Turner recounted a past controlled by "pedantic fools."
"Ancient worthies," generated only confusion by focusing not
on the simple facts in front of them, but on abstract
theories. As Turner (1851) put it,
I think the exclusive and extravagant claims set up for 
ancient lore, as a means of disciplining the reasoning
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powers, simply ridiculous when examined in the light of 
those ancient worthies who produced that 
literature...If it produces infallible practical 
reasoners, we have a great many thousand infallible 
antagonistic truths, and ten thousand conflicting paths 
of right, interest, duty, and salvation (p. 80).
He continued to scapegoat the classicists by aligning them
with these so-called "ancient worthies." He called
classical education an "evasive discipline" which had given
power to "sophistical cant" and "stereotyped nonsense,"
instead of the "obvious facts" (p. 80). To Turner "verbose
declamation" would hold sway over the educational schemes of
the country until "any man will just be at the trouble to
open his eyes and his ears" to sense the garden of the
world. Even so, this ancient invention and diffusion of
confusion continued as the classically trained mind
perpetuated the ideals of the ancients.
Thus, Turner saw the present as dominated by a caste
system controlled by the professional classicists, and he
saw his time as ripe for a heroic class rebellion. If the
industrial classes would rise up, then an implicit American
caste system would fall. This was a foundational goal of
his scapegoating strategy and why he put the agrarian
audience in narrative action. Still relying on his
metonymic logic, Turner (1851) argued that America's elite
educationalists, though not aristocratic in the European
sense, had nevertheless helped develop a "caste education,
legislation, and literature" (p. 78). The caste
participants would only desire to perfect the hierarchy
unless a competing discourse upset the perfection:
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If any one class provide for their own liberal 
education in the State, as they should do, while 
another class neglect his, it is as inevitable as the 
law of gravitation that they should form a ruling caste 
or class by themselves, and wield their power more or 
less for their own exclusive interests, and the 
interests of their friends (p. 78).
The country's leaders had neglected industrial and
agricultural education. This left the working classes in the
dark "while the professions have been studied till trifles
and fooleries have been magnified into matters of immense
importance, and tornadoes of windy words and barrels of
innocent ink shed over them in vain" (p. 79) .
Most of Turner's speech was about the future. It was a
plan of what could be. It was a deliberating proposal in
the language of a ceremonial celebration of the mythic
agrarians and their future utopia close in the distance.
The idea for the future Turner created was that his plan, or
one like it, would come to fruition. As such, Turner was a
prophetic voice singing a truism for the future. For
instance, Turner closed his remarks by illustrating the crux
of the historical moment and the eventuality of the
proposition:
Others may feel a little alarm when, for the first time 
in the history of the world, they see the millions 
throwing themselves aloof from all political and 
ecclesiastical control, and attempting to devise a 
system of liberal education for themselves; but, on 
mature reflection, we trust they will approve the plan- 
-or, if they are too old to change, their children will 
(1851, p. 85).
This plan, like a farmer's life, was fated. It was the 
fixed law of God that the people would design this
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university. To not adhere to the plan, or the general jest 
of it, would be to kill the drama he has depicted.
Rushing (1986) sees myth as an unfolding drama. If 
that is so, than Burke's dramatistic pentad is useful in 
understanding the motivation of the myth. Burke (1969) 
insists, "...any complete statement about motives will offer 
some kind of answer to these five questions: what was done
(act) , when or where it was done (scene) , who did it 
(agent) , how he [or she] did it (agency) , and why (purpose) " 
(p. xv) . Thus, this perspective affords us a crisp way of 
looking at Turner's vision of the future. From this 
perspective. Turner's story was that the agrarian farmer and 
industrialist (agent), living within a caste-system 
controlled by classically learned professionals (scene) 
would re-do the American caste-system (act) , with the aid of 
practical education (agency), in order to promote an 
educational order aloof from political and ecclesiastical 
control (purpose).
The ratios are interesting too. Foss (1989) suggests, 
"A ratio is a pairing of two of the elements in a pentad in 
order to discover the relationship between them and the 
effect that each has on the other" (p. 339) . Some terms, if 
emphasized, will shadow others. The agent dominated Turner's 
symbolic story. The agent, when in conjunction with the 
other elements of Burke’s scheme, and in light of Turner's 
metonymic logic, scapegoating, and mythic sentiments, became 
the central figure of his effort. Turner centered on the
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character of the yeoman agrarian and industrialist.
Further, the disposition of the yeoman, laden with symbolism 
of purity, simplicity, honorable labor, and fate, made the 
pedagogical plan he advanced pure, simple, honorable, and 
fated— both the yeoman agrarian and his pedagogical 
institution would illustrate an ideal conceptualization of 
prudence. The character of the yeoman would rise despite 
the scene.
Smith (1950) asserts, "The Western yeoman had become a 
symbol which could be made to bear an almost unlimited 
charge of meaning, [and] it had strong overtones of 
patriotism..." (p. 135). While Turner perpetuated the 
traditional ideals of the agrarian cause, he also continued 
a notion of beating the odds. He rendered the yeoman 
agrarian as a type of Jacksonian individualist. Again, this 
type of individualism flowed within the linguistic wave of 
mid-nineteenth century oratorical culture. Turner's 
prudential framework helped him generate the mythic context 
that potentially incited the audience to act it out.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
In sum, I have argued that Turner's prudential claim 
about action was that the yeoman agrarians should invent 
their own educational scheme. Turner discursively defined 
and refined this claim through aesthetics of metonymy, anti- 
intellectualism, and, of course, the agrarian myth and the 
symbolic reservoir of the yeoman agrarian. The metonymic 
logic afforded him the opportunity to perpetuate a perceived
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political chasm between the working class and the 
professional class. This lent credence to the agrarian myth 
and the narrative he told. I suggest that Turner used anti­
intellectual sentiments to make himself out to be a 
representative hero of the agrarian myth. He enacted his 
own verbal mortification and he poked fun at his own 
training in order to become a voice for the agrarian. The 
language and themes of the agrarian myth grew out of a long 
symbolic lineage, and the democratic republicanism and 
Jacksonian individualism of Turner's era.
In the process of generating a symbolic reality, I have 
suggested that Turner was asking his audience to live out 
the agrarian myth he told, and take it to its telos. He 
wanted his audience to live out a popular and sacred fable 
that, at that time, represented the process of democracy.
And though the myth was mainly a fable for the voices of 
power, the mass populace, too, seemed to have enjoyed the 
story.
Turner's notion of prudence was itself an imitation of 
past conceptualization of prudence, but this mythic 
tradition, though worse for wear, still exists today.
However, especially in the mid-nineteenth century, this type 
of prudential thinking found declamation in the continued 
move for federal support for agricultural and mechanical 
education.
There has been much deliberation as to Turner' s role in 
the congressional bill passed in 1862. For the most part,
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historians have given Morrill credit as the sole author of
Land Grant Act. Many Land Grant universities have even
heroically memorialized Morrill by having campus buildings
named after him. The real question is what role did the
sense of prudence and the rhetoric of Turner play in
Morrill's inventional processes. Did he imitate them at all?
While Morrill offered his own slant on the myth, he also
perpetuated Turner's idea of prudence. Turner's prudential
thought and his speech were important stepping-stones toward
the ultimate goal of federal support for agricultural and
industrial colleges. Thus, I suggest that Turner’s sense of
prudence certainly added his persuasive art. Even though he
inhibited a fusion of vocational, practical education with
classical education, his audacity brought success in so much
that Morrill, and others, apparently interpreted his policy
and rhetoric as prudent.
Morrill submitted an initial resolution on the topic of
agricultural colleges during the first session of the
thirty-fourth Congress, February 28, 1856, but Mr. Keitt of
South Carolina rejected it. Even so, and all the while.
Turner had been trying to enact his plan. The United States
Agricultural Society met in Washington in 1856 and again in
1857 to address Turner’s ideas. Morrill was the Vermont
delegate to both meetings. Though the records indicate that
Morrill did not make any statements, True (1929) argues that
...it seems probable that Mr. Morrill knew about 
Turner ’ s proposition even if he took no part in 
discussing it. Something must have happened which led 
Mr. Morrill to bring forward a bill differing
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materially in its purpose from that indicated in his 
resolution..." (p. 98) .
After Keitt rejected his first resolution, Morrill went 
back to the drawing board. What he came up with closely 
resembled what Turner desired. Morrill's bill emanated out 
of Turner's basic plan. Granted, Morrill's proposal was not 
an exact duplicate of Turner’s plan. Nevertheless, the 
wording of the speeches which Morrill delivered to promote 
his proposals had a rhetorical and prudential lineage 
illustrated through Turner's message. "Morrill's measure," 
True admits, "was in fact the culmination of the long 
movement for agricultural and technical schools... and it is 
altogether likely that Morrill derived the ideas 
incorporated in the bill from various sources connected with 
that movement" (p. 99).
Again, it would appear that Turner's prudential 
framework aided his rhetorical effort. He reduced reality 
to a canonical mythic struggle between the heroic, thinking 
yeoman, who could do little wrong, and the classical elite, 
who could do little right. He celebrated the audience's 
story while invigorating the agrarian and industrial 
community and his own mythic, agrarian character. Through 
his rhetoric he revealed himself as a prophet of the cause 
calling his troops in for the hierarchical upset. Moreover, 
and as Darsey (1997) notes, "The prophetic life as presented 
by the prophet and his disciples becomes it own rhetoric..." 
(p. 34) . Ironically perhaps. Turner wanted his audience to 
follow him in being a deeply educated and thinking anti-
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intellectual. In final analysis, then, while Wayland could 
not escape his academic status, Turner could and did, and 
recanted his own mythic struggle within his inventive 
choices in order to invite the populace to rise to their 
perceived agrarian distinction.
From Hall's (1980) view point, we might speculate that 
to enact Turner's story would have been itself a preferred 
reading. However, the negotiated reading might not have 
enacted the story as Turner would have, but fused the 
courses of study Turner discussed. That is, a negotiated 
reading might have put the vocational with the classical.
An oppositional reading, I think, would see the plan and 
Turner’s rhetoric not as prudential longings for "the 
people," but rather imprudent discursive practice and 
political ideology that certainly placed a certain sect of 
people over another.
Turner's mission in Illinois would not come to fruition 
until 1871. He was present for the laying of the 
cornerstone of the new University Hall at the Illinois 
Industrial University. Though Henry (1961) explains that 
the plan for this institution did not always exactly look 
like Turner's idea, "Jonathan Baldwin Turner is not only a 
forebear of the land-grant movement but also of the 
University of Illinois" (p. x).
161
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER SIX
JUSTIN SMITH MORRILL AND THE PASSAGE 
OF THE LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT
INTRODUCTION
Justin Smith Morrill was born April 14, 1810, and died 
on December 28, 1898. He lived the ordinary life of a 
country boy from Strafford, Vermont, picking up fragments of 
education from the district school. He spent two years at 
Thetford Academy, but Morrill's school education ended at 
the age of fourteen.
He was then hired to work as a clerk in a Strafford 
store. He spent two years under that contract, and then 
worked for four years as a clerk in a Portland, Maine store. 
Mercantilism seemed to be his calling. After the end of 
those four years, a native of Strafford made Morrill a 
partner. Morrill worked as a manager for fifteen years, 
then retired with a modest fortune, bought a tract of land, 
made it into a farm, built a house, married, and settled in 
for the long haul.
However, in 1854, the Congressional representative from 
the Strafford district declined re-election and many people 
thought Morrill would make a fine candidate. He was elected 
by a majority of fifty-nine votes. He spent the rest of his 
years as a representative, then as a senator. In his 
Congressional life, he is best known for the Tariff Law of 
1861, measures for constructing public buildings, and the 
Land Grant Act.
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Morrill introduced the first land grant bill in the 
House of Representative on December 14, 1857. Though 
Morrill desired that the Speaker of the House send the bill 
to the Committee on Agriculture— Morrill was a member— it 
went to the Committee on Public Lands. This committee had 
the bill for four months and then Representative Cobb of 
Alabama, the chair, reported that it was a no-go on April 
15, 1858. True (1929) argues that the argument against the 
bill was that it was unconstitutional.
On April 20, a pending motion to postpone consideration 
of the bill allowed Morrill an opportunity to speak on the 
matter. He took this opportunity to offer a substitute 
bill. This substitute omitted the original reference to 
Territories and offered a slight change in the way to price 
the land that the federal government might grant. On April 
22, Morrill called for the previous question and the Speaker 
accepted it, requiring a vote on the bill. The House agreed 
to Morrill' s substitute as an amendment and passed it by a 
vote of 105 to 100. The Speaker referred Morrill's bill to 
the committee on Public Lands in the Senate, chaired by 
Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, a fellow republican, and it 
passed in February of 1859.
There was much lobbying during the process and True 
(1929) states that "Turner and his associates in Illinois 
and elsewhere were active by correspondence" (p. 103) . 
Nevertheless, President Buchanan vetoed the bill. As True 
puts it, "The greatest hope that President Buchanan would
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sign the bill lay in his vote in Congress in 1827 in favor 
of a bill to grant public lands for a deaf and dumb asylum 
in Kentucky" (p. 103). However, many Congressmen thought 
that vote was an error and, apparently, Buchanan did too. 
Although Morrill urged his troops on, the final vote had 105 
for Morrill's bill and 94 against. The veto stood.
While disappointed, those in favor of Morrill's bill 
worked behind the scenes in order to promote it despite 
Buchanan's stand. For instance, the United States 
Agricultural Society debated the issues at its meeting in 
January of 1860, but, as True (1929) explains, a verbal 
attack by one of its members on Buchanan prevented any hope 
of the president changing his mind and offering support to a 
new bill. For another, the Illinois agricultural and 
horticultural societies called a joint meeting on June 27, 
I860, in order to generate a resolution to promote Morrill's 
bill. Turner chaired the committee that drafted the 
resolution.
What is more, True (1929) reveals that Turner might 
have personally asked Lincoln, before his presidential 
nomination, to support the cause. Legend has it that 
Lincoln stated, "If I am elected I will sign your bill for 
State universities" (p. 104) . Apparently, Stephen A. 
Douglas, also a possible candidate at the time, likewise 
unveiled to Turner that he would sign the bill. Thus, if 
Morrill introduced it again, after the election of 1860, the
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bill most likely would not have too much trouble getting 
through the system.
After Lincoln's election, Morrill again introduced his 
bill on December 16, 1861, but it did not work out. Morrill 
decided not to offer a substitute bill this time because 
Senator Wade introduced a very similar bill in the Senate. 
True (1929) argues that Wade and Morrill were in cahoots.
In the Senate, the bill went to the Committee on Public 
Lands chaired by Senator Harlan of Iowa, a proponent of the 
measure. The debate in the Senate centered on the measure' s 
constitutionality, the amount of land granted and where, and 
the pricing of the land. After two amendments, it passed on 
May 16, 1862. The amendments focused on the amount of land 
that Congress would locate in individual states, and the 
number of acres they might allot to individual people. The 
final vote, with the amendments in place, stood at 32 to 7. 
Morrill delivered an important speech on the matter on June 
6, 1862. The House called up the Senate bill on June 17 and 
passed it by a vote of 90 to 25. Lincoln signed the bill on 
July 2.
While the political maneuverings certainly clear up 
the constitutional and economic issues that were at the crux 
of the Congressional debate, Morrill's two most lengthy 
speeches on the measure, the one in 1858, and the one in 
1862 before the calling up of the Senate bill, brought to 
bare the most significant rhetorical strategies on which 
Morrill depended. What is more important for my purposes,
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these speeches also reveal much about Morrill1 s 
representation of prudence.
While the need for each speech grew out of particular 
situations, taken together, I suggest Morrill had to meet 
several challenges. For one, he had to negotiate the 
constitutionality of the bills. Also, he had to secure an 
attitude that all this was economically viable and 
productive for the country. Additionally, Morrill was 
speaking, both times, during a vacillating historical 
period. When he presented his first speech, the political 
stage was one of biting compromise, conflict between 
antislavery and proslavery groups, weak presidential 
leadership from James Buchanan, and constant constitutional 
battles over the role of the federal government. During his 
second oration, the country was, of course, at Civil War. 
Economically, both before and during the war, the industrial 
revolution replaced communal agrarianism with commercial 
individualism. Linguistically, changes in demographics 
continued to promote diverse styles of discourse.
In short, Morrill invented his speeches while Congress 
was coming to terms with that bloody conflict, the role of 
science and technology in American culture, the mode of 
agrarian and industrial life and its impact on the character 
of the nation, appropriate educational and intellectual 
policies in a commercial, democratic society, and the 
province of federal institutions.
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In this chapter I analyze both addresses because they 
are very similar in their prudential stances and thus form a 
more coherent illustration of Morrill's over-arching sense 
of prudence. In the first section of this chapter, I will 
describe Morrill's speeches. Second, I will interpret the 
outlook of prudence he developed symbolically. Third, I 
will examine Morrill's textual context. Finally, I will 
offer the implications of Morrill's prudential way of 
thinking and how it, in a way, rendered the process of 
implementing the Morrill Act somewhat confusing.
SUMMARY
Morrill organized his first speech categorically. He
began by establishing the importance of his bill to the
nation and the preponderance of thought and debate upon the
measure. He pointed out, as Turner did, that agricultural
education had not received its fair share of federal aid.
He implored the House to make a change because America, as
an agricultural nation, was slipping. He argued that the
propriety and happiness of a populated country depended upon
the division of land into small, manageable parcels and upon
the education of those who would own and till the soil. The
following was the climax in this introductory part:
If it be true that the common mode of cultivating the 
soil in all parts of our country is so defective as to 
make the soil poorer year by year it is a most 
deplorable fact, and a fact of national concern. If we 
are steadily impairing the natural productiveness of 
the soil, it is a national waste, compensated only by 
private robbery (Morrill, 1858, Congressional Globe, p. 
1692).
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With this, he turned to discuss what he called a "national 
waste."
Morrill moved to a discussion of the "facts" of waste. 
As he had it, "These facts... establish, conclusively, that 
in all parts of our country important elements in the soil 
have been exhausted..." (1858, p. 1692); and his list of 
facts was exhaustive. He used statistical examples of 
agricultural loses, citing specific numbers from 
agricultural journals, and including a table to take them 
all in. His point was that the quality of the soil and the 
financial rewards potentially reaped were decreasing, and 
Congress could combat this depreciation through the federal 
act of establishing agricultural and mechanical 
universities. Along with the talk of "waste" Morrill also 
discussed the progress of science and the lack of scientific 
output for agriculturists.
Like Turner, Morrill (1858) discussed the class of 
yeoman agrarians and mechanics, the rise of practical 
education, and the ineffectiveness of classical education 
for the working classes. When agricultural and mechanical 
universities existed with federal aid, then the "spurious 
dogmas will be touched lightly with the spear of Ithuriel, 
and no longer squat around the ears of weary plowmen" (p. 
1694). The graduates of these new universities "would know 
how to sustain American institutions with American vigor"
(p. 1694). The heroic yeoman agrarian dwelled apart from 
the professionals. Morrill saw yeoman agrarians and
168
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
mechanics as having a unique role and place in American 
society.
Morrill turned to a very extensive declamation on 
European agriculture and how America's productivity stacked 
up against it. He discussed agricultural progressivism in 
Prussia, Saxony, Belgium, France, England, Scotland, Russia, 
Spain, Italy, and Bohemia, all in the effort to make 
American's federal support of agriculture look pretty awful. 
Though he realized some European nations had committed 
agricultural errors, Morrill (1858) explained, "Thus, we 
behold the suffrages of all t.he wiser civilized nations in 
favor of the measure contemplated by the bill under 
consideration...If other nations advance, though we but 
pause, we are distanced" (p. 1695).
Morrill then focused on the importance of land-granting 
and rebuked the argument that the federal government had no 
constitutional authority to grant such land or to require 
the states to use it for the sole purpose of creating 
agricultural and mechanical universities. Morrill (1858) 
argued that everyone, if not directly, would indirectly reap 
the benefits of this land grant. Thus, "if the measure 
shall in any degree increase the future profits of 
cultivators, the value of all land, wherever it may be, 
whether held in small or large quantities, will be 
augmented" (p. 1695, his emphasis) . He also read from the 
constitution in order to support the constitutionality of 
his proposed law. His own sense of prudence, in part,
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seemed to emerge explicitly when he placed his measure under 
the auspicious argument of “prudent proprietorship." As he 
put it, "As a prudent proprietor, may we not do that which 
will not only tend to raise the value of all land, whether 
owned by individuals or by Government, but make agricultural 
labor more profitable and more desirable as a pursuit in 
life?" (p. 1696) . Additionally, he talked about previous 
land grants and used past voices, like George Washington and 
Thomas Jefferson, to further establish federal land 
precedents.
Morrill ended his first speech by praising the enduring
legacy of Congress to give land for the general benefit of
the country and all of its inhabitants, but especially its
agrarians and mechanics. Using repetition, he announced what
the measure would do if passed. Morrill (1858) stated that
it would do something "to enable the farmer to raise two
blades of grass instead of one; Something for every owner of
land; Something for all who desire to own land..." (p. 1696)
and the like. Toward the very end of the speech Morrill
supplied a succinct summary of his arguments:
The persuasive argument of precedents; the example of 
our worthiest rivals in Europe; the rejuvenation of 
worn-out lands, which bring forth taxes only; the 
petitions of farmers everywhere, yearning for 'a more 
excellent way; ' philanthropy, supported by our own 
highest interests— all these considerations impel us 
for once to do something for agriculture worthy of its 
national importance (p. 1697).
With that, Morrill revealed how much land the Land Office
had to dispose of and submitted his substitute bill.
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Morrill's second speech was very similar. It also
advanced categorically and he returned to the topics and
arguments used in the first speech. In the beginning
section he argued that the new educational institutions
would perpetuate republicanism. As Morrill (1862) put it,
"Just in itself, benevolent in its scope, demanded by the
wisest economy, it will add new securities to the perpetuity
of republican institutions" (Congressional Globe, p. 256).
He then discussed what happened to the first bill, and using
a sort of compliance gaining strategy of debt, Morrill
announced that he would soon resign from the House and would
like a favor in return.
Morrill also revealed in his introduction that he
thought that several issues ought to be put upon the table
because of the Civil War, but not this one. "Instead of
being postponed, it is a measure that should have been
initiated at least a quarter of a century ago..." (p. 256).
This was so not only because it would have earlier befitted
the farmer and the agriculturist, but also because teaching
military tactics had become part of this second bill.
Morrill talked about the military dimensions of the new bill
and what the bill, as a whole, proposed:
This bill proposes to establish at least one college in 
every State upon a sure and perpetual foundation, 
accessible to all, but especially to the sons of toil, 
where all the needful science for the practical 
avocations of life shall be taught, where neither the 
higher graces of classical studies nor that of military 
drill...will not be entirely ignored, and where 
agriculture, the foundation of all present and future 
prosperity, may look for troops of earnest friends, 
studying its familiar and recondite economies, and at
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last elevating it to that higher level where it may 
fearlessly invoke comparison with the most advanced 
standards of the world (p. 256) .
Morrill then moved to a more specific discussion of land.
Morrill discussed the steadily decreasing value of
public lands and how the legislature had, heretofore,
granted public lands. From his vantage point, the
legislature had not been too wise in the process. He (1862)
suggested that "grants for railroads and military bounties
have been made which such loose abundance as to destroy the
gifts and more than satisfy all demands..." (p. 257) .
Morrill continued to elaborate on the amount of land the
government had and had not granted and why, and then moved
to a discussion of the "facts" depicting the depletion of
the nation's soil. He referred to his April 20, 1858,
speech and recanted his facts and numbers.
After recalling factual and statistical information
from his first speech, he again compared American
agriculture to European agriculture in order to illustrate
that the United States had, in large part, taken an
agricultural back seat to the rest of the civilized world.
Morrill (1862) said that America was "in the rear of Europe,
and that will never be satisfactory" (p. 258) . Then, he
discussed practical education and how it would propel
America to lead the world instead of follow.
Within the closing portion of his speech Morrill (1862)
discussed the westward expansion and the call for educated
expansioneers, the possible professors of the would-be
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practical institutions— those of practical value— and the 
value of science. He also discussed practical education in 
Europe and highlighted what his measure might do for the 
United States. Apart from repairing the commercial loses, 
such a measure would "nurse patriotism" and the institutions 
would "secure permanent usefulness and enduring honor to the 
whole country" (p. 259) .
PRUDENCE IN THE TEXT 
It is my conjecture that the basic notion of prudence 
in the text, as far as specific political conduct goes, 
grows out of Morrill's advocacy of federally aided, 
agricultural and mechanical universities; and, these 
universities would make the land more fertile and empower 
the agrarian way of life. This is fairly easy to see if one 
considers how Morrill invoked "prudent proprietorship." 
Symbolically, I suggest that Morrill's rhetoric actualized 
his sense of prudence through the aesthetics of the agrarian 
myth: using synecdoche and filiopiety in the process. The 
synecdoche Morrill used personified the United States and 
its republican institutions through the symbol of the 
mythical agrarian. He also engaged in filiopiety, or the 
use of past voices, like Washington and Jefferson, which 
also helped enact his view of prudence and secured the 
patriotic tone of the myth. He therefore grounded his idea 
of prudence in American heritage. What is more, Morrill 
also enacted prudence through commercial talk. Morrill's 
prudential perspective existed in and through the language
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of both the agrarian myth and commercialism; these were both
performative conventions that Morrill apparently roused in
his inventional scheme. He upheld the idea of an agrarian
sacred thriftiness, but also wanted the agrarian to be a
commercial success. Two competing traditions of prudence
commanded Morrill's rhetorical choices.
The Agrarian Mvth, Synecdoche, and Filiopiety
In the previous chapter I argued that the agrarian myth
was a rhetorical marker of Turner's sense of prudence. In
so doing, Turner perpetuated certain themes of the agrarian
myth. I contend that Morrill, too, depended on and borrowed
the mythic tradition to enact his prudential outlook. The
agrarian myth was, foundationally, the romantic notion of
the powerful, political, ruling classes (Hofstadter, 1955).
Hofstadter reveals that the mythic story denoting sacred
agrarian values was a patchwork of themes living through the
speeches, writings, poems, songs, etc., of early American
culture. I discussed some of the themes and the strong
tradition of the myth in the previous chapter, but
Hofstadter explains the myth more thoroughly and the
following quote might serve as a reminder:
Its hero was the yeoman farmer, its central conception 
the notion that he is the ideal man and the ideal 
citizen. Unstinted praise of the special virtues of 
the farmer and the special values of rural life was 
coupled with the assertion that agriculture, as a 
calling uniquely productive and uniquely important to 
society, had a special right to the concern and 
protection of government. The yeoman, who owned a 
small farm and worked it with the aid of his family, 
was the incarnation of the simple, honest, independent, 
healthy, happy human being. Because he lived in close 
communion with beneficent nature, his life was believed
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to have a wholesomeness and integrity impossible for 
the depraved populations of cities. His well-being was 
not merely physical, it was moral; it was not merely 
personal, it was the central source of civic virtue; it 
was not merely secular but religious, for God had made 
the land and called man to cultivate it (p. 24-25).
There were several instances in Morrill's two speeches that
helped perpetuate many of these themes and thus activated
the prudential values inherent within them. Clearly,
Morrill appreciated the existence of the myth, and he
assumed that his audience was very familiar with it. In so
doing, his mythic dialogue acted as an enthymeme. As we
learned from Aristotle and Hariman (1991), prudence more
than often takes shape through enthymemes.
For instance, and as I mentioned above, early on in his
first speech Morrill argued that "prosperity and happiness"
of a populated nation depended "1. Upon the division of the
land into small parcels. 2. Upon the education of the
proprietors of the soil" (1858, p. 1692). To promote
agricultural education Morrill highlighted the importance of
the modest, self-sufficient farm. Morrill was not talking
about the large plantations, but the small homesteads. He
was not talking about the classically educated dandy merely
managing a farm, but the "robust ranks" of sacred yeoman
agrarians (p. 1694). Speaking of this mythic profession, he
said that
No other pursuit in life obtains this universal 
tribute, that, whatever may be the present idol of 
devotion, all classes and rank of men hope to reach 
that estate first bestowed upon Adam, and become 
proprietors of the soil as their ultimate earthly 
paradise (p. 1694) .
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Continuing his praise of the agrarian and his myth, Morrill 
explained, "Many of the purest embellishments of literature 
have been drawn from the field of the husbandman. Gems, not 
only of poesy and song, but of painting and sculpture, of 
philosophy and eloquence, thus have their origin" (p. 1694) . 
Thus, he explicitly noted the myth's existence and its 
performative configurations in order to activate its appeal.
Sustaining his sentiment, Morrill more fully 
characterized what he saw as the mythic agrarian. To 
Morrill (1858), the agrarians were n frugal... Thrift is their 
cardinal virtue. They do not produce, vend, nor consume 
luxuries. They hasten slowly, and go untouched of all 
epidemical speculations" (p. 1694). However, Morrill 
thought that the possibility of wealth attracted the farmers 
to the city. Thus, if Congress passed this agricultural 
college bill perhaps it would curb the desire to leave the 
farm for the city. The passage of his bill would, in part, 
"induce the farmer's sons and daughters to settle and 
cluster around the old homesteads;" it would "prevent the 
dispersion of our population; " and it would "concentrate it 
[the population] around the best lands of our country—  
places hallowed by church spires, and mellowed by all the 
influences of time— where the consumer will be placed at the 
door of the producer;" and it would also "increase the 
loveliness of the land" (p. 1696-1697).
These passages indicate that Morrill, like Turner, was 
certainly imitating traditions of rhetorical performance
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available within the performative culture of the era. 
Specifically, Hofstadter (1955) points out that a 
significant problem was the abandonment of the farm for the 
city. "For all the rhetoric of the pastoral tradition," 
Hofstadter concedes, "nothing could keep the boys on the 
farm, and nothing could conceal from the farm population 
itself that continuous restless movement not merely to farms 
farther west but to urban areas. East and West" (p. 32) .
Part of Morrill's goal was a last stand to combat this run 
away from the homestead. In this, Morrill aligned himself 
with the folklore propagated by farm journals of his times. 
Hofstadter recants what he calls a "typical bit" of this 
folklore: "The great busy West has inducements, And has the
business mart, But wealth is not made in a day, boys, Don't 
be in a hurry to start!" (p. 32, his emphasis) . And again,
"Better stay on the farm a while longer, Though profits come 
in rather slow; Remember you've nothing to risk, boys-- 
Don't be in a hurry to go" (p. 33, his emphasis) . Morrill's 
conception of prudence emerged out of this popular sentiment 
and rhetorical resource.
Additionally, at times, Morrill, like Turner, compared 
the agrarian "career" to others. Morrill (1862) explained 
that
The business of agriculture is something thought to be 
uninviting by those in other walks of life, and they 
shun any investigations of the great truths which 
underlie and surround it, as much as they would shun 
instruction in the craft of a tinker, lest they should 
some day be called upon to mend their neighbors' pot 
(p. 257).
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Turner implied it, but Morrill made more concrete the claim 
that many in America shunned agrarianism as an occupation, 
even as the myth was popular. Hofstadter (1955) explains 
that the agrarian myth, alive within the formats revealed 
above, told farmers that they were "innocent pastoral 
victims of a conspiracy hatched in the distance" (p. 35) . 
Morrill seemed to have believed it was prudent to not only 
remind his listeners of the values the myth enshrined, but 
also to offer them an opportunity to help the so-called 
victims of political and educational neglect.
While Morrill made these mythic assertions he used a 
synecdoche and this helped illumine his prudential stance.
In Chapter Five I explained metonymy, but synecdoche is 
different. Hart (1997) says that synecdoche is "a kind of 
rhetorical shorthand that provides a more interesting view 
of commonly understood objects or ideas" (p. 151, his 
emphasis). He offers an example: "Wherever wood [a ship] 
can swim, there I am sure to find this flag of England [the 
British fleet]" (p. 151). The "wood" stands in for a ship, 
and the "flag of England" stands in for the whole British 
fleet. At the most elementary level, and as Burke (1950, 
1969) declares, a synecdoche refers to a part of something 
the captures the whole of something, or a whole of something 
that captures a part. Madsen (1993) argues that synecdoche 
is synonymous with representation. I contend that Morrill's 
view of prudence, in part, emerged out of synecdochical 
logic. He used synecdoche so that the mythic yeoman
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agrarian and his mythic values stood in, or represented,
America, its institutions, and the character its citizens
ought to be enacting.
We witness synecdoche operating in the beginning of
Morrill's first speech when he personified the country as a
man. Alerting his audience to the justness of his measure,
Morrill (1858) argued that the bill was "just politically,
just to all the States, and just, above, all, to the manhood
of our country" (p. 1692). Not only did Morrill personify
the country, but asserted that the lack of effective
husbandry certainly questioned this "manhood" :
It is our province, as a nation and as individuals, to
do well whatever we undertake. The genius and skill of
our artists and artisans have been universally 
commended. Our navel architecture is a subject of 
national pride. Our engineers are doomed to no merely 
local fame. Our agricultural implements are beyond the 
reach of competition. Yet, while we may be in advance 
of the civilized world in many of the useful arts, it 
is a humiliating fact that we are far in the rear of 
the best husbandry in Europe... (p. 1693).
Morrill was not merely cataloguing America's successes, but
pointing to the supreme importance of the yeoman agrarian as
a significant American symbol. This pointing out was
important to Morrill's persuasive effort because it acted as
a prudential framework for Morrill's action claims. If the
yeoman agrarian could not improve the soil and thus extend
the agrarian way of life, and the myth, then the country
would plummet. Perhaps he regarded it as prudent to link
the country with the plight of the yeoman agrarian in order
to accent the national importance of this plight.
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In his second speech Morrill (1862) proposed:
Should no effort be made to arrest the deterioration 
and spoliation of the soil in America, while all Europe 
is wisely striving to teach her agriculturists the best 
means of hoarding up capital in the lands on that side 
of the Atlantic, it is easy to see that we are doomed 
to be dwarfed in national importance, and not many 
years can pass away before our ships will be laden with 
grain not on their outward but homeward voyage. Then, 
with cheap bread no longer peculiar to America, our 
free institutions may be thought too dear by those of 
whom even empires are not worthy— the men with hearts, 
hands, and brains— vainly looking to our shores for 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (p. 258) .
Importantly, the phrase above was a further elaboration of
the synecdoche. Whatever the condition was of the yeoman
agrarian, so too the condition of the country. The yeoman
agrarian was the epitome of freedom, thrift and self-
reliance, and Morrill wanted to make that representative
association with the United States, the country's
institutions, and citizens. In another way, because of the
representation, the heroic agrarian was the representative
anecdote of Morrill's speech, his efforts on the bill’s
behalf, and the prudent action he was advocating for the
Congress.
Finally, Morrill also engaged in a type of filiopiety. 
Webster's Dictionary (1988) defines filiopiety as "an often 
excessive veneration of ancestors or tradition" (p. 462). 
Jasinski (1995) attests that the rhetorical practice was 
common in mid-nineteenth century oratory (p. 459) . For 
instance, Morrill (1858) asserted his implicit sense of 
prudence when he associated past and present political 
actors with the pastoral tradition:
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Washington, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster, are more secure 
of love and homage as farmers than even as men of 
highest public renown; and Mount Vernon, Fort Hill, 
Ashland, and Marshfield, the Meccas of America, prove 
the ideal truth of the worlds of Pliny, that "the earth 
took delight in being tilled by the hands of men 
crowned with laurels and decorated with triumphant 
honor" (p. 1694).
He also evoked the words of Washington and described how
Washington brought before Congress the subject of
agriculture in his first inaugural address. In the quote,
Washington discussed the primary importance of agriculture
to the nation's welfare and that federal policies ought to
aid in the "cultivation of the soil" (p. 1694) . Morrill
exclaimed that in Washington's voice was the "germ" of the
agricultural college project. Hence, we can say the same
thing about Morrill's idea of prudence. "It cannot be
doubted that donations of land for agricultural colleges
would have received the approval of Washington" (p. 1694) .
Maintaining the filiopiety, Morrill turned to Jefferson
in order to argue for the creation of public educational
institutions. Morrill called forth Jefferson's prudential
thought in order to help him combat the constitutional
arguments against the bill, and thus, again, imply his own
sense of prudential political conduct. Morrill discussed
how Jefferson promoted public institutions for the
dispersion of scientific advancement. Morrill (1858)
submitted "that here the whole question of constitutional
power is covered, as well as a powerful argument suggested,
by Jefferson" (p. 1696). Morrill also mentioned, in
passing, Madison, Monroe, Adams, and Jackson. He declared
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that "there can be no question that General Jackson and the
men who cooperated with him would have approved of grants of
land to all the States for the benefit of agricultural
colleges" (p. 1696). Apparently, Morrill thought the
political stances of these men were prudent. The founders
were prudent in as much as they desired to generate public
policy supporting the yeoman agrarian. Thus, Morrill's
filiopiety, a sense of prudent discursive practice, mirrored
prudential political action.
Commercialism
The language of commercialism also marked Morrill' s
conceptualization of prudence. This type of talk not only
pointed to the commercial reality of the era, but it also
empowered the agrarian myth. This commercialization denied
the agrarian myth he was telling.
After a long recitation of the loses of stock, sheep,
crops, tabacco, etc., Morrill (1858) contended that the
amount of money wasted was significant. For instance, the
loss in Massachusetts was a million dollars on cereal grain
(p. 1693) . There were loses in New York, in Alabama, in
Georgia, etc. In an important paragraph Morrill highlighted
the country's agricultural, commercial slump:
My time will not permit a greater accumulation of 
evidence on this point, although I have a cloud of 
witnesses in reserve, nor is pointing out the nakedness 
of land an agreeable duty. That leading fact, however, 
of a wide-spread deterioration of the soil, stands out 
too boldly to be denied... It follows, just in 
proportion, that capital is disappearing, and that 
labor receives a diminishing reward...(p. 1693).
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Morrill continued his commercial talk in the second 
speech. He implied that he agreed with the passage of the 
Homestead Act— he seemingly thought that act was prudent—  
and argued that the amount of public land still available 
ought to be distributed using the same prudential outlook, 
increasing the value of the land. Morrill (1862) stated 
that "these land colleges come in to aid in the plan of 
improving, not only the new lands, but also the old, and 
thereby extending the basis of taxation and revenue" (p.
257) .
He extended his statistical information on the hog 
crop, flax and hemp; a drastic loss here, a drastic loss 
there. The reparation, of course, began in Morrill's 
agricultural and mechanical universities. My point is that 
Morrill's rhetorical effort revealed that he wanted to help 
the farmer reach a respectable commercial status and assist 
the country along to commercial success. This was also 
prudential reasoning for Morrill.
Morrill's commercial talk pointed to a recognition and 
appreciation of the commercial reality of the mid-nineteenth 
century. As Hofstadter (1955) explains it, from 1815 to 
1860 the self-reliant yeoman agrarian disappeared from the 
world outside myth. "The cash crop converted the yeoman 
into a small entrepreneur, and the development of horse- 
drawn machinery made obsolete the simple old agrarian symbol 
of the plow" (p. 38). The rhetoric of yeoman thrift made 
way for the want of profit. For instance, the call in the
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1860's Prairie Farmer was for division of labor to increase 
profits. Along with the myth came the "rage for business." 
Along with the rhetoric of the sacred yeoman came an 
"entrepreneurial zeal probably without precedent in history" 
(p. 40) . Moreover, Hofstadter exclaims that the "agrarian 
sentiment sanctified labor in the soil and the simple life, 
but the prevailing Calvinist atmosphere of rural life 
implied that virtue was rewarded, after all, with success 
and material goods" (p. 40) . In short, the oratorical 
culture of the day valorized the myth, but the 
entrepreneurial spirit goaded the farmer to embark on a 
journey not toward sacred self-sufficiency and thrift, but 
toward material social standing and, consequently, wide­
spread debt.
Morrill's commercial talk also pointed to the fiction 
of the agrarian myth, and this fiction made the myth much 
stronger. The recognition of entrepreneurial zeal was also 
an implicit denial of the agrarian myth, even as Morrill 
indicated the myth's sacred aura. Hofstadter (1955) says, 
"Oddly enough, the agrarian myth came to be believed more 
widely and tenaciously as it become more fictional" (p. 30) . 
The agrarian myth was a reflective appeal. As Braden (1983) 
says of any myth in a rhetorical context, it draws "upon 
imagination, it strives to illicit what is pleasant, 
soothing, and satisfying, and gains acceptance and strength 
through repetition" (p. 75). By pointing out the myth 
Morrill energized its mythic charm, and he enlivened the
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memory of the myth in the minds of the hearers. However,
intentional or not, his commercial talk made the myth more
nostalgic. Stated simply: Morrill's sense of prudence, as
immersed in his rhetorical text, spawns out of the agrarian
myth, but also in its denial.
We should note, too, that it seems somewhat unusual
that Morrill would promote the mythic, somewhat innocent,
thrifty character of the yeoman agrarian, but also desire
the agrarian to become much more commercialized. Morrill's
rhetoric was a paradox. However, this contradiction points
to the inherent irony of Morrill's rhetoric and the myth he
embraced; and this irony is inherent in Morrill's
performative culture. Burke (1993) says that irony is that
"type of vacillation which comes of realizing that the
traits which one is best equipped to develop are not the
traits best making for one's adaptation to his environment"
(p. 156). The mythic agrarian could never survive in the
commercial culture of the mid-nineteenth century. The irony
in the text re-fashioned the heroic agrarian into a business
person without tainting the persuasive identification the
myth provided. Considering this cultural irony, Hofstadter
(1955) explains that
The triumph of commercial agriculture not only rendered 
obsolete the objective conditions that had given to the 
agrarian myth so much of its original force, but also 
showed that the ideal implicit in the myth was 
contesting the ground with another, even stronger 
ideal— the notion of opportunity, of career, of the 
self-made man" (pp. 39-40).
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Morrill also recognized the problem with land value. True, 
Morrill wanted to curb the hit and run style of farming 
through his universities and the education it might afford, 
but he ironically wanted to keep the old with the new; he 
desired the "thrift" of the yeoman along with the spirit of 
profit.
Hence, in light of Jasinski's (1997) perspective, we 
can see that for Morrill a sense of prudence as a 
performative tradition emerged out of the language of the 
agrarian myth, but also out of commercial talk. He tried to 
awaken agrarian voices, and in a way perhaps he tried to 
offer his own voice as a mythic one through symbolism. 
However, Morrill, a stereotypical self-made person, 
applauded a profession he never had. He projected an 
agrarian voice he could not legitimately call his own. We 
might also say that synecdoche and filiopiety framed 
Morrill's rhetoric argumentatively and figuratively. And the 
irony and confusion that resulted through his 
agrarian/commercial representation of prudence still exists 
today as we grapple with mythic stories that make our lives 
meaningful, but also commercial realities that make our 
lives financially profitable.
MORRILL'S TEXTUAL CONTEXT 
Morrill generated a past, present, and future infused 
with a temporal irony. He longed to return to the 
innocence, purity, and sacredness of the mythic past, but 
also desired to progress toward the commercial future. His
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prudential sense, tied to the language of myth and
commercialism, commanded a temporal confusion that pointed
to the fluid nature of the text's context, and the historic
circumstance that framed it.
The past became sacred and the agrarian myth a story o£
origin. There were several passages that pointed to this
sacredness. For one, Morrill (1858) said that agriculture
was the "the most useful of the earliest arts" (p. 1693).
He continued this thought by illustrating that
All history shows the tenacity with which habits 
acquired in the cultivation of land cling to a people 
from generation to generation. In all ages farmers 
have been stable, conservative, and reverent to 
antiquity. The same plow as described three thousand 
years ago at "Athens, the eye of Greece, mother of 
arts, And eloquence" is still in use among the modern 
Greeks. The habitant of Canada as much believes to-day 
in the propriety of placing the yoke on to the horns of 
the ox, in order to secure the entire strength of the 
animal, as he did in the days when he owed allegiance 
to the Grand Monarch. The old Roman plow, sometimes
drawn, in the days of Nero, "by a wretched ass on the
one side, and an old woman on the other, " still retains 
its place in Italy, and in parts of Spain and the south 
of France. If we turn to the descendants of the 
Puritans, we shall find some of these yet kill their 
pork and plant their corn in "the old of the moon." In 
all ages, and in all countries, the habits, as well as 
the virtues of agriculturists, remain fixed (pp. 1694- 
1895, his emphasis).
Even as Morrill noted that it was difficult for
agriculturists to improve things, he associated the
profession with Adam in order to declare the sanctity of the
steadfastness (p. 1694). Thus, we can see Morrill's idea of
prudence developing through the temporal nod of the
agrarian, and through the process of taking his listeners
through this temporal journey. His rhetoric transformed
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"immediate exigencies into recurring and symbolic ones" 
(Hoban, 1980, p. 279). Morrill called for a participation 
with the myth through a temporal disjoiner. The instances 
in Morrill's speech that recalled the sacred past of the 
agrarian become thresholds through which timelessness 
afforded mythic participation.
In contrast to Morrill's mythic view of the past, 
Morrill' s view of the present and future were very- 
progressive. Morrill (1858) saw the present as a 
contingency of agricultural errors, and thought that "the 
great, irreversible law of American agriculture appears in 
the constant and increasing diminution of agricultural 
products, without any advance in prices" (p. 1693) . Morrill 
(1862) also declared, "By our mode, the earliest crops are 
seldom sequentially equaled, and the last are apt to be the 
worst" (p. 258). Again, from Morrill's perspective, America 
was leaning toward doomsday.
Only commercial inclinations, private enterprise, and 
science could seemingly remedy the woeful condition.
Morrill (1858) said that "the only thing we constantly dwell 
upon with complacency is, that we surpass the stock from 
which we sprang, and that we present our land better than we 
found it. But this is not beautiful unless true!" (p.
1693). Morrill (1862) thought that "the true system of 
farming would seem to be to make the land more fertile than 
it is in its natural state, and every succeeding crop better 
than the last, " (p. 258) . Science and technology were
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saviors. "Merely practical men have looked at science as 
though it were a goddess in the clouds, to be worshipped 
only by fanatics and afar off, when it is really a handmaid, 
beautiful, and busy everywhere at saving labor and capital" 
(p. 259) .
Interestingly, when considering the present and future, 
Morrill adhered to an Euramerican perspective of 
temporality. Many rhetorical scholars refer to this 
progressive view of reality as "time's arrow." Lake (1991) 
explains that this metaphor assumes an irreversibility of 
events and a linear march of time. Rushing (1989b) reveals 
that, when buying into this "time's arrow" metaphor, past 
and present mistakes are "transitional moments" during which 
the future already remedies those errors. Thus, Morrill's 
consistent praise of science became, itself, a prudential 
solution to present and past agricultural problems. Morrill 
provided a litany of agricultural short-comings and 
blunders, and the corresponding inevitable future doom. 
Evidently, he did so in order to assert that science and 
agricultural technology were the only effective antecedents 
to successful, commercial agrarian culture. Morrill further 
developed his prudential viewpoint by asserting that science 
would assist agrarians in their efforts to progress to a 
commercially successful future.
Therefore, Morrill's textual context was temporally 
ironic. He praised the past and offered a threshold of 
timelessness that allowed his listeners to reverse time in
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order to appreciate and participate in the agrarian myth. At 
the same time, he denied that regression to assert an 
irreversible march of agricultural error only halted by 
techno-science distributed, of course, through his 
agricultural colleges.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
Morrill's understanding of prudential political conduct 
was, at the most basic level, that Congress ought to pass 
the agricultural college bill. In so doing. Congress would 
prolong the agrarian myth while most other societal 
indicators pointed to its demise. A sense of prudential 
discursive practice emerged out of the language of myth, 
synecdoche and filiopiety. Prudential discursive practice 
also emerged out of commercial talk. The commercial talk 
not only recognized the commercial ideology of the day, but 
also fictionalized the myth. However, the myth's fiction, 
while it made the myth more nostalgic, pointed to an irony 
in Morrill's implicit prudential outlook and the inventional 
framework that helped enact it symbolically. Morrill's 
rhetoric existed in and through the language of both sacred 
myth and progressive commercialism.
Further, as Morrill and the performative traditions he 
imitated helped develop a certain perspective on prudence, 
they also helped create a temporal confusion. While his 
regression beckoned nostalgic participation and sacred 
recognition, his progressive stance rejected this ebb. In
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short, contradictory traditions of prudence branded 
Morrill's performative choices.
It is my conjecture that Morrill's rhetorical 
discourse, and the enactment of prudence that brought it 
about symbolically framed the act and the perceptual 
response to it. While the bill eventually passed, the 
rhetoric and prudential perspective that Morrill advocated 
did not readily help the process, nor did it lead to a 
coherent vision of what the measure might do, even if 
Morrill wanted the states to decide how to appropriately 
spend the money themselves.
I am not by any stretch of the imagination claiming 
that the Morrill Land Grant Act was and is a failure. I 
suppose one could even say that Morrill's ambiguous prudence 
gave the states an appropriate degree of freedom to do what 
they wanted. However, Lucas (1996) points out that, "In 
fact, for several decades their careers as institutions of 
higher learning were both precarious and uncertain" (p. 62) . 
Even more, the agricultural papers of Morrill's day did not 
seem to offer too much enthusiasm for the measure. Ross 
(1942) explains that the "original law, while offering the 
possibility of strengthening existing projects in industrial 
education and of founding new ones, in itself assured 
nothing" (p. 66). It did not, I suggest, because the way 
Morrill talked about the measure allowed too much room for 
divergent views. Additionally, Ross says there was a doubt 
that the states would even accept it. Morrill's rhetoric,
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and his sense of prudence, revealed that "there was no
effective provision for federal direction and control of
state policy" (p. 68).
In this, Morrill's rhetoric and the policy were kin to
the Homestead Act. They were both policy actions extending
from the republican's 1860 platform. As Rudolph (1962)
explains, "In conjunction with the Homestead Act of the same
year, this [Morrill Act] parcel of legislation gave
political recognition to the yeoman farmer on the eve of his
displacement as the characteristic American" (p. 250) .
Smith (1950) calls the Homestead Act the "agrarian utopia in
politics" (p. 165). In more detail, Smith contends that
...between 1856 and 1860 the homestead principle with 
its utopian blueprint for developing the trans- 
Mississippi region become official Republican 
doctrine...It was a bid for votes that could not be 
attracted to the antislavery cause. The platform of 
1860... showed that the Republicans meant to capture the 
myth of the garden and the symbol of the hardy yeoman, 
and thus to command the imaginations of Northwestern 
farmers (p. 168) .
However, this free-simple empire was not to be. While the
measure passed in 1862, it was not awfully successful
(Hofstadter, 1955). The framers of the Homestead Act and
the free-simple empire acted upon ideals spawning from the
agrarian myth, but these ideals or assumptions, says
Hofstadter, "were out of date even before the act was
passed" (p. 57).
Hofstadter (1955) thinks these framers trusted in
nature as abundant, the nonspeculative ideal of the yeoman,
the easy process of passing land to settlers without cost,
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and the native strength of the farmer to be self-sufficient. 
However, these assumptions did not match up with the 
Industrial Revolution well established by 1862, nor did it 
mesh with the communications revolution that was on the 
horizon. It was "incongruous even with the natural 
character of the plains, with their winds, sandstorms, 
droughts, and grasshoppers" (p. 57). Hofstadter asserts 
that the farmer was caught up in the "toil of cash-crop 
commercial farming" (p. 57) . Basically, the farmer was not 
self-sufficient at all, but depended on the exchange value 
of his products measured through supply and demand. The 
myth did not secure the agrarian's livelihood. The agrarian 
found hope only within a "commercial position, which in 
turn, was dependent upon the vicissitudes of the world 
market" (p. 58).
These same assumptions affected Morrill's discourse.
In practice, he articulated a commercialism; in ideology, he 
promoted an agrarian ideal. His prudential scheme was 
wrought with irony. While some might call his irony 
strategic, I do not think so, at least in his immediate 
situation. The bill passed, but it never really did what 
Morrill wanted it to.
Hofstadter (1955) , in his explication of the populist 
and progressive movements of the nineteenth century, 
contends that the American farmer had a dual character. 
Populist rhetoric derived from a "soft" side of the farmer's 
existence and used traditional agrarian ideology. Yet, most
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farm organizations since the populist decline in the late 
nineteenth century talked in terms of a "hard" side. 
"Agricultural improvements, business methods, and pressure 
politics" (p. 47) defined this hard side. Morrill advocated 
both sides and therefore produced a kind of agrarian 
schizophrenia, or split in agrarian identity. The act he 
advocated, once enacted, failed to halt the tide of agrarian 
discontent. It did not provoke the children of farming 
families to cluster around the old homestead. They still 
went to the city. Morrill's act, and the conception of 
prudence that brought it about, seemingly institutionalized 
this agrarian schizophrenia.
Thus, Rudolph (1962) says that "the land-grant college 
movement owed something both to those forces that were 
destroying the agrarian orientation of American society and 
to those sentiments that would seek to perpetuate the past 
as an agrarian myth" (p. 251) . One could say that Morrill's 
legislation was essentially a "romantic effort...to remain 
philosophically agrarian..." (p. 251) while, at the same 
time, surrendering to the culture of profit. Thus,
Morrill's irony alerts us to another implication of his 
rhetoric.
Burke (1993) sees an often uneasy relationship between 
what he calls the "Self," the individual agent, and the 
"Non-Self," social institutions and the like. There is 
often, thinks Burke, a "maladjustment" between the Self and 
Non-Self if the agent does not fit in with the scene. This
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rift might be "righted through the surrender of Self" to the 
Non-Self. However, Burke argues that some writers, Marx for 
instance, insisted "that we must change the Non-Self, or 
must change the social institutions to fit our needs, rather 
than changing our needs to fit the social institutions..."
(p. 156). This relationship between Self and Non-Self often 
leads to irony. Burke elaborates on his notion of irony 
when he calls it a "recognition of the fact that people 
surrender only because they have to, along with the 
recognition of the fact that one does not propose to accept 
such ready forms of integration for himself" (p. 156). This 
is also what I mean by saying that Morrill's prudence was 
ironic. Morrill' s idea of prudence accommodated to the 
commercial zeal of the day, while still projecting a bit of 
agrarian audacity. His irony potentially allowed his 
audience to associate with the agrarian myth and 
disassociate from commercialism; acting out a fervor for 
profit all the while.
Moreover, from Hall's (1980) point of view, we might 
say that the preferred reading was in putting the two 
strains of prudence together. However, because they seemed 
incongruous, a negotiated reading perhaps tended to provoke 
a dialectic between the two. An oppositional reading, 
perhaps, would read either one prudence or the other; or 
resist the whole measure as a political ploy for the 
republican agenda. In any case, Morrill's rhetoric did not 
have the influence he perhaps desired. However, the public
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institutions that resulted certainly changed the landscape
of American higher education.
While the state institutions, once established, did
certainly improve agricultural production, it also displaced
the yeoman agrarian. However, perhaps that is not the stuff
to dwell on endlessly in my rhetorical way. The Land Grant
colleges broadened the idea of public higher education. For
the most part, they gave students of all classes and
interests options. One could go to school to be a farmer,
but end up a writer. One could go to school to be an
artist, but end up an engineer. Ross (1942) puts this idea
nicely when he says that
Whatever the name, the real test of all the land-grant 
institutions was their ability and disposition to 
fulfill their peculiar mission in the new era, and it 
was in ministering to the technical, social, and 
political needs of the nation come of age that they 
attained measurably to the vision of the true prophets 
of the industrial movement in becoming real people's 
colleges— with all their limitations a distinct native 
product and the fullest expression of democracy in 
higher education (p. 182).
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
REVIEW OF STUDY 
The Morrill Act apportioned to each state thirty- 
thousand acres per each senator and representative they had 
in Congress under the 1860 census. The law obligated states 
to sell the land and use the interest from the receipts to 
endow, support, and maintain a college of agriculture, 
though not excluding scientific, classical, and military 
studies. The result of the law, though we are still 
debating its value, brought about new vocational curricula, 
extended higher education to the working classes, put 
classical academics and vocational instruction under the 
same roof, and most significantly, it democratized higher 
education and thus carved out an intellectual and learned 
niche for the practical, working citizenry.
The law did not come about without rhetorical effort 
both for and against the general, democratic notions of the 
measure. The persuasive messages critical to the ultimate 
passing of Morrill Act, working alone and together, 
demonstrate the important role of prudence in the invention 
of public argument. Thus, I have sought to understand the 
role of prudence in the texts I have analyzed and I have 
indicated that prudence gives us both historical and 
theoretical insight. I will come along to those insights 
shortly.
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I consider my project a continuation of the ongoing 
historical interpretation of nineteenth century American 
higher education. Even more so, I consider my research an 
addition to the discussion about nineteenth century 
rhetorical discourse. I also regard this study as a 
contribution to the theoretical understanding of prudence. 
Thus, I reviewed prudence from a theoretical perspective. I 
also reviewed several works of rhetorical criticism in my 
literature review, each embarking from particular 
understandings of theoretical prudence. In so doing, my 
point was to illustrate that critics have either thought of 
prudence as too stable, or too polysemic. My conception of 
prudence appreciates the play of prudence between stability 
and polysemy. I see prudence as a dynamic performative 
tradition, but also a unique sense of situational 
appropriateness in performance.
Analytically, I appreciate both the instrumental mode 
of critical analysis, but also the far-reaching, textual 
play of multiplistic modes of prudential symbolism. My 
basic method has been textual criticism. More specifically, 
a hybrid of traditional instrumentalist, or intentionalist 
interpretative practice, and an interpretative practice that 
focuses on performative traditions in textual action. In my 
application, I first used Jasinski's (1997) understanding of 
performative traditions, then, like Wilson (1998), I focused 
on each text' s textual context and how prudence emerged out 
of that. In short, Jasinski (1997) thinks that by
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decentering the hub of critical activity away form purpose 
and agent to the text/context relationship, a critic can 
better focus on the orchestration of cultural performative 
traditions in textual action. I also recognize the idea 
that deviating away from the assumptions of instrumental 
practice invigorates rhetorical scholarship. It was my hope 
that these two schemes of interpretation— Jasinski's and 
Wilson's— would reveal interesting results when put 
together. Working in tandem, they recover a contextual 
dialectic between the text and its immediate rhetorical 
situation, and between the text and its broader cultural 
grammar.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
I had several questions that I addressed: 1) Given the
rhetors I examine, what sense of prudence did they each 
offer and how did they symbolically actualize or achieve 
that notion of prudence? Along the same lines, was such an 
idea of prudence linked to any communal tradition(s) of 
prudential thinking? 2) Considering the idea of textual 
context, what vision of the past, present, and future did 
each rhetor project, and what sense of prudence did that 
develop? 3) What was the effect of the implicit view of 
prudence within each text— did it help or hinder the 
rhetorician's persuasive efforts?
To answer my first question, Day and Kingsley suggested 
that it was appropriate to hold tight to traditional 
classical and literary pedagogy. Metaphor tellingly
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developed this prudential idea. The authors supplied 
structural, light and dark, and nature metaphors to 
encourage a certain way of seeing classical education, and 
practical education. The sacred/secular metaphors of 
"taste" and "genius" also cultivated a notion of prudence. 
These were metaphors with a long symbolic lineage, and used 
by Yale’s former president Timothy Dwight. Thus, while the 
Yale Report was a secular, educational epideictic, the 
authors engaged a homiletic tradition. This helped to 
project a sense that classical education was both secular 
and sacred, and that Yale graduates would go on to establish 
Dwight's vision of a godly society through poetic and 
refined discursive practice.
Wayland asserted that Brown ought to democratize its 
education in order to uplift the practical classes of 
society. He actualized his idea of prudence through the 
discursive sentiments of individuality, self-reliance, and 
commercialism; and his rhetoric of identification. His 
prudential ideals were conventional. Wayland supplied a 
tradition of prudence that perpetuated a political 
imagination consonant with the perceived egalitarianism in 
the age of Jackson. Moreover, his idea of prudence emerged 
out of his own design of moral philosophy and political 
economy, both tied to Jacksonian democracy. In light of his 
discourse on individuality and self-reliance, Wayland 
consequently made himself out to be a kind Jacksonian 
outsider, fighting the good fight, on behalf of working
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people he really could not relate to. Wayland volunteered 
himself, both politically and discursively, as a shining 
example of individualism for his democratic audience. He 
also shaped a sense of prudent conduct for the Brown 
corporation.
Turner's basic claim was that the yeoman agrarians 
ought rise up and invent their own educational scheme. He 
achieved his representation of prudence symbolically through 
the aesthetics of, first, metonymy in as much as Turner 
generated a seemingly natural, antithetical relationship 
between the professional class and the working class.
Second, Turner activated his prudence through anti- 
intellectualism. Finally, Turner's prudence primarily 
existed in and through the language of myth. These 
rhetorical appeals were also traditions living within the 
oratorical culture of Turner's day. Turner perpetuated 
ideas of societal structure propelled by Calhoun, but Turner 
wanted to re-do the hierarchy. Turner enlisted the 
Jeffersonian ideal of a natural aristocracy. Further,
Turner performed a middling style of discourse that 
resounded an anti-intellectual sentiment, and a humble style 
that was in vogue. His use of the agrarian myth had a long 
symbolic lineage.
Morrill's idea of prudence resembled Turner's . The 
basic notion of practical political conduct Morrill advanced 
was the founding of federally aided, agricultural and 
mechanical universities. I suggest that this general
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conceptualization of prudent conduct issued from the 
agrarian myth's symbolism. However, different from Turner, 
Morrill's created his slant on the myth using synecdoche and 
filiopiety.
However, Morrill also enacted prudence through the 
language of commercialism. Morrill's commercial talk 
pointed to a recognition of the commercial zeal of his day, 
but it also, intentionally or not, pointed to the fiction of 
the myth. It generated nostalgia. It also indicated the 
irony implicit in the agrarian myth, and in the culture 
Morrill lived in and through.
I have already pointed to the strength of the agrarian 
myth at that time. Filiopiety, as Jasinski (1997) argued, 
was also a very popular sentiment. Commercialism, too, was 
immensely strong during Morrill's era. The rage for 
business and entrepreneurial zeal was commonplace. In 
brief, a conception of prudence linked to the agrarian myth, 
and discursive strategies that activated it, were 
conventional. Also, a sense of prudence linked to 
commercialism, and the commercial talk that brought it 
about, was traditional. In short, Morrill's vision of 
prudence was actually two competing visions put together.
The irony that resulted indicated an ironic tension in the 
broader, oratorical culture.
In the effort of answering my second general question,
I contend that Day and Kingsley constructed the past, 
antiquity, as an era of beauty and perfection; ancient
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language was God's language. The present was a struggle 
between the beauty of past treasures and the "business” or 
"practical" character of their contemporary America. The 
future, if students studied past treasures, would be bright. 
Yale and its students would deny a brilliant future if they 
ignored the past. This vision perpetuated Dwight's 
political ideal and promoted the post-Puritan notion of a 
" godly government."
Much different from Day and Kingsley, Wayland created a 
temporal narrative that painted the past as a time of 
warranted mis-understanding and error. Wayland illustrated 
what he saw as the present through repeated comments about 
the "progress" of the nation, and in his rendering of Brown 
as an educational embarrassment. His future took form in 
his arguments about what might happen if the corporation 
heeded his proposals. If the corporation conceded to 
Wayland's policy requests it would result in money for Brown 
and uplift the middling and lower classes that, then, would 
help enact Wayland's prudential way of thinking. Wayland's 
historical narration framed the role of American college 
education and the specific role of the practical classes 
within the unfolding of American history. Wayland seemingly 
accepted that average American citizens longed to live up to 
a cultural ideal of materialism and self-determination; they 
longed to live out the myth of the self-made American.
Turner narrated a heroic myth as his understanding of 
reality. He unveiled the past as controlled by classicist
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fools. While places like Yale praised the ancients as 
worthy, these ancients really only produced confusion. They 
thought too much and talked too much. Thus, Turner saw the 
present as a caste system controlled by these classically 
educated fools perpetuating the trifles and confusions of 
ancient, pedantic ideals. Turner's proposal for the future, 
then, was to re-work the caste system. His future, like his 
myth, was a story. We can see that Turner's story was 
basically that the agrarian farmer and industrialist, living 
within a caste-system controlled by classically learned, 
professional dolts, needed to re-do the American caste- 
system, with the aid of practical education, in order to 
promote an educational order aloof from political and 
ecclesiastical control.
Morrill's past was sacred and the agrarian myth a story 
of origin. This illustration of the past as mythic and 
sacred indicated, also, Morrill's sense of prudence. Mythic 
time partly developed this representation of prudence. As 
the agrarians looked to the mythic past, so too did 
Morrill's symbolic overture ask his audience to do the same. 
Different from his mythic view of the past, Morrill's view 
of the present and the future were very progressive. He saw 
the present as a vast file of agricultural and political 
errors that both devalued land and the labor of it. 
Regardless, he also saw the present as an era of scientific 
progress— this would be the future remedy to the agrarian's 
woes. Morrill adhered to an Euramerican perspective of
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temporality in this regard. He bought into "time's arrow." 
In short, Morrill's textual context was temporally ironic.
He praised the past and offered a threshold of timelessness 
that allowed his listeners to appreciate and participate in 
the agrarian myth. However, he denied that regression 
because his view of the present and future asserted the 
necessity of progression and that techno-science was the 
remedy for the excessive march of agricultural blunders and 
lost profits. Thus, the overall effect of his textual 
context and the sense of prudence it helped project was 
irony and confusion.
Finally, to answer the third general question, placed 
within the broad context of nineteenth century rhetorical 
culture, Day and Kingsley's idea of prudence was both 
successful and not so successful. Again, I realize the 
label, "successful", is problematic. Nevertheless, when we 
consider the different readings Hall (1980) suggests are 
available to any audience member it makes more sense. What 
I mean is that a preferred reading, if such a reading 
emerges, illustrates a sense of success. Hence, Day and 
Kingsley were successful because their rhetoric captured and 
perpetuated the privileged role of the classically educated 
person in an oratorical, evangelical society.
Significantly, the sense of prudence that the Yale Report 
clung to and developed also helped Day and Kingsley advance 
their sense of prudence to many denominational schools in 
the West and, for the most part, staved off any major
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philosophical change for conservative colleges for many 
years. Yet, they also alienated practical education and 
made it difficult to believe that there was any other road 
to thorough education or godliness other than classical 
education. Thus, their representation of prudence was also 
unsuccessful because oppositional readings existed as well.
Like Day and Kingsley, Wayland was both successful and 
unsuccessful. I suggest that Wayland's prudential outlook 
and the way he enacted it through his rhetoric helped a 
broad, cultural persuasive effort. Wayland's sense of 
prudence aided his persuasive pursuit to democratize higher 
education in America because he borrowed it from an 
immensely popular public sentiment. While for the most part 
the faculty of Brown dismissed the report, as did many 
conservatives in the higher education scene, the general 
public seem to have accepted Wayland's idea of prudence.
Turner's enactment of prudence and rhetoric was 
important and, in a sense, successful because Morrill 
imitated it. While Morrill offered his own slant on the 
agrarian myth in his own speeches, it is my conjecture that 
Turner's idea of prudence still lived within Morrill's 
efforts. More specifically, Morrill, like Turner, promoted 
the symbolism of labor and the garden to afford the 
agrarian, in part, a mode of prudent conduct.
Morrill's rhetorical discourse is problematic because, 
while the bill did pass, the rhetoric and prudential 
perspective that Morrill implied did not readily help the
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process, nor did it lead to a coherent vision of what the 
measure might do. In practice, Morrill praised the zeal for 
commercialism; in ideology, he promoted an agrarian ideal. 
Morrill advocated two sides of agrarian identity: the 
traditional, mythic side, and the commercial, business side. 
He therefore produced a kind of agrarian schizophrenia. The 
act he advocated failed to block the tide of agrarian 
discontent. It did not halt the desire to leave the farm 
for the city. Morrill's act, and the notion of prudence 
that brought it about, seemingly institutionalized this 
agrarian schizophrenia. It contributed to the decline of a 
myth it tried to perpetuate.
IMPLICATIONS
It now comes time in my project to theorize about my 
findings. In order to do that I want to first consider my 
project from historical/pedagogical vantage point. Second,
I will speculate about the role of prudence by thinking 
about it in relation to several of the basic rhetorical 
canons and other important rhetorical concepts like the 
rhetorical agent, purpose, and audience.
We can see from a historical perspective how certain 
representations of prudence inhibited or facilitated certain 
ways of thinking about pedagogy. In fact, I suggest that 
the changes occurring within nineteenth century American 
higher education were generally a struggle between diverging 
conceptions of prudence in rhetorical action. The Morrill
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Act emerged out of a contest between divergent expressions 
of prudence.
For instance, the Yale Report and its representation of 
prudence helped facilitate neoclassical elitism, yet 
alienated classical pedagogy from mainstream democratic 
ideals. It inhibited a sense of legitimacy for practical, 
vocational pedagogical plans. However, Wayland's rhetoric 
and the style of prudence attached to it antagonized 
conservative educators and this idea illustrates the 
persuasiveness of his prudential outlook outside of the 
scene. Wayland's enactment of prudence facilitated future 
educational progressives through its discursive resource, 
but it inhibited his immediate task. He made little lasting 
progress at Brown. Thus, we can speculate that inside the 
pedagogical scene, the idea that literary education was 
sacred still persisted. The change could not come from 
within.
Turner’s embodiment of prudence facilitated his 
progressive ideas because he wanted to invent a totally new 
pedagogical system. He legitimized practical, vocation 
education, but his notion of prudence inhibited the fusion 
between vocational and classical studies; a fusion we are 
still having trouble with.
However, Morrill's understanding of prudence, tied to 
both Wayland's and Turner's, legitimized every and any 
pedagogical adventure. As I mentioned earlier, the debate 
about the historical and pedagogical value of the Morrill
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Act is ongoing. Ross (1942) reveals that the measure often 
invites "superlative encomiums of the measure as the 
'greatest act in the history of higher education'" (p. 67). 
Lucas (1996) disagrees when he reveals what he sees as the 
present-day outcome of Morrill's law. He says that today 
"one comes to the university to learn how to become a 
sanitation engineer, an information specialist, a financial 
analyst, a health-service coordinator. . .and so on ad 
nauseam..." (p. 67). I insist that the way Morrill talked 
about his measure helped lead to this contemporary state of 
things. The Morrill Act opened the wedge that led to 
excessive vocationalism. Morrill's speeches were 
significant moments of irony that illustrated a notion of 
pedagogical accommodation to cultural, commercial longings, 
while also romanticizing about the non-commercial. In 
short, Morrill, through his irony, surely made the 
implementation of his political practice difficult, but his 
way of pluralizing the agrarian character also facilitated a 
schizophrenia in higher education itself.
What I mean is that Morrill's rhetoric authorized 
plural voices within the walls of American higher education. 
I would not dare say that plurality is a bad thing.
However, it does confuse things. Look at most every 
administrative justification for any contemporary 
college/university course. Within those justifications are 
usually voices of communitarianism, individualism with a 
technical slant, and populism. The voices mix together in a
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contemporary pedagogical stew; they are all part of the
recipe and the product cannot exist without them. Burke
(1969) says that
True irony, humble irony, is based upon a sense of 
fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him 
[her] , is indebted to him [her] , is not merely outside 
him [her] as an observer but contains him [her] within, 
being consubstantial with him (p. 514, his emphasis) .
And these voices do not come and go, but exist always,
rising in intensity at certain historical moments, and then
fading, but to rise again.
This study also gives us several indications of how
rhetoric and prudence work together theoretically. One way
prudence and rhetoric interact is through the process of
invention. Rhetorical invention is the process of coming to
terms with the most persuasive strategies given the
opportunities and limitations of a situation at hand and the
communal, linguistic resources available to the rhetor.
Traditionally, the product of rhetorical invention is a
rhetorical performance: persuasive discourse in action. I
have argued that prudence orchestrates the process of
invention.
Hariman's (1991) idea of prudence as performance serves 
me well here. Again, he thinks that prudence is a 
performative virtue that rests in one's ability to master 
the nuances of rhetorical art, and perform a rhetorical 
script dramatically in order to move an audience. Prudence 
is not an explicit plan one can break off or separate from 
the performance of rhetoric. Prudence lives only in and
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through the creative endeavor of rhetorical discourse. 
Prudence lives in and through the stylistic and 
argumentative forces of a persuasive effort. Therefore, 
invention also lives only within rhetorical action. The 
rules for creative practice exist within the practice; or, 
at least, resources for invention are most readily found 
through observation of persuasive art. Hariman says that 
"prudence becomes a master code for successful performance 
within a community, and the use of prudence as a norm 
becomes a mean for maintaining the community's traditional 
alignment of its social practices" (p. 29) . The point, I 
think, is that invention is not a scientific process. Even 
though we have our text books and our hand books, invention 
as a creative, innovative endeavor springs from immersion in 
a rhetorical community.
This does not mean that rhetoric cannot be subversive, 
but that the potentiality for rhetorical success is guided 
from communal norms of prudent thinking, even while there 
are many different norms of implicit prudence. For 
instance, the potentiality for Wayland's rhetorical success 
lived within the communal norms of Jacksonian individualism 
and commercialism. These were cultural discourses Wayland's 
persuasive effort originated from and contributed to.
This study also says something about the relationship 
between prudence and rhetorical organization or form. To 
Burke (1931, 1968), rhetorical or artistic form leads an 
audience from one part of the performance to the next. The
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rhetor generates situational variables in a sort of plot 
moving forward to some end. The audience, then, begins to 
expect some happening and becomes aroused and persuaded 
through that expectation. Swartz (1996) says that "in 
experiencing an expectation, [an audience member] grows to 
identify with either the persuader or the ends of the 
communication" (p. 315) . Echoing Burke, Swartz also says 
that form helps define conditions of aesthetic or normative 
values within a culture. My point is that prudence often 
grows out of form. A sense of prudence promotes a certain 
expectation of outcome, in discourse and in political 
action, that ignites that notion of prudence to constantly 
be rediscovered in the process of invention.
We see in my study that prudence often emerged out of 
mythic form. When a speaker energized the agrarian myth 
through speech, the mythic sentiments invigorated a pre­
political narrative, the society that embraced the mythic 
symbols, and the individuals that perceived that they 
participated in that society and story. The best example of 
this was Turner's speech. His textual context was a mythic 
story. Again, his story was that the agrarian and working 
industrialist, living within a caste-system controlled by 
the classically learned, needed to re-make the American 
caste-system, with the aid of vocational education, in order 
to promote an educational order detached from political and 
ecclesiastical control. This was a hero's plot. Turner 
used it as an inventional resource and contributed to its
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persuasiveness. To live out the expectation would certainly
be, at least in Turner's mind, prudent.
Additionally, my study forces us to consider the
relationship between prudence, style and politics. Hariman
(1992) links politics with style:
Style becomes an analytical category for understanding 
a social reality; in order to understand the social 
reality of politics, we can consider how political 
action involves acting according to a particular 
political style. From this perspective, political 
events are produced within a social setting through 
conventions of artistic composition depending upon 
aesthetic reactions for persuasive effect (p. 151, his 
emphasis).
The understanding of a certain political style depends on an 
understanding of decorum within that political scene.
Again, decorum and prudence are similar. Where decorum 
accounts for situational obligation, prudence accounts for 
the representation of how one comes to terms with those 
obligations. A notion of decorum assumes a certain style, 
and a representation of prudence enacts that style. Thus, 
we can speculate that prudence is, in part, a type of style.
To Hariman (1992) , the courtly style of political 
action and power took shape through explicit norms of 
decorum, like the performance of hierarchy, self-conscious 
ceremonies, and the like. Day and Kingsley supplied an 
embodiment of prudence that was somewhat courtly. The 
authors used refined speech to promote a refined type of 
pedagogy. They performed hierarchy through their metaphors 
and used conventions of address developed socially through 
Dwight's discourses. Wayland's style was different, it was
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a bit more "middling," as Cmiel (1990) might say. Turner's 
style was middling. Morrill's style was too. However, both 
Turner and Morrill gave slight impressions of a technical 
style. Turner's style was particularly interesting because 
he performed what I have called an anti-intellectualism in 
order to shed himself of his classical roots. Morrill tried 
to adhere to this style, but had to adhere to the decorum of 
Congress. It might be that pedagogical change must 
discursively take shape through a subversion of stylistic 
norms in light of its conservative scene. Turner was cruel 
to be kind. His rhetoric was prudent for his particular 
occasion, but certainly some might perceive it as imprudent 
within the expanded scene of mid-nineteenth century American 
higher education. Thus, I suppose we can say that a sense 
of imprudence is often strategic stylistically, though one 
runs the risk of alienating particular audiences in that 
process. Wayland exhibited this idea as well.
This study of prudence also pursues a richer 
understanding of the complicated relationship between a 
rhetorical text and its immediate rhetorical situation, and 
between the persuasive text and its broader cultural 
context. As mentioned earlier, Jasinski (1997) recovers 
Wicheln's (1925) bifurcated sense of rhetorical context. On 
the one hand, there is an impression that audience and 
occasion bind rhetoric through certain "exigencies" and 
situational "constraints" (Bitzer, 1968). This first sense 
of context "functions as a prison cell that contains
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advocate and text" (Jasinski, 1997, p. 199). However, there 
is another, broader view of context. This widened, cultural 
sense of context saturates the text "as the result of 
organic process of emergence and development" (p. 200) .
There is, then, a specific rhetorical situation, but also a 
cultural context through which a text is not necessarily 
inhibited by the hyper-particular, but the wave of 
intellectual, institutional, political, religious, and 
economic forces that take shape through linguistic effort. 
This linguistic context lives in and through textual 
performance. Jasinski's point is that there is 
intentionality in a text, but also contextual manifestations 
of a broader cultural grammar embedded in that text, but not 
necessarily out of authorial purpose.
Hence, culture and situation bifurcate prudence. We 
can get an idea of a hyper-particularized sense prudence, 
but also a cultural, traditional conceptualization of 
prudence manifested in the rhetoric's broader symbolism. 
Thus, while traditionalists see prudence as particularized, 
we might speculate that there are two sets of prudence: 
"situational prudence" and "cultural prudence". My point is 
that a rhetor might have a specific idea of prudence in mind 
for the situation, but a reader might pick up another, 
perhaps an opposed sense of prudence within that discourse.
I agree with Wilson (1998) that the textual context is 
certainly not the same as the rhetorical situation, but I 
also think that the temporal movement within the text
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illustrates how the rhetor or rhetors see the practical 
wisdom of a particularized political or pedagogical policy. 
Yet, the performance of prudence, though it is a coveted and 
contested space, depends on a traditional, cultural idea of 
prudence. A cultural representation of prudence necessarily 
resides within the text, even as a rhetor might subvert it 
for a particularized rhetorical goal.
We can also theorize that, in light of Morrill, some 
modes of prudence within rhetoric might be more open than 
others. Again, Morrill used synecdoche, filiopiety, and the 
agrarian myth as rhetorical resources for persuasive ends. 
Implied within those symbolic gestures was an idea of 
prudence. However, at the same time, Morrill supplied a 
conception of prudence linked to the commercialism of his 
day. This confused things. It generated an irony. I 
realize that irony can be strategic, but we can speculate 
that if there are two competing understandings or styles of 
prudence within a text, then it is doubtful if the rhetor 
can be overly successful because the interpretation is too 
open. That is to say that even while interpretations of 
prudence are always open, some rhetorical discourses open 
themselves up more than others.
We can also better speculate about the role of the 
rhetorical agent from a theoretical/historical perspective. 
Again, during the first few decades of the nineteenth 
century, the mainstay of the neo-classical rhetorical 
culture helped create a communitarian ethos. Day and
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Kingsley's rhetoric exemplified this. Nevertheless, the 
process of building moral consensus through rhetoric gave 
way to the orator building up his or her own identity. 
Wayland illustrated this, so did Turner. The public arena 
became a place to promote an individualized personality.
My dissertation thus illustrates the relationship between 
authorial ideas of prudence and communal conceptions of 
prudence. We can see in my texts a move away from a refined 
style of speech and communal ethos, toward an 
individualistic ethos through a search for pedagogical 
autonomy. Again, this change also illustrated the 
variability of prudence. In short, ethos is tied to 
prudence, and both are tied to communal notions of selfness.
When can also speculate about the role of prudence on 
the nature of rhetorical purpose. I suggest that embedded 
in any rhetorical message is a "prudential purpose, " and in 
line with Jasinski (1997), it does not necessarily have to 
be intentional. We can, in a way, remove the agent to 
highlight a prudential purpose, apart from a specific, 
policy outcome, in order to interpret a perception of 
prudential conduct and appropriate discursive conduct that 
the rhetoric implies and/or explicates. An audience member 
might interpret an idea of prudence the author has not 
intended from a cultural, traditional stand-point.
Therefore, a cultural sense of prudence seems to be more 
polysemic than a situational sense of prudence, but it is 
never fully so.
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Hence, we can say the there is also a strong 
relationship between prudence and an audience. Again, 
prudence is pretty much up for grabs. It is, as Wilson 
(1998) charges, a contested space. Audiences, or specific 
audience members, can read prudence from a preferred 
reading, a negotiated, or even an oppositional. But even as 
rhetors try to "fix" prudence within the discourse, there 
are always communal notions of prudences that audience 
members can cling to despite the rhetoric they have 
received. Hence, I think this idea is a bit different, and 
an elaboration on Wilson's thinking.
THE PROBLEM WITH PRUDENCE 
The real problem with prudence is that it is a concept 
that does not allow itself to be put on a specific shelf, in 
a particular file, in a unique scheme. Prudence is as 
prudence does. Because of the nature of the dissertation as 
a learning process, I want here to offer my own thoughts, my 
final conclusions about the nature of prudence and its 
impact on rhetoric and nineteenth century American higher 
education. To do so, I will ask several important 
questions, but try, in my humble way, to answer them.
First, is understanding prudence from an academic 
stance important? My answer is, of course, yes. I outlined 
why I think my study is important in my first chapter, but I 
missed something. If we comb through any contemporary 
newspaper we can find "prudence" all over the place. It is 
even in our popular media. A character on the popular
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television series, "Saturday Night Live," made the word 
famous when he constantly mimicked former president George 
Bush in the late 1980's and early 90's. The famous line:
"It wouldn’t be prudent." It seems that, in its 
contemporary usage, to be imprudent means to be 
unaccountable, not informed, and the like. Much like the 
contemporary use of the word "rhetoric, " the term "prudence" 
or "imprudent" is apparently another mindless "catch word" 
in a political environment over-populated with such "catch 
words." Rhetorical scholars need to re-introduce a more 
sophisticated way of thinking about words and discourse to 
the general political process.
Next, does prudence exist before discourse? My answer 
is yes and no. I do not think that an idea of prudence 
exists without a mode of prudence already articulated, if 
only implicitly, in a rhetorical community. However, an 
audience cannot deem a discourse prudent until it exists.
The process, if it is a process, is cyclical and 
interactive.
Third, is prudence just an interpretation done by an 
audience? Where is prudence? This question echoes the 
previous question, and it is a difficult one to answer. I 
think that prudence is both a strategic endeavor, but also 
up for grabs by an audience. A rhetor wants to be prudent; 
even if being imprudent is prudent. Often times doing what 
is not appropriate is appropriate and strategic. Thus, a 
rhetor always attempts to be prudent, but the rhetor' s
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prudence has a double life. It is prudent, in some way, to 
the speaker, but an audience must also scrutinize that 
prudence.
Another question: Are speakers conscious of prudence?
I would never be so arrogant as to explicitly state that I 
can delve into the mind of a speaker. However, I would 
speculate, in line with by previous paragraph, that a rhetor 
attempts to be prudent. The rhetor might not call it 
"prudence," but nonetheless, I would suggest there is always 
an urge in a speaker to do something that will result in 
rhetorical success. However, I do not think that, for 
example. Day and Kingsley thought to themselves, "Gee, it 
would be prudent to use Dwight’s discursive elements of 
'taste' and 'genius 1 here."
Is there a difference between prudent discourse and 
prudent action and behavior? My answer is yes. Throughout 
my dissertation I have attempted to illustrate that 
discursive practice and political action are closely 
aligned. One must talk the talk to walk the walk. However, 
I do think that one can have a prudent action in mind, but 
be imprudent in discursive practice, or vice versa.
Another thing that I must ask myself to consider is the 
relationship between "common sense" and prudence. Are they 
the same thing? Perhaps. There is a sense that prudence is 
not a "book smart" concept, but a "street smart" process. 
However, both "common sense" and "prudence" are communal to
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the extent that they depend on popular opinion or resolve to 
give them life.
Also: What is the role of rhetorical imitation in all
this? As "common sense" has it, imitation is the best form 
of flattery. Thus, imitation illustrates a reception of 
discursive practice and/or political action as prudent. I 
doubt a rhetor would imitate something he or she found 
imprudent.
Finally, what is the role of prudence and rhetoric on 
historical and contemporary higher education? This is an 
important question. I have argued that the struggle over 
nineteenth century higher education was struggle between 
norms or prudence. I think struggles of prudence are 
foundational to cultural change and new discursive 
practices. What emerged in Morrill's rhetoric were plural 
voices of prudence. This opened a wedge. We have now many 
voices of pedagogical prudence. We have a synthetic, almost 
pastiche mode of higher education. However, in line with 
Burke, this is all processive. Again, periods of history do 
not come and go, but shine, and do not shine so brightly. 
Burke (1969) thinks that what rises inevitably falls, but 
comes back later. This is his "over-all ironic formula" (p. 
517) . The voices we have in contemporary American higher 
education are in dialectic. We can, even now in the first 
year of 2000, see that the more well-rounded, thoroughly 
educated graduates are the types employers prize. Perhaps 
Day and Kingsley's communitarianism is once again intense.
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
More research on rhetoric, prudence, and nineteenth 
century higher education must take place to better equip 
ourselves to think about the Morrill Act and its historical 
and contemporary consequences from a rhetorical perspective. 
Further, we also need to improve our understanding of 
prudence and rhetoric theoretically. I suggest three 
specific modes of future research.
First, I would suggest that rhetorical scholars focus 
on other texts that provide information about the prudence 
of both classical and practical education during this early 
period of American higher education. For instance, a 
scholar could study specific educational plans from the 
agricultural presses. These plans might include the ones 
from the People's College, the State Agricultural College in 
New York, the Michigan Agricultural College, the Farmer's 
High School in Pennsylvania, to mention just a few. Apart 
from specific pedagogical plans, one might study the 
prudence of classical and practical education by analyzing 
the ongoing debates in the journals of that era. One could 
analyze the debates in, for instance, the Rural New Yorker, 
The Country Gentleman, the American Agriculturist, or the 
New England Farmer, again, to mention just a few.
Second, one could study the specific state plans for 
utilizing the money reaped from the land grant after the 
Civil War. Ross (1942) bolsters the point I made about 
Morrill's prudential conflict when he says that "The
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possibilities of this plan of national aid [the Morrill Act] 
were only to be manifested in the course of time as the 
states utilized it in accord with their particular 
conditions and needs" (p. 67). The state debates, 
therefore, on how to manage the process would be very 
interesting to analyze.
Third, in accordance with Lucas (1996), I propose that 
contemporary pedagogical perspectives about curriculum have 
roots in some of the basic ideas of the Land Grant movement, 
and specifically in Morrill's ironic sense of prudence. It 
would be interesting to analyze contemporary persuasive 
messages that call for certain pedagogical policies and 
compare them to historical ones.
Apart from these three ideas, trying out the 
implications I have supplied from a theoretical and 
methodological stance would improve the way we theorize 
about prudence, rhetoric, and interpret both historic and 
contemporary pedagogical schemes.
Understanding the role of prudence in rhetorical 
discourse, no matter the method, is important. Certainly, 
it is significant in the understanding of political and 
cultural change, but also understanding pedagogical change. 
The focus on prudence, rhetoric and persuasive pedagogical 
messages will help us more fully understand how we talk 
about pedagogy, how we enact that pedagogy, and how we 
transform pedagogical perspectives.
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